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SUMMARY
An analysis of special economic dependency and preferential 
rights as claimed in respect of fishery resources is the topic of 
this thesis* The overall purpose of the study is to assess the 
legal recognition which has been accorded to the concepts by inter­
national law and European Community law respectively. Initially 
the concepts are examined within the context of international law*
The development and recognition of special economic dependency and 
preferential rights by the international community are examined in 
detail, especially as the International Court of Justice confidently 
asserted, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland)
Case in-1974, that both concepts were international customary law.
The conclusion drawn from the examination is, however, that neither 
concept has attained the status of international law. Nevertheless, 
because it has proved politically expedient, the concepts have been 
recognised as important considerations to be taken account of in 
fishery negotiations. Similarly, under European Community law the 
conclusion again is that while both concepts have been recognised they 
are not recognised as legal concepts which may be invoked as of right. 
The concepts accordingly cannot be dismissed and the question as to 
when claims of special economic dependency and preferential rights 
may be successful is considered. Considered, that is, by reference 
to international law, European Community law and occasionally municipal 
law. The raison d'etre for this, as constantly stressed throughout 
the text, is that although a concept adopted by one legal system need 
not necessarily be characterised in the same way by another legaü. 
system, legal systems do interrelate. Interrelation will be all the 
more probable if concepts of the same name are utilised to express
(iii)
similar factual situations. Special dependency claims are, 
therefore, examined to see whether a factual resemblance may be 
identified between claimants in different legal systems. In respect 
of preferential rights, possible ways of their being articulated so 
as to give expression to special dependency are considered, with the 
conclusion being dravm that preferential rights should not be defined 
only in terms of preferential rights of access to fish stocks. A 
broad definition is required if specially dependent regions are to 
reap any long-term benefit from being granted preferential rights.
The relevance of this study may be thought by some to be minimal 
in respect of international law. However, although claims of special 
economic dependency and preferential rights have receded with the 
establishment of 200 mile fishing/economic zones, Article yi of the 
1981 Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea does provide that a coastal 
State may derogate from granting access to other States if its "economy 
is overvrhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of the living resources 
of its exclusive economic zone." It is anticipated, therefore, that 
in the li^t of such a provision, special economic dependency and 
preferential rights will gain fresh relevance under international 
law. As far as European Community law is concerned, any study of 
the concepts should be welcome because although it does not solve the 
problems currently confronting those responsible for negotiating a 
common fisheries policy, it does at least highlight those ways in 
which the concepts may be accommodated within the Community system 
and how through the interrelation of legal systems acceptable means 
of expression may be found.
The law is as of 3I December I98I.
(iv)
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to assess the legal recognition which 
has been accorded to the concepts of "special economic dependency" and 
"preferential rights" as claimed in respect of fishery resources. 
Attention will be focused particularly on the legal recognition afforded 
to the concepts by international law and European Community law with 
conclusions being dratm on the nature of the recognition accorded by 
the two different legal systems,
37he International Court of Justice in 1974 pronounced that ;
"[[T^ wo concepts have crystallised a.s customary law in recent 
years arising out of the general consensus revealed at that 
Conference (i960 Law of the Sea Conference), The first is 
the concept of the fishery zone .., The second is the con­
cept of preferential rights of fishing in Eidjacent waters, 
in favour of the coastal State in a situation of special 
dependency on its coastal fisheries
The Intei^national Court gave judicial recognition to "special 
economic dependency" and "preferential rd-ghts" as concepts of custormry 
international law. Subsequent State practice has not, however, borne 
out the Court's declaration as being true. This will be illustrated 
in a critical analysis of the Court's judgaient, in which the status of 
"special economic dependency" and "preferential riglits" under inter­
national law is assessed.
Has not the advent of the 200 mile zone, be it an exclusive economic 
zone or a fisheries zone, negated arguments of "special economic depend­
ency" and demands for "preferential rights"? Wliy should the concepts 
be examined now that it is accepted that coa-stal States may claim a 200 
mile zone? Is such a study one only of academic interest with no 
practical application for those currently responsible for initiating 
fishery management schemes? The answer to those questions must be in
the negative. The concepts may have lost their apparent relevsjice on 
the international plane; nevertheless, they are neither dead nor 
redundant. They ai% re-emerging in negotiations relating to the 
"share out" of fishery resources from a comion pool.
The Member States of the EEC on 1 January 1977 extended their 
fishing limits in the North Atlantic to 200 miles, Ejcternally the 
Community appears as one coastal State. An internal fisheries policy, 
which accommodates the principles of equal access and non-discrimination 
in the exploitation of the common pool, is still being sought. Dero­
gation from the application of these principles is being claimed by 
coastal communities which allegedly demonstrate a "special economic 
dependency" on fisheries. Such a dependency, it is advocated, shou].d 
lead to the granting of preferential slights in respect of access to 
fish stocks.
Newfoundland is arguing for preferential rights vis;^yi^ otlier 
eastern Canadian provinces while a similar claim may be anticipated from 
Prince Edward Island. Newfoundland justifies such a claim by a depend­
ency on fisheries not demonstrated by the other eastern maritime States,
"Special economic dependency" and "preferential rights" have been 
revitalised albeit in new fora. It does not follow, of course, that 
concepts reappearing in either a supranational legal context or a 
municipal legal context will be defined and articulated in the same way 
as they have been in international law. Nevertheless, legal systems do 
interrelate and such interrelation may be all the more ob\dous when con­
cepts with the same name are invoked to handle similar factual situations.
Preferential rights were said to apply under international law when 
a State demonstrated a special economic dependency on fisheries; and
3now once more, albeit within a different context, a special economic 
dependency on fisheries is claimed as justification for preferential 
rights.
Hay not the fora which are witnessing such claims and seeking a
means to give them effect to a lesser or greater extent look to how the
concepts of "special economic dependency" and "preferential rights" were
characterised and articulated, on the international scene? The need to
look to other legal systems has been recognised by the International
Court of Justice* In 1970 for instance the Court declared ;
"If the Court were to decide the case in disregard of the 
relevant institutions of municipal law it would lose touch 
with reality, for there are no corresponding institutions 
of international law to which the Court could resort *..
It is to rules generally accepted by municipal legal 
systems *.. and not to the municipal law of a particular 
State, that international law refers,,"(2)
"Special economic dependency" and "preferential rights" have male 
a fresh appearance within new fora* Nevertheless, it is suggested 
that, in an attempt to define a,nd legitimise the concepts within such a 
fora, reference may be made to the characterisation and articu3..ation of 
the concepts on the international plane. The utilisation of the con­
cepts on the international stage may indeed have relevance for other 
legal systems. Those seeking to establish recognition of "special 
economic dependency" and "preferential rights" may highlight instances 
where international law has acknowledged "special economic dependency" 
and where "preferential rî.ghts" were accordingly granted. In. other 
words, a factual resembla,nce between claimants of "special economic 
dependency" in different legal systems may^be demonstrated. Nor are 
the concepts totally extinct under international law,
A first perusal of the Draft Convention on the Lai^r of the Sea may 
suggest that "special economic dependency" and "preferential rights" are.
with the advent of the 200 mile exclusive economic zone, dead concepts
under international, law* A closer examination of the articles governing
access to the coastal State's exclusive economic zone demonstrates
othen-rise* Under the Draft Convention where the coastal State is
unable to harvest the entire allowable catch of the exclusive economic
(3)zone, other States are to be granted access to the s u r p l u s , N e v e r ­
theless, although "land-locked States" and "States with special geograph­
ical conditions" are to enjoy rights of exploitation in respect of the 
resources of the exclusive economic zone,^^^ such participation is to 
be regulated so as to "avoid effects detrimental to fishing communities
( K )
or fishing industries of the coastal State,"' ' Such a condition will, 
it is submitted, involve quantifying the dependency of a fishing community 
on its fisheries. This will be necessarj'’ before any possible detrimental 
economic effect on the community concerned may be assessed* A coastal 
State may under the Draft Convention be exempted from granting access to 
other States on the grounds that its "economy is overwhelmingly dependent 
on the exploitation of the living resources of its exclusive economic 
zone."^^^ Derogation is allowed in explicitly defined circumstances. 
The Draft Convention does not, however, provide any definition as to 
what is to constitute "oven/he]jningly dependent". Yet a State invoking 
Article 71 will have to substantiate such a claim.
Consequently, it is suggested that reference will be made to the 
recognition of "overwhelmingly dependent" within other legal systems.
The application of "special economic dependency" and "preferential 
rights" within a regional/quasi«federal or municipal context may be 
relevant in resolving future disputes which may arise between a coastal 
State and other States over access to the former's exclusive economic 
zone. The interaction between international- law and regional/municipal 
legal systems may currently appear to operate down from international
5law to European Community law or municipal law. This, however, need 
not be necessaxdly true in the future. It is very possible in the 
light of the provisions in the Draft Convention that the articulation 
of "special economic dependency" and "preferential rights" shall have 
repercussions for international law or at least for those regional 
arrangements which are the concern of international law.
Interrelation between the international legal system and other 
legal orders will be identified in the following examination of "special 
economic dependency" and "preferential rights".
Essentially, what this study Involves is an examination of the 
legal recognition which has been awarded to "special economic dependency" 
and "preferential rights". Both concepts will be examined within the 
context of international law and European Community law and occasional 
reference will be made to municipal legal systems. In the course of 
assessing the legsd recognition that has been awarded to "special economic 
dependency" and "preferential rights", an attempt will be made to define 
these concepts as they are seen to exist. The study opens with a 
chronological account of the seaward,s extension ly coastal States of 
their fishing limits. The study then narrows to concentrate on the 
evolution of claims to "preferential rights", Tliei'eafter the concepts 
are examined separately. Both concepts are considered in the light of 
the International Court’s judgment which enunciated not only the 
characterisation and articulation of the concepts, but the conditions 
under which the concepts could be invoked. Problems, actual and 
potential, associated vrith both concepts are discussed. In respect 
of "special economic dependency", particular insta,nces which have given 
and which are giving rise to claims for preferential rights are considered 
The object of such an examination is to see if some general conclusions
may be drawn as to what constitutes or may constitute "special economic 
dependency". The Chapter on "preferential rights" concludes by looking 
at possible means of giving expression to "preferential, rights" in 
practical terms. Attention is then focused on the particular problems 
which the claims of "special economic dependency" are creating for the 
EEC. The Chapter devoted to the EEC considers in detail the extent to 
which the Community has accepted the concepts of "special economic 
dependency" and "preferential rights", and the way they are understood 
within a Community context, Tlie final Chapter of the study is concerned 
with the conclusions which may be drawn from the material examined in 
the earlier Chapters.
Footnotes
(l) Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v Iceland) Merits 
IGJ Reports 1974p 3 at 23,
(2) Barcelona Tract!cn, Light and Power Company Case (Belgium v Spain), 
ICJ Reports 1970, 3 at 37,
(3) Article 62(2) Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, 4
éâ/1 78.if7 in *ifummm «»t#
(4) Articles 69(1) and 70(1).
(5) Articles 69(2)(a) and 70(3)(a).
(6 ) Article 71,
CHAPTER ONE
The Seaward Extension of Fishery Limits*
Historical Persnective
The following traces chronologically from the seventeenth century
to the present day the extension seawards by coastal States of their
fishery limits,
"... God appointed the fishes to swarm along the British
coasts at certain seasons. It is a benefit God has
granted to the British people, V/hy should they be '
hindered from possessing it? Other nations may share
in this advantage, but only by the same law by which
they possess their own, that is by a just price. As
matters stand, the British are being robbed of their
rights."
William Welwood made this assertion in the early seventeenth 
(2)
century^  ^when he held as responsible for this denial of British rights 
"the continued inundation of foreign fishermen."
( 2)
Welwood may have been the first' to articulate the antecedent of 
the exclusive fisheries zone, but it was only in the middle of the 
twentieth century that the concept was developed in response to an 
imperative need to control fishing effort. As long, though, as the 
resources of the sea were characterised as inexhaustible, fishing 
activity was freely enjoyed and did not require regulation.
The characterisation of the sea's resources as inexhaustible and 
freely available to all, was the essence of Grotius* treatise, Mare 
Liberum, p u b l i s h e d  in I609. In that work, he argued that the high 
seas could not be apportioned for the exclusive use of either any nation 
or person, Grotius initially dealt with the freedom of navigation, but 
subsequently focused his attention on fisheries and contended that "the 
same principle which applies to navigation applies also to fishing, 
namely, that it remains free and open to all,"
Grotius* treatise did not escape criticism, Welwood in Dominio 
Maris drew a distinction between the liberty of navigation and the 
liberty of fishing and challenged Grotius * assumption that apparently 
the resources of the ocean were inexhaustible, John Selden in his 
workp Mare Clausum,expressed a view contrary to Grotius and argued
thatp not only was the sea capable of dominion and appropriation, but 
that the exercise of such dominion and appropriation neither violated 
the law of nature nor the law of nations,
"Mare liberum" supporters did concede that a State should enjoy 
some control over its adjacent coastal waters and the seeds were thus 
sown for the doctrine of the territorial sea to develop. The nature 
and extent of a State's rights within its territorial sea evolved 
gradually with a common limit for defence and fisheries emerging only 
in the middle eighteenth century,
In the nineteenth century, coastal. States increasingly in bi-lateral
and multi-lateral agreements recognised exclusive fishing limits. The
Anglo-French Convention 1839 provided:
"the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty shall enjoy the 
exclusive right of fishery within the distance of three 
miles from the low-water mark, along the whole extent 
of the coasts of the British Islands; and the subjects 
of the King of France shall enjoy the exclusive right
of fishery within the distance of three miles from
low“Water mark, along the whole extent of the coasts
of France,"(8)
Article II of the 1882 Convention for Regulating the Police of the North
sea Fisheriesprovided, iuber alia, that;
"The fishermen of each country shall enjoy the exclusive 
right of fishery within the distance of three miles from 
low-water mark along the whole extent of the coasts of 
their respective countries, as well as of dependent 
islands and banks ..."
In 1901, Article II of the Convention between the United Kingdom ajid
Denmark for Regulating the Fisheries Outside Territorial Waters in the
10
Ocean Surrounding the Faroe Islands and Iceland,provided that:
"The subjects of His Majesty the King of Denmark shall 
enjoy the exclusive right of fishery within the distance 
of three miles from low-water mark along the whole 
extent of the coasts of the said islands, as well as 
of the dependent islets, rocks and banks ..."
By the beginning of the twentieth century, in the delimitation of 
exclusive fishery limits, there was increasing evidence in favour of a 
three mile rule as measured from the low-water mark (the Scandinavian 
countries continued to adhere to a four mile limit^^^^). Fisheries 
regulation was regarded as an incident of a coastal State's jurisdiction 
over its territorial sea. Although the idea of a separate fisheries 
zone independent of the territorial sea was present in the minds of a
(12)few jurists,' ' any extension of national jurisdiction beyond the 
territorial sea was for the purpose of enforcing either customs or 
fiscal legislation,
A separate fisheries zone in which the coastal State would exercise 
authority, but authority of a different kind from that exercised in the 
territorial sea, was considered at the 1930 Conference for the Codifi­
cation of International L a w . ^  The Conference failed to produce an 
acceptable uniform limit for fisheries; but fisheries jurisdiction as 
an aspect of a coastal State's jurisdiction over its territorial sea 
was discussed and it was mooted^^^^ that it mi^t be a "subject for 
consideration whether the rules for controlling fisheries in territorial 
waters could not be extended to certain areas outside these limits,
Between the I930 Conference and 1945 there was little action, either 
international or national, on fishexdes. A few countries did claim a 
fisheries zone beyond the territorial sea and where this was done the 
maximum limit was twelve nautical miles from the c o a s t . T h e  norm 
at the end of the 1930s, therefore, was for States to have no fisheries
11
jurisdiction beyond the favoured three mile breadth of territorial sea. 
1945 to 1970
The conclusion of the Second World War witnessed an increase in 
the intensity of fishing activ*ity. Technological advances led to the 
rapid expansion of fishing fleets and the equally rapid depletion of 
the fish stocks, which had reached new levels as a result of the "fallow" 
reduced fishing years of the War. The establishment of the United 
Nations Specialised Agency, Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), 
reflected to some extent a recognition that fisheries resources should 
be managed on an international basis. The Truman Declaration in 1945 
heralded the commencement of the coastal State movement seawards. The 
Declaration of 28 September 1945^^^^ provided that conservation zones 
were to be established by the United States in "those areas of the high 
sea^ contiguous to the coasts of the United States." These zones, 
because of "the pressing need for conservation and protection of fishery 
resources", were necessary in those coastal areas "wherein fishing 
activities have been, or in the future may be, developed and maintained 
on a substantial scale." In the event of those fishing activities 
being pursued, either in the past or in the future, by American nationals, 
the United States declared its intention to "establish explicitly boimded 
conservation zones in which fishing activities shall be subject to the 
regulation and control of the United States," In respect of the fishing 
activities between foreign nationals, conservation zones were to bo 
established "under agreements between the United States and such other 
States" while all fishing in such zones was to be "subject to regulation 
and control as provided in such agreements." The Declaration recognised 
the right of any State to establish similar conservation zones based on 
the same principles enumerated in the Declaration, provided that is,
JL4:
that recognition was given to "any fishing interests of nationals of the 
United States which may exist in such areas,"
There was, in 19^5, recognition that a need to conserve fishery 
stocks might demand a zone, contiguous to the territorial sea, in which 
a coastal State could reserve fishing exclusively for nationals and for 
foreign fishermen fishing in the area. In other word.s, derogation from 
the norm was permissible if (a) the state of the stocks was such that 
action to preserve them was necessary, and (b) if the interests of 
other" States concerned were recognised and safeguarded l)y the coastal 
State " i.e. the rights of the coastal States were not to extinguish 
those of other States,
The Truman Proclamation was followed in 19^7 by Chile's claim of 
national sovereignty over a zone 200 miles from its coasts and offshore 
i s l a n d s , T h e  Chilean extension in turn paved the way for a similar 
extension by two other Latin American countries, Peru^^^^ and Ecuador,
In the late 1940s extra territorial waters jurisdiction was limited 
to South Ajmerican countries. Nevertheless although there was no wide­
spread assa,ult on the high seas, the seeds of such an assault were being
(22)GOTm,^ ^
The next important development in respect of coastal State juris­
diction was the judgment of the International court of Justice in the 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (UK v Norway) 1951*^^^^ This judgment 
was important in that it was held that the method employed for the 
delimitation of the fisheries zone by the Royal Norwegian Decree of 
12 July 1935 was "not contrary to international law", and that the 
"baselines fixed by the said Decree in application of the said method"
(25)were not contrary to international law.' ^  The importance of the
13
judgment lay in what was decided about the location of baselines with
respect to the measurement of the territorial sea, and as a State's
fisheries jurisdiction was still largely dependent upon the extent of
its territorial sea the choice of baselines was important for fisheries
jurisdiction* Although not the subject of uniform international
regulation, the International Court declared that nevertheless;
"the delimitation of sea areas has always an inter­
national aspect [and] it cannot be dependent merely 
upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in 
its municipal l a w , "(26)
The criteria used and the method employed to determine the breadth of
the territorial sea had to be those recognised by other members of the
international community,
(
Rather than measure the territorial sea from the low«water mark,' ^
Norway employed the so-called "baseline system" and a.ccordingly enclosed 
as territorial seas waters which would othervrise have been high seas,^^^^
The British challenged, not only the legality of the straight 
baseline system, but the choice of certain baselines used in its 
application, The Court, however, concluded that on the facts before 
it, a solution delimiting the Nonfegian territorial sea must be deter­
mined by "geogra,phical realities" and held that;
"The real question in the choice of baselines is in 
effect whether certain sea areas lying within these 
lines are sufficiently closely linked to the land 
domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters.
This idea, which is at the basis of the determination 
of the rules relating to bays, should be liberally 
applied in the case of a coast, the geographical con­
figuration of which is as unusual as that of Non-ray,"
The Court concluded that international law should take "into 
account the diversity of facts and therefore, concede that the drawing 
of baselines must be adapted to the special conditions obtaining in 
different regions", and the Norvregian system was not an infringement
14
of international law, but rather, "an adaptation rendered necessa.ry by 
lo^al conditions,"
The Court’s judgment was important regarding the method to be 
employed in delimiting a coastal State’s territorial sea and to this 
extent was important for fisheries jurisdiction. Fisheries jurisdiction 
was an integnral part of territorial waters jurisdiction and consequently 
on the basis of the Court’s judgment a State could in certain circum­
stances extend its fisheries jurisdiction via the employment of straight 
baselines.
Following the Court’s ruling, Iceland, in 1952, issued regulations 
extending her exclusive fishing zone from three to four miles and 
established a new set of straight baselines from which the outer limit 
of the new zone was to be m e a s u r e d , T h e  Court’s judgment was 
codified in the 1958 Convention on the Terri tori a.l Sea and Contiguous 
Zone, which currently still forms part of the existing treaty law on 
the law of the sea.
The 1950s saw, under international law, the recognition of when 
and in what circumstances derogation from the application of the low- 
water mark method in measuring the territorial sea might be allowed.
There still remained an absence of ag3:'eement on the breadth of a State’s 
coastal waters. The International Law Commission preparing for the 
proposed 1958 Law of the Sea Conference recognised this and declared 
that "international practice is not unifom as regards the delimitation 
of the territorial Although, not recommending any particular
uniform length, the International Law Commission when preparing the 
draft Articles declared that in its opinion, "international law does 
not permit an extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles,"
The ILG did not, however, recommend or even suggest the possibility of
15
(32)a fishing zone extending beyond the territorial sea*'
Miat were the possible options avai3.able to the Conference? Two
years before the opening session of the 1958 Conference, the Canadian
Government had proposed in the W  General Assembly a three plus nine
formula, vizi a three mile territorial sea and a nine mile contiguous 
( 33)fishing zone,' ' and this proposal was formally submitted by the
Canadians to the 1958 C o n f e r e n c e , T h e  Canadian Government favoured
the retention of a narrow territorial sea with a separate fishing zone,
whereas the United Kingdom, acknowledging that "there was no prospect
( 35)of securing agreement on the retention of the three mile limit", 
sought a compromise and gave its support to the United State's proposal 
of a six plus six formula. This was a six mile territorial sea with 
a six mile fishing zone beyond, in which the fishing rights of other 
States would be recognised. Recognised, that is, if they hsd fished 
there during the previous five years* Canada opposed this reference 
respecting traditional fishing rights on the grounds that such rights 
had no place under international law. Accordingly, when the initial 
Canadian proposal was ifithdrawn from the First Committee dealing with 
the territorial sea, Canada co-sponsored a proposal with India and 
Mexico, calling for a six mile territorial sea plus a six mile exclusive 
(emphasis added) fishing zone. The proposal did contain the caveat 
that if a State had declared a territorial sea between six and twelve 
miles prior to the opening of the 1958 Conference, that width would also 
be acceptable. However, this proposal was quickly withdravm and a new 
Canadian proposal for a simple six mile exclusive fishing zone was sub­
stituted. A territorial sea in excess of six miles, rega.rdless of when 
claimed, was not to be recognised. Only the fishing zone proposals 
passed the First Committee* In the final voting in plenary, four 
proposals were submitted in respeçt of a formula for a territorial sea
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and/or fishing zone, viz:
(!) the Canadian proposal on a fishing zone only;
(li) the six mile territorial sea plus a six mile fishing 
zone (vrith recognition of other States* rights) pro­
posed by the United States;
(iii) an Eight Power sponsored proposal by Asian and
Latin American countries calling for a twelve mile 
territorial sea and if this was not acceptable, a 
twelve mile fishing zone; and
(iv) a Soviet proposal providing that every State should 
enjoy the discretion to declare the width of its 
own territorial sea between a distance of three and 
twelve miles.
None of the proposed were s u c c e s s f u l . T h e  1958 Conference 
consequently failed to define the breadth of the territorial sea of a 
fishing zone. The 1958 Conference did acknowledge the concept of a 
contiguous zone adjacent to the territorial sea, the maximum breadth of 
which was not to exceed "twelve miles from the baseline from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is to be m e a s u r e d , H o w e v e r ,  the 
powers of the coastal State within the contiguous zone were confined to 
those necessary to*
"(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immi­
gration, or sanitary regulations within its territory, 
or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed 
vrithin its territory, or its territorial sea."(38)
No mention was made in this Article of fisheries.
(39)The freedom of all States to fish on the high seas was maintained 
1958 did, however, recognise the coastal State's "special, interest in the 
maintenance of the productivity of the living resources in any area of 
the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea"^^^^ and the Convention on 
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas provide 
that a coastal State may initiate negotiations with those States whose 
nationals fish in such an area in an effort to reach agi'eement on "the
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measuz'es necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the 
high sea in the area."^^^^ The Convention refers only to conservation 
of living r e s o u r c e s a n d  makes no mention of fishing rights* Not 
only is the Convention silent on any preferential fishing rights per­
taining to the coastal State hut is quite emphatic that any conservation 
measures adopted should not "discriminate in form or in fact against 
foreign fishermen * "  ^ The international community in 1958 had, 
because of the absence of agreement on extra territorial sea fishing 
rights p to confine itself to outlining the conservation measures which 
could be adopted in respect of living resources.
The i960 Law of the Sea Conference was no more successful than its 
predecessor in defining either the territorial sea or a fisheries zone.
In i960, a Canadis,n proposal for a six mile territorial sea and a 
six mile contiguous zone was submitted. The breadth of the territorial 
sea was set at a maximum of six nautical miles, while within a fishing 
zone contiguous to its territorial sea and "extending to a limit of 
twelve nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of its 
territorial sea is measured", the coastal State would have "the same 
rights in respect of fishing and the exploitation of the living resources 
of the sea as it has in its tez*ritorial sea,"^^^^ No mention was con­
tained in this proposal regarding the rights of foreign fishermen. 
However, a compromise solution on this issue was adopted and submitted 
in a joint proposal by the United States and Canada, The solution 
adopted was that foreign fishing rights would be recognised i<dthin the 
outer six mile zone, but that they would be phased out over a ten year 
period ~ i,e, from 30 October 1960.^^^^ This proposal failed by one 
vote to achieve the necessary two-thirds m a j o r i t y , A  final effort 
to get a multi-lateral treaty incorporating the six plus six formula was
attempted by Canada, and although apparently more then 40 countries 
indicated a willingness to accede no such treaty materialised,
Regarding the extent of the territorial sea and fisheries zone, 
the law in I96O was uncertain. However, political support could be 
detected for either (a) a twelve mile territorial sea, or (b) a narrower 
territorial sea and an adjacent fishing zone extending beyond the 
territorial sea to a maximum of twelve miles, A twelve mile terri»’ 
torial limit was, it appears, the maximum which the international 
community would entertain in I96O,
The failure of the 1958 mid I96O Conferences to delimit either the 
territorial sea or a separate fisheries zone, prompted States to adopt 
the course of action which best suited their fishing interests.
Coastal States were in the early I96O8 already aware of a possible need 
to extend their jur2.sdiction zones and were not willing to compromise 
their freedom to do s o , C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  simultaneous to the 1958 
Conventions being signed and ratified, State practice was independently 
developing the law of fisheries,
Iceland in fact did not wait for the I96O Conference but extended
her exclusive fisheries zone to twelve miles as from 1 September 1958,
This was a. twelve mile fishery limit drawn from straight baselines as
adopted in 1952, British vessels were prohibited from entry into this
zone, although in the Exchange of Letters 1961,^^^^ which settled the
dispute between the two countries, Iceland agreed that for a period of
three years British vessels could, at specified times, enter the outer
six mile zone,^^^^ The United Kingdom thereby, in I96I, accorded
recognition to what would, in three years, be a twelve mile exclusive 
( 41^fisheries zone,' '
Norway, waiting until the conclusion of the I96O Conference, 
extended her fisheries limit to twelve miles on 1 September I96I, In 
the previous year Nort-ray and the United Kingdom had concluded a Fishery 
Agreement, whereby an initial extension of Norwegian limits to six 
miles, as of 1 April I96I, was r e c o g n i s e d . T h e  agreement provided 
for the temporary continuation of British fishing in "the zone between 
the limits of six and twelve miles measured from the baseline from 
which the territorial s©a of Norway is measured," As of 3I October 
1970, British vessels were to be prohibited.
Similar type agreements were negotiated between the UK and Denmark, 
In 1959 agreement was reached providing for an exclusive six mile 
fisheries zone round the Faroe Islands, with British vessels being 
allowed to fish under regulation in the six to twelve mile zone.
Under the 1959 agreement, it was open to either party to give a year's 
notice, at any time after 27 April I962, of intention to terminate, 
Denmark issued notice on 28 April I962 and the agreement terminated on 
27 April 1963, A twelve mile exclusive fishery limit was intro­
duced for Greenland in 1963,^^^^ with one for the Faro© Islands being 
introduced on 12 March 1964,
V/liat was being favoured was obviously the six-pliis^six formula 
alcin to that narrowly defeated at the I96O Conference. There was a 
swing away from the view that a coastal State only enjoyed exclusive 
fishery rights in its territorial waters. The 1959 Anglo-D&nish Agree-» 
ment, for example, recognised that exclusive fisheries jurisdiction need 
not be limited to the breadth of the territorial sea. Similarly, the 
1964 European Fisheries Gonvention^^^ illustrates that the law of 
fisheries and the control exercised by coastal States were undergoing 
change.
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The Convention provided that the coastal State had;
"the exclusive right to fish and exclusive jurisdiction 
in matters of fisheries within the belt of six miles 
measured from the baseline of its territorial s e a ."(-57)
Within the six to twelve mile zone? fishing was reserved for those
fishing vessels of contracting parties, other than the coastal State,
which had fished "habitually in that belt between 1 January 1953 sind
31 December 1962,"^-^^^ Ajrfcicle 4 qualified Article 3 and stated that
vessels exercising their right under Article 3 should not "direct their
fishing'effort towards stocks of fish or fishing grounds substantially
different from those which they have habitually exploited." The
coastal State was charged with the responsibility of enforcing the
provisions of Article 4, The coastal State could regulate fisheries
within the outer zone and could enforce such regulations, including
those designed to give effect to internationally agreed conservation
measures, provided that no discrimination, either in form or fact,
occurred against fishing vessels of other contracting p a r t i e s . A
coastal State was obliged before issuing such regulations, to inform the
other contracting parties concerned and "consult those contracting
parties, if they so wish,"^^^^
In the 1960s, tie picture that emerged in Europe was of fishing 
zones up to a maximum of twelve miles beyond which the "freedom of 
fishing" prevailed. Coastal States increasingly enjoyed an exclusive 
fisheries zone of six miles and it is noteworthy that the European 
Convention characterised the regime as a fisheries zone and not as 
"territorial waters". Vessels other than those of the coastal State 
were allowed to fish, subject to regulation within the outer zone - i.e. 
the control of such fishing activity was exercised via bi-lateral 
agreements.
A similar trend was underway outside Europe, Canada announced 
on 4 June I963 that it was intending to establish as of mid-May 1964, 
"a twelve mile exclusive fisheries zone along the whole of Canada's 
coastline," The Canadian Government, having decided that as of April
1963!
"We could no longer pin our hopes on the possibility of 
a new rule of international law being created by general 
agreement, nor could we expect sufficient support for a 
limited multi-lateral agreement with international 
countries."(61)
In'September I965, New Zealand passed the Territorial Sea and 
Fishing Zone Act,^^^^ which provided for an exclusive fisheries zone 
of nine miles adjacent to the three mile territorial sea.
On l4 October I96O, the US Congress enacted legislation designed
to establish, beyond the territorial sea of the United States, a con­
tiguous fisheries zone in which the United States was to;
"exercise the same exclusive rights in respect of fish­
eries ,,c as it has in its territorial sea, subject to 
the continuation of traditional fishing by foreign 
States within this zone as may be recognised by the 
United States,"(^3)
The fisheries zone was defined as having:
"as its inner boundary, the outer limits of the terri­
torial sea and its seaward boundary, a line drawn so 
that each point on the line is nine nautical miles
from the nearest point to the inner boundary,"(64)
In the years following the I96O Conference the formula proposed 
at that Conference provided the blueprint for the future development 
of the law of .fisheries and the I96OS saw, not only the evolution of, 
but the acceptance of, a fisheries zone independent of the territorial 
sea. The two were no longer considered synonymous and in 1974 the 
twelve mile exclusive fisheries zone was accorded judicial recognition 
by the International Court of Justice.
The International Court of Justice concluded that exclusive fishery 
zones extending no more than twelve nautical miles from the baselines 
from which the territorial sea was drawn, were valid under customary 
international law. The twelve mile zone was a concept which had 
"crystallised as customary law" in the years subsequent to the I96O 
C o n f e r e n c e , T h e  question confronting the Coui't was the compati­
bility of Iceland's claim to a 50 mile exclusive fishing zone with 
international law,^^^^ The Court did not elaborate on the concept, 
but merely declared that a twelve mile fishery zone was tertium genus 
existing between the territorial sea and the high seas. The Court 
produced no evidence to support its contention that a twelve mile 
fishery zone was generally accepted.Nevertheless, the Court's 
conclusion appears to have been justifiable in the light of State 
practice. By 1975 there were 75 countries claiming a twelve mile 
fishing limit while some 38 States claimed a fishing zone ranging from 
three to 13O miles.
Although not declaring explicitly that Iceland's 50 mile claim was 
contrary to international law, the Court considered that Iceland's uni­
lateral extension constituted "an infringement of the principle enshrined 
in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Conference on the High Seas
The International Court of Justice may have failed to declare its 
position on the 50 mile extension, but the dissenting judges were not 
so reticent. All the dissenting judges declared the claim to a 50 mile 
exclusive fishing limit as incompatible with international law. Judge 
Gros, for example, declared that he clearly regarded "the extension from 
12 to 50 sea miles as contrary to international law."^^^^ While Judge 
Onyeama pronounced that in his view the Icelandic Regulations had. "no 
basis in International law" since the provisions relating to the exten-
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sion of Iceland's exclusive fishery jurisdiction were not authorised by
any of the four Geneva Conventions and "particularly the Convention on
the High Seas, nor do they accord with the concept of the fishery zone
as at present a c c e p t e d . S i m i l a r l y ,  the separate opinions delivered
illustrated an inability to reach a consensus of opinion,
"The conclusion that there is at present a general view 
of customary law establishing for coastal States an 
obligatory maximum fishery limit of twelve miles would 
not have been well founded,"
This was the joint opinion submitted by Judges Forster, Bengzon, Jimenez 
de Arechaga, Nagendra Singh and Ruda,^^^^ Those judges were nevertheless 
able to support the Court's judgment because it did not declare that the 
Icelandic extension was "without foundation in international law and 
invalid erga ornnes," Judges Dillard and Waldock felt that any conten­
tion that a 50 mile exclusive fishing zone was ipso jure contrary to 
international law and so invalid erga ornnes, ws.s difficult to sustain.
Judge Waldock asserted such a claim would only be valid if acquiesced
(7Z')in by other States,'  ^ Vfhereas Judge Dillard expressed the view that 
the evolution of an acceptable breadth for a fisheries zone depended upon 
the continuing process of "claim and counter-claim in the context of 
specific disputes,"' ^
The Court's judgment highlighted the uncertainty prevailing at the 
time in respect of a coastal State's fisheries jurisdiction. On the one 
hand, the judgment gave weight to the argument that in the light of State 
practice, a fisheries zone extending to twelve miles was acceptable under 
international law. On the other hand, it did not declare an extension 
in excess of that limit to be in violation of international law. The 
door was left open for continued coastal State expansion. And continue 
it did throughout the seventies.
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In 1973p 19 States claimed exclusive fisheries jurisdiction beyond 
twelve m i l e s O n  a break down of the claims the picture looked as 
follows :
200 mile territorial sea « Argentine, Brazil, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Panama, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uruguay,
200 mile exclusive fishing zone - Chile, Nicaragua and 
Peru,
200 mile patrimonial sea - Costa Rica,
130 mile territorial sea - Guinea,
80 mile exclusive fishing zone - French Guyana,
70 mile exclusive fishing zone - Morocco,
50 mile territorial sea - Gambia and Tanzania,
50 mile exclusive fishing zone - Iceland, Omau and 
Pakistan,
30 mile territorial sea - Ghana, Mauritania and Nigeria,
30 mile fishing limit - Congo,
18 mile territorial sea - Cameroon,
20-200 mile exclusive fishing zone - Korea,
The nature of the coastal State's claim varied considerably. 
Argentine claimed a 200 mile territorial sea, but under its I967 fishing 
law reserved only the resources within twelve nautical miles from the 
coasts for Argentine vessels.
The Brazilians claimed a 100 mile exclusive fisheries zone, but a 
200 mile territorial sea. Other claims envisaged foreign fishing under 
licence, others were aimed at the conservation of resources, whilst 
others were based upon the continental shelf concept. By 1978 almost 
two-thirds of coastal States (85 States) claimed fisheries jurisdiction 
beyond twelve miles, while over half (67 States) claimed limits of 200 
miles. Of that 67, 28 claims were for an exclusive economic zone; 2? 
for a fisheries zone; l4 for an extended territorial sea and 3 in other 
forms (e.g. Peru which claimed sovereignty and jurisdiction over the sea, 
its soil and sub-soil up to 200 m i l e s ) , [ N o t e :  an up to date table
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illustrating the extent of coastal States' fishing limits is reproduced 
in Appendix I of this study.]
Some countries decided to await the outcome of UNCLCB III and 
refrained from claiming an exclusive economic zone. Other countries 
have claimed an exclusive economic zone hut have made provision for the 
necessary modification in their national legislation to reflect the 
final text adopted by UNCLOS.
The implications of extended fisheries jurisdiction varies from
(77')one country to another.' ' However, four general types of national 
legislative measures are d i s c e r n i b l e . T h e r e  is that of Latin 
American and African countries claiming sovereign jurisdiction over 
coastal waters and resources up to 200 miles, usually under the terri­
torial seas concept, i.e. normally provision is made for innocent passage 
through the zone by foreign vessels and for the conservation and manage­
ment of fisheries resources within the zone of the coastal State,
Alternatively, European countries in particular have provided foz* 
the extension of existing fisheries zones to the 200 mile limit without 
appreciably changing the legal framework or format of the claim,
A third type of national legislation is that which adopts the 
negotiating texts of UNCLOS as a blueprint. This has led to uncertainty 
as States refer to the text relevant at the time when they made their 
d e c l a r a t i o n . S u c h  legislation provides for a twelve mile terri­
torial sea, a 24 mile contiguous zone and the delimitation of the 
continental shelf by the formula provided for in the Negotiating Texts, 
Exploitation and exploration activities may only be carried out within 
the economic zone on possession,for example, of a licence.
The fourth type of national legislation is that dealing not only 
with a coastal State's rights, but its responsibilities for fisheries 
management within the 200 mile zone. Vîhether the extension is made in 
terms of a fisheries conservation zone (USA) or in terms of an exclusive 
economic zone (Norway), all the national legislation in this category 
provides for the determination of the total allowable catch (in the US
legislation - "optimum yield") of the fishery resources in the 200 mile
zone, for the assessment of the national capacity to harvest the resources 
and for' the allocation of the surplus amongst foreign fishing nations.
Some countries provide criteria for determining the apportionment, e.g. 
"preference being given to those who had habitually fished in the area 
..." Access by foreign vessels is now, as previously, regulated by 
bi-lateral agreements between the coastal State concerned and foreign 
States, Bi“lateral agreements relating to access are found to be of 
essentially three types. Agreements which:
(1) provide for the phasing out of foreign and the sub­
stitution of local vessels in newly established zones 
of national jurisdiction, e.g. 19?6 Agreement between 
Mexico and the United States regarding shrimp 
fisheries ;(82)
(2) grant reciprocal fishing rights to vessels of both 
parties in their respective zones of jurisdiction, 
e.g. 1977 Agreement between the UK and USA concerning 
the Virgin Islands;(^ 8/
(3) prescribe the terms and conditions under which the 
fishing vessels of one party may operate in waters 
under the jurisdiction of the other, e*g. 1976
Agreement between Tunisia and Italy, EEC and non-
Member States.(84)
Most bi-lateral agreements belong to category (3)*^^^^ Bi-lateral 
agreements vary as to their structure and duration. Some agreements are 
self-contained and of short duration, e.g. I976 Agreement between Iceland 
and the United Kingdom, whereas others are for a longer period, usually
four to five years, and provide a framework of co-operation between the
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coastal State and flag State, Framework agreements generally do not 
spell out the specific conditions to be applied in respect of access. 
These are generally determined and stipulated from time to time by
the coastal State, e.g. EEC fisheries agreement with the Faroe Islands,
At this stage it is worth recording the existence of some 22 inter­
national fishery commissions.Fisheries Commissions belong to one 
of two principal groups (a) Species Commissions - i.e. those concerned 
with one species or a group of related species, or (b) Regional Commis­
sions - i.e. those concerned with all or the most important fished 
species within a defined region,International fisheries regulation 
although logical, given the international character of fish stocks, does 
not have a high success record. Fisheries Commissions have been unable 
to enforce their conservation regulations and in many instances a reduc­
tion in the fishing of over-exploited species to scientifically recom­
mended levels has proved impossible for political reasons, both national 
and international.
Fishery Commissions have diminished in importance v-rith the extension 
of fishery limits to 200 miles, Fpecies Commissions have continued to 
function, whereas Regional Commissions have had their previous area 
greatly reduced, and where their scope does lie beyond the 200 mile 
limit their impact is relatively limited.
Various proposals for the regulation of fisheries were presented 
at the opening session of UNCLOS III,^^^^ Traditional maritime States 
and those engaged in distant water fishing, supported a legal regime. 
Retaining narrow national limits and the freedom of the high seas, while 
coastal States with extended jurisdiction utilised a new concept, viz: 
the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), The concept gained popu­
larity during negotiations, but proposals nevertheless varied as to the
actual regulation of fisheries within the economic zone. The distant 
water fishing nations were initially strongly opposed to the extension 
of exclusive fishery zones. However, the USSR had by 1974 accepted, 
albeit conditionally, the economic zone concept while Japan was 
waivering.(^^) Conversely, the Nicaraguan proposal reflected the view 
of the under-developed countries, whereby the coastal State would be 
entitled "to a sea adjacent to its coasts, up to a distance of 200 
nautical miles measured from the applicable baseline," This area was 
to be designated as the "national sea of the coastal State.
Developing countries sought exclusive jurisdiction over the fisheries 
of their economic zone, whilst the developed nations favoured preferen­
tial rights. Preferential rights which admitted foreign fishing vessels 
in the event of the coastal State being incapable of harvesting the 
allowable catch of a particular stock. A detailed study of the pro­
posals which emerged in the various sessions of UNCLOS is outwith the 
scope of this s t u d y , C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  it is to the fishing rights of 
coastal States as contained in the I98I Draft Convention on the law of 
the Sea that attention is now focused,
Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea I98I
Under the Draft Convention the coastal State has within the exclusive
economic zone,(^^)
"sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, 
whether living or non-living, of the sea bed and sub-soil 
and the superjacent waters ..."(96)
The coastal State is responsible for determining not only "the
allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic zone,,(97)
but also "its capacity to harvest the living resources of the exclusive 
economic zone,"^^^^ The coastal State must, however, in the exercise
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of its rights and the performance of its duties pay;
"due regard to the rights and duties of other States and 
act in a manner compatible with the provisions of the 
G onventi on,"(99)
The coastal State is charged with the task of conserving resources
within the EEZ and accordingly is to adopt measures which shall;
"maintain or restore populations of harvested species at 
levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, 
as qualified by relevant environmental and economic needs 
of coastal fishing communities and the special require­
ments of developing States ..,"(^00)
Account must be taken of "the best scientific evidence available" 
with the coastal State co-operating where appropriate ifith the "competent 
international organisations, whether sub-regional, regional or global 
In taking the appropriate measures of conservation, the coastal State 
must have regard, to the effects on species either associated with or 
dependent upon the harvested species and aim to maintain or restore the 
population of such species "above levels at which their reproduction may 
become seriously threatened,
The coastal State's most important task as far as foreign States 
an?e concerned is to decide, in respect of the exclusive economic zone's 
living resources, the surplus available over its own harvesting capa­
city. That surplus, the Convention provides, is to be made
available to other States either through agreements or other arrangements
according to certain criteria which the coastal State is, especially 
with regard to developing States, to take into account. The criteria 
include the "significance of the living resources of the area to the 
economy of the coastal State and its other national interests", the 
interests of land-locked States and those States "with special geographi­
cal characteristics" and the interests of those States "whose nationals
have habitually fished in the zone,"^^^^ The criteria are laid down
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only in general terms. They are not set out in any hierarchy nor can 
they he said to be exhaustive. Foreign States have been denied a say 
in respect of the surplus available over and above the coastal State's 
harvesting capacity. They have no voice in the calculation of the 
surplus.
Fishing by foreign vessels in the exclusive economic zone is to 
be regulated by the coastal State and a list, though not an exhaustive 
list, is given of the forms that such regulations may take, viz;
(a) licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels and equipment, 
including the payment of fees and other forms of 
remuneration, which, in the case of developing 
coastal States may consist of adequate compensation 
in the field of financing, equipment and technology 
relating to the fishing industry;
(b) determining of the species which may be caught, and 
the fixing of quotas of catch, whether in relation 
to particular stocks or groups of stocks or catch 
per vessel over a period of time, or to the catch by 
nationals of any State during a specified period;
(c) regulating of the seasons and areas of fishing, the 
types, sizes and amount of gear, and the numbers, 
sizes, and types of fishing vessel that may be used;
(d) fixing the age and size of fish and other species 
that may be caught;
(e) specifying information required of fishing vessels, 
including catch effort statistics and vessel position 
reports ;
(f) requiring, under the authorisation and control of 
the coastal State, the conduct of specified fisheries 
research programmes and regulation of the conduct of 
such research, including the sampling of catches, 
disposition of samples and reporting of associated 
scientific data;
(g) the placing of observers or trainees on board such 
vessels by the coastal State;
(h) the landing of all or any part of the catch by such 
vessels in the ports of the coastal State;
(i) terms and conditions relating to joint ventures or 
other co-operative arrangements ;
(j) requirements for the training of personnel and the 
transfer of fisheries technology including enhance­
ment of the coastal State's capability of undertaking 
fisheries research;
(k) enforcement procedures.
Coastal States are required to give due notice of conservation and
106).
(107)
management regulations and are to exercise control over the foreign
vessels granted access.
In the event of stocks occurring within the exclusive economic
zone of two or more coastal States, the Draft Convention provides that
the States concerned are;
"to seek either directly or through appropriate sub-regional 
or regional organisations, to agree upon the measures 
necessary to co-ordinate and ensure the conservation and 
development of such stocks ..."(108)
Similarly, action is to be taken "where the same stocks of associated
species occur both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area
for 
(110)
beyond and adjacent to the z o n e s , S i m i l a r  provisions 
co-operation are made in respect of highly migratory species.
The coastal State is. granted rights, but it is also charged with 
obligations over the exclusive economic zone. The coastal State is 
given preferential rights over other States, but it should be regarded 
not as the owner of the exclusive economic zone, but rather as guardian 
of its resources.
Preferential rights are granted to coastal States in respect of, 
inter alia, determining the total allowable catch and the share to be 
made available for foreigners. However, the coastal State's preferen­
tial rights are not of the kind considered in the next Chapter. The 
preferential rights given to coastal States under the Draft Convention 
are granted to the State by virtue of it being a coastal State, They 
are granted independently of any economic dependency that the coastal 
State may have or claim to have on the fisheries of its adjacent waters.
The foregoing has traced the extension by coastal States of their 
fisheries jurisdiction over adjacent waters. It is proposed in the next
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Chapter to focus attention exclusively on the concept of special 
economic dependency and the preferential fishery rights that may 
arise as a consequence.
33
Footnotes
(1) For the attitude of the Romans and Greeks to the sea and control 
of activities thereon, see, e.g. P. Potter, Tlie Fr-eedora of the 
Seas in History, Law and Politics (1924); P,T. Fenn, "Justinian 
and the Freedom of the Sea" 19 AJIL (1925) 71?. For the attitude 
of the Spanish and Portuguese in the fifteenth century, see H. 
Vanderlinden, "Alexander VI and the Demarcation of Maritime and 
Coastal Domains of Spain and Portugal l493“l494" American Histoxdcal 
Review 22 (1916) 1-20. For the early English and Scottish 
attitude, see, e.g. T.W. Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea (I9II).
(2) W. Welwood, De Dominio Maris (I615), Discussed by Fulton, supra 
note (1 ) at 354 et seq.
(3) "He was the first author who clearly enunciated, and insisted on, 
the principle that the inhabitants of a country had a primary and 
exclusive right to the fisheries along their coasts ..." Fulton, 
supra note (l) at 355*
(4) H. Grotius, Mare Liberum (I6O9),
^     '
(5) tJ* Selden, Mare Clausum (1635)*
(6) T.W. Fulton, supra note (l) at 370-74.
(7 ) In the preceding century, the claims made for control over adjacent 
coastal waters varied. Certain States, e.g. France and Holland, 
delimited their control by the cannon shot rule, whereas Scandin­
avian countries favoured a coastal belt measured in terms of 
mileage. For further consideration of the territorial sea and 
its porsible origin, see, e.g. professor Jessup, The Law of 
Territorial Waters (1927)? T.W. Fulton, sunras CT.B.Y. Meyer,
The ExiTent of Jurisdiction in Coastal Waters [l937)î W.L. Walker 
in 22 BYlfTTT^T 210; H.S.K. Kent, "The Historical Origins of 
the’W e ™ M i l “rLimit" 48 AJIL (1954) 437.
(8) Article IX. Convention between Her Majesty and the King of the 
French defining and regulating the limits of the Exclusive Rights 
of the Oyster and Other Fishery on the Coasta of Great Britain and 
of Frarce, Signed at Paris, 2 August 1839. T.W, Fulton, supra 
612, British and Foreign State Papers, Vol 27, 983. — -
(9) The contracting parties were the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, 
prance, Germany and The Netherlands,
(10) Signed at London, 24 June I9OI, UKTS No 5 (1903),
(11) The Scandinanvian countries continued to adhere to a four mile 
limit. Also important regarding the coastal State's fisheries 
jurisdiction was the ten mile rule which W3æ emerging at the time 
in respect of bays,
(12) E.g. Professor Aubert mooted such a fisheries zone at the I892 Session 
of the Institute of International Law « Annuaire Vol 12, 104-154.
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(13) This is in spite of what Lord Macmillan said in 1933» viz;
"Whatever be the limits of territorial waters, it has long
been recognised that for cert.ain purposes, notably those of
police, revenue, public health and fisheries, a State may
enact laws affecting the sea surrounding its coast to a
distance seawards which exceeds the ordinary limits of its
territory." Croft v Dunphyr-1933lAG 156 at l62. At the time
the existence of a contiguous zone was not universally accepted
and even once accepted fishing is not a reason whereby a State
may extend its jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea. See
Article 24(2) 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone UKTS 5 (1963); 450 UNTS 82; Article 33 I98I
Draft Convention on the Law of the SeaT*(unpublished) see below note (94)
(14) Conference for the Codification of International Law, held at The 
Hague 12 March 1930-12 April 1930. Acts of the Conference for 
Codification of International Law, Report of the Second Committee,
Terri.torial Waters, 24 AJIL (I930) S-ipn. 234,
(15) By the Icelandic delegate, because of the adverse effect of dredging- 
fishing tackle on the stocks in the Icelandic waters which were of 
"international interest".
(16) The Icelandic delegate stated that whereas some of his countrymen 
regarded the three mile limit as too narrow and favoured instead
a six mile limit, he personally favoured a four mile limit provided 
that is it were possible to have rules for the protection of 
fisheries in certain areas outside territorial waters,
(17) The USSR extended its limits to twelve nautical miles in 1935, 
Ecuador and Brazil in 1938, while Prance declared a limit of 20 
kilometres in 1936,
(18) XIII Bulletin, Denartment of State, No 327, 30 Seutember 1945, 484
- reproduced in Lay, Churchill and Nordquist; New Directions in 
the Law of the Sea, Vol 1, 95=98,
(19) Presidential Declaration Concerning Continental Shelf, 23 June 
1947. UNIS Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas,
UN Doc, ST/LEIs/Ser b/1 at 6 (1951), For discussion on the events 
preceding the Chilean assertion and the search for a legal precedent 
to justify such an extension of national sovereignty, see Anne 
Hollick; "The Origins of 200 mile Offshore Zones" ?1 A.TIL (1977)
494.
(20) Presidential Decree No ?8l, 1 August 194?. UN Doc. S?/LEG/vSer b/1,
(21) Maritime Hunting and Pishing Law (Decree No 003, 22 February 1951)
- see also Agreements between Chile, Ecuador and Peru - signed at 
the First and Second Conference on the Exploitation of the Maritime 
Resources of the South Pacific, 1942 and 1954, viz; Declaration on 
the Maritime Zone and Agreement Supplementary to the Declaration of 
Sovereignty over the Maritime Zone of Two Hundred Miles -■ contained 
in Lay, Churchill and Nordquist;, New Directions in the Law of the 
S^, Vol I, 231-33. ........ .
(22) Canada for instance while not claiming an extensive territorial 
sea, took advantage of the opportunity offered through Newfoundland
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Canadian waters, since it was semi-enclosed by Canadian territory’, 
Canada seized the opportunity afforded and demonstrated it was 
conscious of its position as a coastal State and that as such it 
had coastal State interests. B. Johnson; Fisheries in Canadian 
Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, ed. B. Johnson and M.W.
Zacher, University of British Columbia, 1977*
(23) ICJ Reports 1951» 116.
(24) Held by ten votes to two. The dissenting judges were; Sir A. 
McNair (g b) and M. Read (Canada). See, ibid, 158-185 and 186-206.
(25) Held by eight votes to four.
(26) Ibid, 132.
(27) The fact that the low-water mark was the normal mark from which the 
territorial sea should be measured was recognised by the Court,
"... for the purpose of measuring the breadth of the territorial 
sea, it is the low-water mark as opposed to the high-water mark,
or the mean between the two tides, which has been generally 
adopted in practice, and is the most favourable to the coastal 
State end clearly shows the character of territorial waters as 
appurtenant to the land territory."
(28) Non-ray had dravm straight baselines along her "outer coastline" 
between fixed points on the mainland Itself, or on the innumerable 
islands, islets or skerries forming the Norwegian "Skjaergaard", 
thus, including inside the baselines the waters of all the Norwegian 
fjords and sounds formed by the mainland and/or the "Skjaergaard".
(29) The Court identified a final consideration, viz: "that of certain
economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and the impor­
tance of which are clearly undenied by a long usage," (See next 
Chapter for a fuller treatment of "economic interests" as enunciated 
by the Court), For discussion on the implications of the case, see 
J.H. Evenson: "The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and its Legal
Consequences", 46 AJIL (1952) 610,
(30) Regulations were issued under the 1948 Law in Scientific Conserva­
tion of the Continental Shelf Fisheries (Text in Law and Regulations 
on the Regime of the Territorial Sea), UN Lsgi.slative Series 
ST/LSO/Ser B/6 (1957) 513» 1951 ^as also the year in which Iceland’s
denunciation of the Anglo-Danish Convention which had established a 
three mile exclusive fisheiy limit became effective.
(31) Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly 
1956 2 YB Int. Law Comm. 253, 256, UN Doc A/3159 (1956) Articles 
concerning the Law of the Sea, Article 3(1),
(32) Ibid, Article 3(2).
(33) External Affairs Statement and Speeches 58/59, "Canadian View on 
Fishing Zones and Territorial Haters", see Johnson, sunra, note
(22), at 61.
(34) a/CONF 13/cl/L 77 Rev. 1.
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the lavr of the Sea, Misc. No, 15 (1953) Cmnd, 584 at 6.
(36) Proposal (1 ) received 35 votes in favour, 30 against, 20 absten­
tions; proposal (11) received 45 votes in favour, 33 against,
7 abstentions; proposal (ill) received 39 votes in favour, 33 
against, 9 abstentions; and proposal (IV) received 21 votes in 
favour, 47 against, I7 abstentions.
(37) Article 24 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone, supra note (I3).
(33) Ibid, Article 24(1).
(39) Ibid, Article l(l). Article 2(2) 1953 Convention on the High
Seas, UKTS No 5 (1963)? 450 UNTS 82.
(40) Article 6(1) 1953 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, UKTS No 39 (1966); 599 UNTS
285.
(41) Ibid, Article 6(3) and (4).
(42) Ibid, Article 1(1) "All States have the right for their nationals
to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject ... (c) to the pro­
visions contained in the following Articles concerning conservation 
of the living resources of the high seas."
(43) Ibid, Article 7(c),
(^ l4) a/ conf 19/L ll/lJ-l-.
(45) Second UNCLOS Official Recoids Summary Records of planning Meetings 
and of meetings of the Committee of the thole (I96O) A/CO^ ÎF 19/8
170-171.
(46) There were 54 votes in favour, 28 against and 5 abstentions. The 
28 votes cast against were those of Burma, Chile, Ecuador, Guinea, 
Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Peru, 
Saudi Arabia, Joi^ dan, UAR, Venezuela, Yemen and ten Soviet bloc 
States. Those in favour included iTiter alia current members of 
the European Communities and Norway".
(47) Other countries made their participation conditional on accession 
by the United States. The Kennedy Administration however rejected 
the proposed treaty in I963. B, Johnson, supra, note (22), 64,
(48) Canada for instance, which had. featured so predominantly in the 
negotiations of both Conferences, ratified only one of the Con» 
ventions » the Continental Shelf Convention, UKTS No 39 (1964); 
499 UNTS 311; further expansion it was felt would be fettered by 
ratii’ication of the Territorial Sea Convention and the High Seas 
Convention - its freedom of fishing clause could be construed to 
mean that the unilateral declaration by a State of extended fishing 
jurisdiction would be illegal. Ratification by the United States 
of this Convention was used by the domestic opposition against the 
200 mile fishing zone in 1975, B. Johnson, surra, note (22), 64,
(49) Exchange of Notes Settling the Fisheries Dispute between the United 
Kingdom and Iceland, 11 March I96I, 39? pNTS 275» A similar 
Exchange of Notes settled the dispute between Iceland and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, 19 July I96I, 409 UNTS 4?.
(50) Any future dispute regarding fisheries extension by Iceland was 
to be referred to the International Court of Justice at the 
request of either party.
(51) The United Kingdom's acceptance and the reasons for it will be 
discussed in the next Chapter.
(52) UKTS No 25 (1961) Cmnd 1352.
(53) UKTS NO 55 (1969) Cmnd 776.
(54) Brown, "British Fisheries" (1972) 25 Current Legal Problems 45.
(55) (1964) 3 IBM 1122.
(56) 581 UNTS 57c The original signatories of the Convention were
Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland,
Italy, TjiJixembourgp the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom, Luxembourg did not ratify the Convention, 
Poland acceded to the Convention in I96O, Iceland, although 
present at the Conference refused to become a party to the Conven­
tion.
(57) Ibid, Article 2.
(58) Ibid, Article 3 .
(59) Ibid, Article 5 .
(6 0) Ibid, Article 5(2), Britain gave effect to the Convention by the 
196*4 Fishery Limits Act, The baselines from which the new fishing 
limits were drawn included a series of straight baselines promul­
gated in the Territorial Waters Order in Council 1964. In a semes 
of Ordesrs made under section 1(3) of the Act, provision was made 
for the continued exercise of traditional fishing rights in the 
"outer six mile" belt. The validity of the Convention was recog­
nised in agreements concluded between the United Kingd.om and Poland, 
Norvray and the USSR on 26, 28 and J O  September respectively;
UNTS 153; 548 UNTS 63; 539 UNTS 159.
(6 1) Canada, Senate, Standing Committee on Banking and Commerce, Pro­
ceedings No 1, 7 May I963, 10. (B. Johnson, supra, note (22) 97,
note (27)).
(62) Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act 1965» (I966) 5Ibh 1.
(63) Public Law 89-658. (1966) 5 ILH IIO3 .
(64) Ibid, section 2.
(65) Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v Iceland) Merits,
ICJ Reports 197% 3 at 23.
(66) The Icelandic Government implemented its intention to extend 
Iceland's exclusive fishing zone to J O  miles by the Resolution 
of the Althing of I5 February 1972 and Regulations of l4 July 
1972. The text of both a.re reprinted in Lay, Churchill and 
Nordquistp New Directions in the Law of tîie Sea, Vol 1 at 89 and 
90 respectively.
(67) For more detailed discussion of the Court's judgment, see R. 
Churchill, "The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases; The Contribution 
of the International Court of Justice to the Debate on Coastal 
States' Fisheries Rights" [1975) 25 ICLQ, 82-105.
(68) Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra, note (65), 29.
(69) Ibid, 135.
(70) Ibid, 246 - see also Judge Petren who was o f  the view that the
Court had side-stepped the issue and had failed in what it was
required to do, viz; pronounce on the conformity of Iceland's 
extension with international law.
(71) Ibid, 46.
(72) I h j A , 120,
(73) Ibl5b 5 6*
(7 4) The 19 States were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Malta, Morocco, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Peru, Senegal and Uruguay. Costa Rica 
claimed a 200 mile zone in 1972, but this was characterised as a 
conservation zone rather than an exclusive fisheries zone.
(75) National Legislation Relating to the Management of Fisheries Under 
Extended Zones of National Jurisdiction, GÜFl/78/lnf 9 = FAQ 
Committee of Fisheries Twelfth Session, Rome, 12-16 June 1978.
(76) US Fishery Conservation and Management Act 1976 (public Law 9/-h«265) 
section 4<)1; "following ratification of a comprehensive treaty 
which includes provisions with respect to fi.shing conservation
and management jurisdiction resulting from the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, the Secretary, after consul­
tation with the Secretary of State may promulgate any amendment 
to the regulations promulgated under this Act if such amendment 
is necessary and appropriate to conform such regulations to the 
provisions of such treaty, in anticipation of the date when such 
treaty shall come into force and effect for, or otherwise be 
applicable to the United States ..."
(77) A detailed.analysis of the varying types of national legislation 
is to be found in the FAO paper cited at note (75), supra.
(78) Ibid, 3.
(79) United Kingdom Fishery Limits Act 1976.
(80) p. Bimie, "UNCLOS and the Legal Regime - Home and World Wide", 
unpublished conference paper, Edinburgh, 12 June I98O,
39
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case of Guyana and India.
(82) 1976 Fisheries Agreement. Amended 1977 (1978) 17 ILM 1073»
(83) 1977 Agreement between the UK and the USA concerning the Virgin 
Islands. Replaced by 1979 Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement (1979) 18 
ILM 895.
(84) Agreement between Tunisia and Italy 1976. Agreement between 
EEC and USA, QJ No L l41, 9 June 1977* Agreement on Fisheries 
between EEC and Sweden, pJ Mo L 226/2, 29 August I98O,
(85) J.B. Garroz and M.J, Savini, "The New International Law of 
Fisheries Emerging from Bi-lateral Agreements", (1979) 3JTarine 
2011^79-98. " "
(86) Agreement on Fisheries between the European Economic Community, 
of the one part, and the Government of Denmark and the Home 
Government of the Faroe Islands, of the other part - OJ No L 226/12, 
29 August 1980,
(87) For the Constitutions, memberships and jurisdiction of international 
Commissions, see FAO Fisheries Circular No 138 (I972) "Report on 
Regulatory Fishery Bodies",
(88) For an account of the historical development of fishery organisa­
tions, see A,W, Koers, International Regulation of Marine Fisheries; 
A Study of Regional Organisations (1973) and for a more recent 
6ui"vey of the management of international fisheries, see P,A.
Driver, "International Fisheries" in Maritime Dimension (ed, R.P. 
Barston and P. Bimie) I98O, 40-43. —  "
(89) The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission is one such example. . 
For details of the problems which beset NEAFG, see D,J, Driscoll 
and N, McKellar, "The Changing Regime of North Sea Fisheries in 
the Effective Management of Resources", The International policies 
of the North Sea (ed. G.M. Mason) 1979*
(90) Participation in UNCLCB III has been almost universal; 137 
countries out of the l4p invited attended the negotiations in 
1974; in 1976 this number rose to I5 6.
(91) H.G. Knight, Managing the Sea's Living Resources, 6 0,
(92) Working Documents Submitted by the Nicaraguan National Zone 
Characteristics, UN Doc. A/CONF 62/G2/L 17» 23 July I974.
(93) See, for example, Stevenson and Oxman, "The Preparations., for the 
Law of the Sea Conference", 68 AJIL (1974) 1; "The Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; The 1974 Caracas Session", 
69 AJIL (1975) 1; "The 1975 Geneva Session", 69 AJIL (1975) 763; 
and Oxman, "The United Nations Conference on the'Lavj of the Sea;
. The 1976 New York Session", 71 AJIL (1977) 247; "The 1977 New 
York Sessions", 72 AJIL (1978) 57; "The Seventh Session 1978",
73 AJIL (1979) 1; "Thé” Eighth Session 1979", ?4 AJIL (1980) 1;
"The mTiTth Session I98O", 75 AJIL (I9SI) 211.
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(94) Copy received by author from UN Law of the Sea Unit, September 
1981c Text of 1980 Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea is 
published in (I98O) I9 ILM 1129.
(95) Article 55 defines the exclusive economic zone as "an area beyond 
and adjacent to the territorial sea ..o" while Article 57 provides 
that the breadth of the exclusive economic zone shall not exceed 
beyond "200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured."
(96) Article 56(1)(a).
(97) Article 6l(l).
(98) Article 62(2),
(99) Article 56(2),
(100
(101
(102
(103
(104
(105
(106
(107
(108
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Article 6l(3).
Article 6l(2).
Article 6l(4).
Article 62(2).
See Article 62(2); Article 69; Article 70.
Article 62(4),
Article 62(5).
Article 7 3.
Article 63(1 )*
Article 63(2 ).
Article 64, High Migratory Species are listed in Annex I to 
the Draft Convention,
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CHAPTER TWO
Special Dependency and Preferential Rights; 
Evolution and Legal Recoprii
It is proposed within the confines of this Chapter to trace the 
evolution of preferential rights, claimed because of a special economic 
dependency, and to assess the legal recognition that has been accorded 
to such a claim. The concept of preferential rights arising because 
of a special economic dependency on fisheries will be examined within 
various legal contexts. Initially, the recognition accorded \yy the 
international legal system will be assessed and subsequently that 
accorded within (i) the European Economic Community, and (ii) the 
Canadian federal system will be examined.
Recognition of Special Economic Dependency/Preferential Rights 
Under International Law
The economic value of a fishery to a coastal community was mentioned,
but not elaborated upon, in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Gase,^“'^
In interpreting the term "bay", the Tribunal concluded that account
should be taken of "all the individual circuiiistances which for any one
of the different bays are to be appreciated and such individual
circumstances identified by the Tribunal included "the special value
(?)which it has for the industry of the inhabitants of its shores."'
Economic interests were identified therefore as a possible consideration 
which could be talien into account when defining a "bay", but that is all. 
The special value which the waters had for the industry of the inhabi­
tants of its shores was not singled out in preference to other possible 
considerations. However, there was in I9IO judicial acknowledgement 
of the possible relevance of economic interests in a particular matter 
of international concern.
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Special economic interests of a coastal community arose again in the
(3)Anglo-Norwesian Fisheries Case 1951* Special economic interests were
not specifically recognised as giving rise to fishery rights, hut rather 
were recognised as a consideration which could be taken into account in 
the determination of the territorial sea. The issue confronting the 
Court and the Court's judgment have already been discussed in Chapter 
One, The Court concluded that weight had to he given to certain con­
siderations when selecting the baselines from which the territorial sea 
was to be measured. The final consideration highlighted by the Court 
is what is of relevance here. The Court stated;
one consideration not to be overlooked, the scope of 
which extends beyond purely geographical factors ; that 
of certain economic interests peculiar to a region, the 
reality and importance of which are closely evidenced by 
a long usage" (emphasis added),
The Court reinforced its recognition made earlier that in certain of the
coastal regions adjacent to the waters in question, the inhabitants
derived "their livelihood essentially from fisheries.
In adapting the general law, local conditions and, apparently, 
certain economic interests peculiar to the region, could be taken into 
account; and, in particular, the Court considered that those fishing 
rights enjoyed round the Lopphauet were "founded on the vital needs of 
the population and attested by very ancient and peaceful usage ,.
Such a dependency was, in the Courb's view, a legitimate consideration,
V/hat weight can be attached to the court's conclusion? Economic 
interests peculiar to a particular region could be taken into consider­
ation in the delimitation of the territorial sea and thereby could 
determine the extent of a State's fisheries jurisdiction « fisheries 
jurisdiction being, at that time, an incident of territorial waters' 
jurisdiction. Consequently, with regard to other States, the rights
accorded to the coastal State were, in effect, exclusive rights, The 
Court’s judgment only extended, in specific circumstances, the area over 
which a coastal State could exercise its already recognised coastal 
water rights.
Too much should not he read, into the Court’s recognition of special 
economic interests. Such interests were recognised only as a supple­
mentary consideration which should not he overlooked. It was not a 
consideration which could stand independently of other factors. Special 
economic interests in themselves would not he grounds for applying the 
method of straight baselines. Other factors required to he present.
The Court, furthermore, qualified the economic interests to he taken
into account and stated that their reality and importance had to he
evidenced by long usage. In other words, an established dependency
was demanded. Judge H.S.U, Mo in his separate opinion declared that
with regal'd to the;
"fishing activities of the coastal inhabitants ,,. 
individuals by undertaking enterprises on their own 
initiative for their ovm benefit and without any dele­
gation of authority by their Government cannot confer 
sovereignty on the State, and this despite the passage 
of time and the absence of the molestation by the people 
of other countries,
Although Judge Mo was highlighting the fact that individuals cannot act
as the agents of their State unless so authorised, he also weakens any
assertion that the Court recognised that an economic dependency on
fisheries produced preferential rights as of right under international
law. Those engaged in the fishing did so because other States refrained
from preventing them,^^)
The recognition accorded to special economic interests in the 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case was therefore limited. On the basis of 
the Court’s judgment, special economic interests could only give ri.se to
fishing rights for the coastal State via the territorial sea. Delimit­
ation of the territorial sea hy the use of baselines other than the 
normal low-water mark could provide States with a larger territorial 
sea and thereby extend, inter alia, the ambit of their fisheries juris*» 
diction. Special economic dependency did not, in itself, provide 
extended fisheries jurisdiction. All the Court’s judgment did was to 
recognise that economic interests could, along with other considerations, 
allow derogation from the normal method employed for delimiting the 
territorial sea; it did not give to inhabitants of an area dependent 
on fisheries, preferential rights for access, vis-a-vis other States.
In the examples before the Court, other States chose not to intervene. 
There was no evidence that they felt under any legal obligation not to 
do so.
The Court's judgment was reflected seven years later in Article
'4 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone.(^) Stradght baselines could be employed for delimiting the
territorial sea in localities "where the coastline is deeply indented
and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its
immediate vicinity" and where employed:
"account could be taken, in determining particular base­
lines, of economic interests peculiar to the region 
concerned, the reality and importance of which are 
clearly evidenced by a long usage,"(ïO)
Tvjo things are immediately apparent. Only in defined geographical 
conditions is account to be taken of a region’s economic interests; and, 
secondly, account of such economic interests is optional* It need not 
be invoked. The Convention imports no obligation that account should 
be taken of the economic interests of a region. The Convention only 
stipulates the circumstances in which economic interests may be con-
^5
sidered, but leaves consideration as optional. That is all the 
Convention provides. The Convention is silent on what is to be 
understood by "economic interests peculiar to a region", except that 
such interests must be real and important and of long standing,
What is meant by real and important? Again, the Convention is 
silent. Real and important may be the nature of the criteria to be 
adopted for determining the "economic interests peculiar to the region", 
but no indication is given as to the criteria themselves.
Furthermore, it is only by implication that economic interests may 
be deduced as pertaining to those activities which may be exercised in 
the territorial sea - and thereby fishing. No specific mention is 
made either of fishing or any other activity. Nor is there any indica­
tion given as to who is to be responsible for determining the special 
economic interest. However, the convention does state that the interest 
must be evidenced by "long usage" and this would certainly appear to 
deny any new claimants.
The 195s Convention recognised, therefore, that certain geographical 
circumstances may allow the adoption of the straight baseline system and, 
in such conditions, account may be taken of special economic interests 
of the region concerned. Special economic interests are afforded recog­
nition, but only with respect to the delimitation of the territorial sea, 
and then consideration of such a factor remains optional.
As already mentioned in Chapter One, the Geneva Convention on 
Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Peas 
recognised a coastal State's special interest in the maintenance of the 
productivity of the living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent 
to its territorial sea. The recognised special interest of the coastal
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State was exclusively in respect of the conservation of living resources. 
No mention was made either of fishing rights or of any special economic 
needs displayed by the coastal State, However, the concept of special 
dependency was considered by the 1958 Conference.
The champion of preferential rights.for coastal States# Iceland, 
submitted a. draft article to the Conference's Third Committee which 
provided that;
"In exceptional circumstances, where a people is primarily 
dependent on its coastal fisheries for its livelihood and 
for economic development, the State concerned has the 
right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the fisheries 
up to the necessary distance from the coast in view of 
relevant local considerations.
The need for preference was seen as arising only in exceptional 
circumstances, i.e. only when a population could demonstrate that it 
was dependent on coastal fisheries both for its livelihood and its 
economic development. Fisheries apparently would have to be funda­
mental to the economy of the area concerned.
The draft article was withdrawn and Iceland submitted an alterna­
tive which was successfully steered through the Committee Stage. The
( 12essence of this proposal^  ^was that :
"Where a people is overwhelmingly dependent upon its coastal 
fisheries for its livelihood or economic development and it 
becomes necessary to limit the total catch of a stock or 
stocks of fish in areas adjacent to the coastal fisheries 
zone, the coastal State shall have preferential rights 
under such limitations to the extent rendered necessary 
by its dependence on the fishery,"
Although this proposal wa.s adopted in Committee on 21 April 1958,^^^^
it was defeated on 25 April 1958 when it was put to the vote in plenary,
as it failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority.
It is apparent that, while the overwhelming dependency upon coastal 
fisheries for livelihood or economic development is retained, the coastal
4?
state would only enjoy preferential rights when the fishery stocks 
were so threatened as to require the adoption of conservation measures.
The coastal State would he further restricted in that the limitations 
imposed on other States * fishing activities were to he only those 
rendered necessary hy its (the coastal State's) dependence on the 
fishery. Obviously, the latter provision would have required a decision 
to he taken as to the dependence of the coastal State on the fishery 
concerned. If left to the coastal State, such a decision would he a 
subjective one. A coastal State wishing to have preferential rights 
in its adjacent waters could easily emphasise its dependency on fisheries. 
However, the draft article did provide, in the event of a dispute amongst 
interested States, for the initiation of a dispute settlement procedure.
This draft article represents the initial positive attempt to 
characterise both special dependency and preferential rights. The need 
to be overwhelmingly dependent suggests, for instance, that fishing or 
fishing related industries would have to be a main source of employment 
for a substantial proportion of the population, with possibly no other 
alternative employment available ; and that a decline in the fishing 
industry would be felt and have repercussions throughout the region's 
economy. The fishing industry and ancillary industries would have to 
be not only a principal employer, they would have to be central to the 
region's economy. Criteria such as these, although not enunciated in 
the proposed article, were at least implied.
The day following the rejection of Draft Article 60A, the Conference 
did adopt a Resolution originally proposed by South Africa and which, 
with amendments proposed by Ecuador and Iceland, was concerned with 
"special situations relating to coastal f i s h e r i e s , T h e  Resolution 
recognised that there were instances when a community would be "over­
H-O
whelmingly dependent upon coastal fisheries for their livelihood or 
economic development , . and that such coastal communities might 
depend "primarily on coastal fisheries for the animal protein of its 
diet and whose fishing methods are mainly limited to local fishing from 
small boats,"
In these circumstances, the Resolution advocated that States 
"should collaborate to secure just treatment by regional arrangements 
or by other means of international co-operation" subject to the require­
ment that regard should be paid to "the interests of the other States" 
who participated in the fisheries of the area. The settlement of any 
disagreements, it was recommended, should be done via the "appropriate 
conciliation and arbitral procedures which were to be established for 
the purpose.
Special dependency received recognition, but a claim based on 
special dependency was not to come into play until it was necessary, 
for conservation purposes, "to limit the total catch of the stock or 
stocks of fish in an area of the high seas adjacent to the territorial 
sea of a coastal State ,,," Special dependency in itself could not 
give rise to preferential rights. The fishery stocks in the waters 
adjacent to the coastal State had to be so threatened that conservation 
was required. Only then would a claim for preferential treatment be 
legitimately entertained, and even then any practical expression of 
preferential rights had to take account of the interests of other States 
engaged in the fisheries.
Special dependency was recognised, but it was ill-defined. It was 
defined only in general terms and no formula or yardstick for the assess­
ing of special dependency was spelt out. The Resolution adopted the 
wording of the Icelandic proposal, viz: that those living in the areas
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claiming dependency should be "oven^hèlmingly dependent upon coastal 
fisheries for their livelihood or economic development."
The third factor mentioned in the Resolution, the use of small 
boats, is a characteristic of special dependency currently submitted, 
e.g. small boats restricted in their fishing activities to grounds only 
a few hours from coastal ports is accepted as a characteristic which reflects 
a special dependency and as such has received recognition within the 
context of the European Communities, Although not stated in the 
Resolution, it would appear that all these factors had to exist simul­
taneously before a claim for preferential treatment would be supported.
In 1958f the international community accorded some formal recog­
nition to the concept of special dependency and the preferential rights 
to which that dependency could give rise, in respect of access to 
fishery resources. That recognition was not of a binding legal nature.
It was not expressed in terms of a legal obligation. It was merely a 
resolution and must be seen as a reflection of the consensus of opinion 
amongst States at that particular time. What vras recognised was that, 
in certain special situations, preferential treatment would be called 
for in the allocation of resources in particular coastal waters, but 
that preference had nevertheless to be articulated so as to be comple­
mentary to provisions incorporated in a "universal system of international 
law", and had to be reconciled to the needs of other interested States,
The Resolution did not grant priority to any of the competing 
interests," The varying interests of States had to be reconciled and 
the claims of one State were not to lead to the rights of the other 
claimant(s) being extinguished. It can be assumed from the emphasis 
which the Resolution placed on the need for conservation that the inter­
national community did not envisage "preferential rights" as being
:)U
permanent. Preferential rights were, in other words, a contingency 
measure and were to be of a temporary duration.
What weight was accorded to the Resolution? Arguments advanced 
in the Icelandic Fisheries Case give some indication. Formal recog­
nition had been given to the concept of preferential rights in 1958 
which,it was stated, had been designed specifically to deal with 
situations similar to that characterised by Iceland, The salient 
features of the Resolution were identified,vizj that preferential 
rights could only be invoked when there was evidence of a need for 
conservation; collaboration between all the States concerned was 
required, as was an objective conciliation or arbitration of any 
differences and, most important of all,"the concept of preferential 
rights had nothing to do with exclusive rights.
The Federal German Republic submitted that, although Iceland 
frequently reiterated the need for conservation and the dependency of 
coastal communities on fisheries, no mention was made of preferential 
rights in respect of extending fishing limits. The 1958 Resolution 
did not and could not provide the authority for Iceland to extend its 
fishery limits to a 50 mile exclusive zone. Even if the Icelandic 
claim for an extension of fishing rights was based on conditions with 
which the Resolution was intended to deal, Iceland had failed to pay 
"regard to the interests of the other States," The Icelandic action 
could not be justified under international law as "the very concept 
designed to deal with the situation facing Iceland" had not been invoked. 
Roth the United Kingdom Government and the Federal German Government con- 
sidered the principles laid down in the I958 Resolution as being those 
which should be adhered to by States.
(18)
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It may be concluded that the contribution of the Resolution on
the evolution of preferential rights was;
(i) special dependency would, in cer-bain circumstances, 
lead to preferential rights for a claimant, but 
that such rights had to be agreed to by ail those 
interested in the relevant fishery - a coastal 
State could not talce unilateral measures ; and
(ii) the needs of the special dependency claimants had
to be assessed and calculated vis-a-vis the interests 
of the other parties concerned.
At the i960 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, Iceland re­
submitted its proposals advocating preferential rights for those "over­
whelmingly dependent on their coastal fisheries for their livelihood 
and economic development," The United Kingdom delegation was opposed 
to the proposal on the grounds that, although it was identical to that 
proposed in 1958, the situation in I96O was fundamentally different.
In i960, it was contended, the proposal was being considered:
"against the background of a six mile exclusive fishery 
limit, whereas, under the present joint Canadian and United 
States proposal, after a very short time the coastal State 
would enjoy exclusive fishing within a twelve mile zone.
Moreover, under the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conser­
vation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, those 
States would be able to take care of conservation require­
ments beyond the twelve mile zone. Surely coastal fishing 
communities in general would feel that their essential 
interests would be safeguarded? If it could be assumed 
that Iceland's proposal was meant to relate only to the 
very few countries whose economies were overwhelmingly 
dependent on their fisheries, different questions arise.
If there was fish for all within the contiguous zone during 
the proposed ten year period, there would seem to be no 
case for preferences, but if there were not enough fish, 
consideration could be given to some limitation of distant 
water fishing. The United Kingdom delegation would, 
therefore, be ready to consider the claims of such countries 
for preferential treatment within the twelve mile zone during 
the ten year p e r i o d . "(^9)
Obviously, there was a reluctance to grant to coastal communities 
demonstrating an overwhelming dependence on fisheries preferential 
treatment as a legal right. The United Kingdom indicated a willingness
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to consider claims for preferential treatment, but clearly demonstrated 
the belief that such claims should be considered only as and when they 
arose, A prima facie justifiable claim, in British eyes, would be 
when, so as to prevent the depletion of stocks, fishing activity required 
to be controlled.
The Icelandic proposal was adopted in the Committee of the Whole, 
nevertheless, it cannot be said to have had the support of the inter­
national community as a whole,
In April I96O, an amendment to the United States/Canadian proposal
was tabled which provided, inter alia, that;
"the coastal State has the faculty of claiming preferential 
fishing rights in any area of the high seas adjacent to its 
exclusive fishing zone when it is scientifically established 
that a special situation or condition makes the exploitation 
of the living resources of the high seas in that area of 
fundamental importance to the economic development of the 
coastal State or the feeding of its population,"
and such a situation could exist when;
"(a) the fisheries and the economic development of the 
coastal State, or the feeding of its population are 
so manifestly interrelated that, in consequence, 
that State iP greatly dependent on the living 
resources of the high seas in the area in respect 
of which preferential fishing is being claimed;
(b) it becomes necessary to limit the total catch of 
a stock or stocks of fish in such areas ..,"(22)
Finally, it vras proposed that the coastal State would enjoy pre­
ferential rights only for the period of time "determined by the Commis­
sion" and that, in the granting of preferential rights, regard would 
have to be given "to the interests of any other State or States in the 
exploitation of such stock or stocks of fish .
Iceland Initiated an amendment to the joint United States/canadian 
proposal to the effect that paragraph 3 (viz;
"that any State whose vessels have made a practice of 
fishing in the outer six miles of the fishing zone 
established hy the coastal State «,, for the period 
of five years immediately preceding 1 January 1938, 
may continue to do so for a period of ten years from 
31 October I96O")
would not apply to the situation "where a people is overtfhelmingly
dependent upon its coastal fisheries for Its livelihood or economic
development J'
In the voting of 26 April I96O, the Icelandic proposal and the 
subsequent proposed amendment to the United States/Canadian proposal, 
were rejected. The initial amendment to the United States/Canadian 
proposal was modified (it still retained the provision relating to 
special dependency) and adopted into the joint United States/Canadian 
Submission, However, as already seen in Chapter Ono, that failed to
be adopted b^ r a margin of one vote.
What can be said of special dependency and preferential rights by 
i960? It appears that States would admit that in certain defined 
situations, namely, where the need for conservation could be demonstrated, 
certain coastal communities could, because of a special dependency on 
fishing, demand preferential rights vis-a-vis other States in obtaining 
access to the fish stocks concerned. The view of the international
community would appear to be no different from that of 1958» viz.; there
was a recognition of the possibility of preferential rights for claimant 
States, but that such rights were to be invoked only as a contingency 
measure when stocks were threatened and even then, required to be nego­
tiated with the other States involved in the relevant fisheries.
The i960 Conference failed on the formal level and consequently 
it is the Resolution on the "Special Situations Relating to Coastal 
Fisheries" which must be seen as being the reflection of international 
opinion at that time.
p'-f'
The International Court of Justice in Ju3-y 1974 declared that the 
concept of preferential rights of fishing in adjacent waters in favour 
of the coastal State, in a situation of special dependence on its 
coastal fisheries, had become crystallised as customary
The court took as its starting point the 1958 Resolution;
"preferential rights for the coastal State in a situation 
of a special dependence on coastal fisheries originated 
in proposals submitted by Iceland at the Geneva Conference 
of 1958."(25)
The Resolution, however, only provided a framework within which special 
dependency could be expressed. It did not grant coastal States pre­
ferential rights as of right.
The IGJ having stated that the concept was one of customary inter­
national law, concluded that;
"the preferential rights of the coastal State in a special 
situation are to be implemented by agreement between the /-✓v 
States concerned, either bi-lateral or multi-lateral ^
Tliis pre-requisite need for agreement undermines the argument that the
concept of preferential rights was one of international custom and
reinforces the argument that preferential rights were something which
could be invoked only in exceptional circumstances dependent on prior
agreement amongst all interested parties. Nor does State practice
support any possible argument that negotiation for preferential rights
should follow as a right under international law, once a particular
situation is seen to exist.
How, then, did the Court perceive the legal status of preferential 
rights? Initially, the Court made reference to several bi-lateral 
and multi-lateral agreements in which "preferential rights had been 
recognised". The evidence produced, though, was unconvincing. The 
1961 Exchange of Notes between the UK and Iceland^^^) was cited as an
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example of a bi-lateral agreement in which special dependency was 
recognised as meriting preferential rights. Admittedly, the United 
Kingdom did in I96I recognise the "exceptional dependence of the 
Icelandic nation upon coastal fisheries for their livelihood and 
economic development,
Agreement was prompted as it became increasingly apparent that a 
coastal State could, if it so wished, albeit subject to certain con­
ditions , claim an exclusive fisheries zone of up to but not exceeding 
twelve miles. Under the Exchange of Notes, the United Kingdom 
abandoned its objection to Iceland's twelve mile fishery zone in 
return for continued fishing by UK vessels in the six to twelve mile 
zone for the subsequent three years,
\Jhy did the United Kingdom make explicit reference to the depen­
dency of Iceland? Certainly, agreement had to be reached as the 
situation as it existed was not satisfactory. However, could it not 
be that the United Kingdom, particularly by securing provision for 
reference to the International Court of Justice, was hoping to curb 
any fux'bher extension of fishery limits by I c e l a n d ? ^ I t  may be 
that the qualification contained in the Icelandic delegation's speech 
in 1958 was recalled, viz; that while a twelve mile zone would at 
that time serve Iceland's requirements well, it would nevertheless "be 
necessary to keep open the possibility for future action in Icelandic 
waters if experience should demonstrate the necessity thereof" and that 
the policy in that respect would be "to satisfy the Icelandic require­
ments on a priority basis as far as fishing in the coastal areas is 
concerned /
It was probable that the United Kingdom wished to forestall any 
further extensions by Iceland, or at least wished to have available
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the procedural means of settling any dispute which might arise if 
extension were contemplated. The special dependency was recognised, 
vrith respect to Iceland only, and it was not recognised as a concept 
of general application. It was, rather, recognition of & de facto 
situation, which had to be recognised if agreement between the parties 
concerned was to be achieved.
Mention should be made of the 1964 European Fisheries Convention,^^’^  ^
Although not considered by the International Court, it did recognise 
the concept of special dependency. Airfcicle 11 of the Convention 
provided that, on obtaining the approval of the other contracting 
parties, a coastal State could "exclude particular areas from the full 
application of Articles 3 and in order to give preference to
the local population if it was "overwhelmingly dependent upon coastal 
fisheries," Article 11 did not provide for the special treatment of 
particular cases, nor wsæ its application compulsory. It was included 
possibly to encourage those areas which might submit a claim of special 
dependency to join the Convention, They would join if the possibility 
of derogating from the Convention's provisions was offered. Article 
11 also offered to other States a means of controlling coastal State 
activity, i.e. a claim of special dependency could not justify uni­
lateral State action. However, Article 11 did not offer sufficient 
safeguard, to those States from which a claim of special dependency 
could be anticipated, viz; Iceland and Norway, Neither. Iceland nor 
Norway acceded to the Convention,
The contmcting parties of the European Convention did not spell 
out what was to be understood by "overwhelmingly dependent", but the 
convention serves to highlight yet again that preferential rights 
ruled out unilateral action by a coastal State. Any preferential
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regime demand©! the. approval of the other contracting parties.
The ICJ did refer to the 1973 Faroes Fisheries A g r e e m e n t i n  
which the partles^^^) to the agreement recognised that the Faroe 
Islands should enjoy preference in waters surrounding the Faroe Islands, 
because of the "exceptional dependence of the Faroese economy on 
fisheries , Although there is no evidence to show that the 
contracting parties felt legally obliged to grant preferential rights, 
the Court did not even raise the issue. The Court impo-jrir-ed a legal 
character Into preferential rights which was not justified on the basis 
of the 1973 Agreement, The Faroes Fisheries Agreement was concerned 
with giving recognition to a ide facto situation. Fishery stocks were 
being fully exploited; regulation was necessaryj and that regulation 
had to take account of the Faroese dependency on fisheries. Similar 
circumstances prompted the 1974 Agreement on the Regulation of the 
Fishing of the North East Arctic (Arcto-Norwegian) God between the 
United Kingdom, Norway and the USSR,^^*^^
The Court also made reference to the practice of the International 
Commission for the North West Atlantic Fisheries (IGNAF) and the North 
East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NSAB’C), but that was all. No 
analysis of the practice within these Commissionswas made, although 
presumably the Court was referring to the way in which quotas were 
allocated. Admittedly, within ICNAÏ'*, preferential treatment had been 
accorded to the two coastal States, viz: the United States and Canada,
Neither could be characterised as possessing a special dependency on 
fisheries. In respect of quota allocations within NEAFC, only three 
quotas had been determined prior to the Court's judgment, and only one 
of those had provided preferential treatment for the coastal State (viz; 
Ireland in the allocation of the Celtic Sea herring quota).
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The Court took preferential rights for coastal States within the 
Commissions at face value. The Court neither considered the reasons 
why preferential treatment was granted, nor whether the parties con­
cerned felt any legal obligation to provide preferential treatment for 
coastal States, The Court, nevertheless, on the basis of such evidence 
claimed with authority that preferential rights was a concept of 
customary international law. Yet not only was the actual amount of 
evidence dravm upon minimal, the weight of the evidence selected was 
weak, ' The evidence produced to substantiate the Court's finding, 
rather than being convincing as to the concept's acceptance as inter­
national law, illustrated tlmt relatively few States put preferential 
rights into practice. Relatively few States were involved in the 
application of the concept - twenty-one in all,^^^^ and in addition, 
the practice was confined to a single geographical area (the North 
Atlantic), The Court failed to demonstrate that States felt any legal 
obligation to act in the way they had done in respect of special 
dependency and preferential rights. If the Court had done this, it 
could have been advanced that, at least as far as those States involved 
in the fishing activity of the North Atlantic were concerned, there did 
exist a regional custom whereby special dependency produced preferential 
rights.
Was the Court anticipating the way it felt the law was going to 
develop? It has been a l l e g e d , t h a t  the Court was rendering 
"judgment sub specie legis ferendae" and was anticipating "the law 
before the legislator had laid it down,"^^^^ In spite of suggestions 
that the Court was discussing lex ferenda in respect of a coastal State's 
preferential rights, practice subsequent to the Court's judgment shows 
this not to have been the case.
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Admittedly, certain proposals submitted to the UN Seabed Committee 
would have "legalised" %)referenti8l rights in specific circumstances.
The USSR proposal, for instance, would have granted preferential 
rights in respect of coastal, fisheries to developing States only, 
whereas, under a Japanese proposal, preferential rights would have 
been granted to developing States based on their fishing capacity, 
while developed States could have reserved a portion of the catch to 
protect their small-scale coastal fisheries,
However, as already seen in Chapter One, coastal States particularly 
in the 1970s, have by unilateral action extended their jurisdiction 
and have assumed exclusive regulatory control over fisheries. State 
practice undermines any assumption that coastal States dependent on 
fisheries may, as of legal right, claim preference in the exploitation 
of fishery resources.
This conclusion is borne out, not only by State practice, but also 
by what has come from UNCLOS III, viz; in the form of the I98I Draft 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Coastal States certainly enjoy 
preferential rights under the Draft Convention, However, the pre­
ferential rights essentially enjoyed by the coastal State are nottim>ugh 
any dependency on fisheries. The preferential rights of the coastal. 
State, rights wiiich may in effect be exclusive, are simply a consequence 
of being a coastal State,
A brief look at the Draft Convention illustrates that the ri^ts 
of the coastal State envisaged are different from those enjoyed because 
of a special dependency on fisheries. (See also Chapter One for the 
nature and extent of the coastal State's fisheries jurisdiction under 
the Draft Convention), The coastal State, under the Convention, enjoys 
preference over other States in respect of the living resources within
the exclusive economic zone,^^^^ The coastal State is to decide the 
total allowable catch, its own harvesting capacity and the slmre to be 
made available to foreign fisheries. The surplus to the coastal 
State's harvesting capacity and the total allowable catch is to be 
, made available, subject to certain factors, to foreign fishing vessels. 
The coastal State enjoys a preferential share of the fishing resources 
in the exclusive economic zone in relation to other States, a preference 
which may become exclusive should the coastal State decide that there 
is no smplus available. The coastal State enjoys a preference in
that it is first on the scene and it alone, subject to seeking "the 
best scientific advice" is to decide on whether access may be granted 
to other interested States, by virtue of their geographical position,
A coastal State, under the Draft Convention, enjoys a preference over 
other States, because it is a coastal State. It possesses preferen­
tial rights as of right, independent of any other considerations.
However, a closer examination of the Draft Convention's provisions
reveals tliat the concepts of preferential rights and economic dependency
are expressed within the text. The coastal State, for example, is
obliged under the Convention to grant, through a^greements and other
arrangements, access by foreign fishing vessels to the surplus fish.
In granting access, the coastal State is to talce into account*
"inter alia, the significance of the living resources of 
the area to the economy of the coastal State (emphasis 
added; concerned and its other national interests '
Once having decided on its total harvesting capacity, one of the factors
which the coastal State has to talte into account when granting access to
foreign fishing vessels, is the importance of fishing in the 200 mile
zone to its own economy and its othr national interests.
Again, whilst emphasising the need of land-locked S t a t e s t o
OJ.
participate on an equitable basis in the exploitation of an appro­
priate part of the surplus of the living resources of the exclusive
(46)economic zones of the coastal State of the same subregion or region^  ^
in granting such participation, account should be taken of "the need 
to avoid effects dd,rimental to fishing conununities or fishing industries 
of the coastal S t a t e . A l s o ,  account should be taJcen to safeguard 
against participation constituting "a particular burden for any single 
coastal State or a part of it,"^^^^
Foreign vessels are to obtain access to the surplus fisheries. 
However, the Draft Convention reflects the need for particular attention 
to be given to fishing communities in the coasta]. States, Foreign 
States have prima facie rights, but under the Draft Convention there 
are occasions when these rights may be superseded by the "superior" 
rights of the coastal State - or at least by "the needs of the fishing 
communities and the fishing industry," Tlie Draft Convention goes no 
further than to mention these factors in general terms. However, it 
is clear that, although access by foreign vessels is to be arranged ly 
agreement, it will be the coastal State which >jill possess the upper 
hand in any negotiations, VJliether the needs of the fishing communities 
can be raised within the context of foreign access and vrhat these needs 
may be will be decided by the coastal State concerned,
The Draft Convention does not accord the need "to avoid effects 
detrimental to fishing communities or fishing industries of the coastal 
State" primary importance, but it is listed first of those factors which 
are to be taken into account when gx’anting foreign access. Consequently, 
primacy may bo given in practice,
Hoî'zever, most important of all is that a coastal State may derogate 
from granting access to foreign fishermen if its "economy is overwhelm-
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ingly dependent on the exploitation of the living resources of its 
exclusive économie gone,"^^^) TMs provision demonstrates that 
special dependency is not defunct under international law, hut rather 
has been revitalised and in a positive fomi by the Draft Convention. 
Article 71 states quite explicitly that the provisions regarding 
foreign access do not apply if a coastal State demonstrates an over­
whelming dependency. Such a dependency is not just a supplementary 
factor which may be taken into consideration. The Draft Convention 
has elevated the concept of economic dependency to on© which must be 
taken Into account. Accordingly, the need for a definition of 
"overtfhelmingly dependent" becomes more, rather than less, imperative 
under tte Draft Convention, Apart from Article 71» the Draft 
Convention does, by implication, recognise the concept of preferential 
rights Msed on the special economic circumstances of the coastal 
State. Although akin, however, to preferential rights claimed by 
coastal States in their adjacent waters, the effect of special depen­
dency under the Draft Convention is different. Special dependency is 
to b© reflected not so much in the initial allocation of resources, 
but in the surplus stock available. Special dependency could be 
utilised to enliance the coastal State's already preferential position 
and could give the coastal State near exclusive, if not exclusive, 
rights within its SEZ, Special dependency is not a, concept which 
the intezuational community can afford to ignore. Not, that is, if 
it is to be utilised effectively within the international forum.
The instances examined above of when special economic dependency 
has been recognised and preferential rights have accordingly been 
granted do not suggest legal recognition by the international community, 
The concepts have admittedly been recognised, but they lack legal
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certainty. There is no evidence to support a contention that, given 
the existence of a particular set of circumstances, parties are 
required to negotiate preferential rights. There is no evidence 
to suggest, as the International Court of Justice attempted to do 
in 1974, that the recognition accorded to special economic dependency 
and preferential rights on the inteiuatonal scene has been anything 
other than recognition of a de facto situation. Recognition, rather 
than being prompted by legal necessity, has in effect been a political 
response to a certain set of circumstances. Special economic depen­
dency has been utilised as an important political bargaining weapon 
in international fishery negotiations and recognition of such a claim 
has been granted when it has been judged politically expedient to do 
so. In a nutshell, the international community has recognised that 
special economic dependency and demands for preferential rights are 
important considerations which may demand deference, but such deference 
will be dictated by political factors rather than any feelings of legal 
obligation.
Nevertheless, as already mentioned, the I98I Draft Convention 
exeBipts a coastal State from applying those provisions relating to 
foreign access if its "economy is overwhelmingly dependent on the 
exploitation of the living resources of its exclusive economic zone," 
Indeed this may be identified as being a formal recognition T:y the 
international community of the fact that a special economic dependency 
does give, as of right, rise to certain consequences. The Convention 
is silent, however, on what constitutes "overwhelmingly dependent" and 
yet a coastal State wishing to invoke Article 7I will have to sub­
stantiate its claim of dependency. Accordingly, it is submitted 
that such a coastal State may look for guidance to the recognition
64
and articulation of "overwhelmingly dependent" within other legal 
systems.
Where may such a State 3ook? The most obvious arena to look to 
would be the EEC as it is within the Community forum that special 
economic dependency and preferential rights have been the most voc­
ally debated in recent years. The EEC's recognition of special 
dependency and preferential rights and the Community's attempt to 
articulate the concepts are analysed in detail in Chapter Five of 
this study. Nevertheless, the Gomnumity®s recognition of special 
economic dependency is highlighted below so that the nature of the 
Community's recognition may be assessed.
Recognition of Special Economic Dependency and Preferential Rights 
under European Community Law
Initial recognition of special economic dependency by the Com­
munity was recorded in Regulation No 2l4l/70,^'^^^ That instrument 
guaranteed to Member States free access, wi-thout discrimination, to 
the fisheries in the maritime waters of each Member State, but provided 
for derogation in that for five yeai^ a three mile exclusive zone could 
be reserved off those coasts where the local population was heavily 
dependent on inshore fishing for its l i v e l i h o o d , T h e  prospect 
of enlargement of the Community meant fishing assumed a new emphasis. 
Fishery negotiations with the prospective four Members proved part­
icularly tough and the failure to obtain a favourable agreement 
acceptable to Norwegian fishing interests contributed to Norway's not 
acceding to the Community, The Act of Accession,while retaining 
the basic principle of equal access, admitted derogation. Member 
States could in a six mile zone, calculated from the baselines, restrict 
fishing activity to that of vessels which had traditionally fished in
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those waters and which operated from "ports in that geographical 
coastal area."(^^) Derogation was permitted until 31 December I982,
The six mile limit was extended to twelve nautical miles in defined 
geographical areas.
Recognition of special dependency became increasingly more 
apparent within the EEC following the extension, as from 1 January 
19??» by Member States of their fishing limits In the North Atlantic 
to 200 miles,
The Hague Resolution further provided that an internal fisheries 
policy should take account of the special needs of certain areas, viz; 
Greenland,Iceland and the Northern United Kingdom, and that those 
needs should be reflected in the allocation of the total allowable 
catches amongst Member S t a t e s . T h e  draft quota proposals 
submitted for I98I reflect the special needs of such areas and the 
"special needs of certain regions in which economic activity is largely 
dependent on fishing has been adopted as one of the guidelines 
on which the common fisheries policy is to be based.
The EEC's recognition that certain regions are confronted with 
problems through a special dependency on fisheries is fur'ther demon­
strated by the studies which the Gomiaission has sponsored of such areas, 
e.g. that of (i) Brittany and (ii) Ireland,
The Gonimunity has further acknowledged special dependency in 
the structural measures, which have been proposed inter alia to 
alleviate the problems and improve the position of areas specially 
dependent on fisheries.
The EEC does apparently recognise that the special needs of 
certain regions within Member States may merit preferential treatment
uu
in the allocation of fishery resources. That recognition appears, 
however, to have been dictated by a political rather than a legal 
requirement. Recognition of special dependency only became more 
explicit within the EEC on the Gomidimity *s enlargement in 1973®
Why?
Recognition of special economic dependency was necessary if the 
applicant States were to become Gommunity Members and this required
Coiumunity membership being made acceptable on the domestic 
political front®
Recognition by the EEC of special dependency has not been confined 
to intra-community relations, The fisheries agreement between the 
EEC and the Faroe Islands makes explicit reference to "the vital 
importance for the Faroe Islands of fisheries which constitute their 
essential a c t i v i t y , T h e  special dependency of the Faroe Islands 
is reflected in the allocation of quotas of the fish stocks concerned.
Agreement between Norway and the EEC on fisheries recognised a 
Norwegian special dependency on the fisheries off the west cosist of 
Greenland,Recognition was consequently accorded of a de facto 
situation. Dependency was in other words used as a bargaining 
weapon.
However, the agreement with the Faroe Islands alone of the bi­
lateral agreements which regulate the EEC's external fishery relations, 
makes specific mention of a special dependency on fisheries. The 
majority of bilateral agreements are concerned with reciprocal fishing 
rights. There are two other categories of external fishery arrange­
ments, (i) those which are based on the principle of access to sur­
pluses, e.g. the EEG/US Agreement 1977, whereby EEC vessels are granted
fishing rights off the US c o a s t , a n d  (ii) those agreements based 
on the principle of non-reciprocity where the Community contributes 
part of the finance, viz; Agreement with Republic of Senegal, 
and Agreement with Republic of Guinea-Bissau.
Those bilateral agreements concerned with reciprocal fishing
rights provide that each party;
"shall determine each year, for the fishing zone falling 
under its jurisdiction, subject to adjustments necessi­
tated by unforeseen circumstances, and on the basis of 
the need for rational management of the biological 
resources -
(a) the total allowable catch for individual stocks 
or complexes of stocks ,..
(b) ,,, the catch allocated to the fishing vessels 
of the other party and the zones in which the 
catches may be made *,,"
and in the determination of these possibilities, each party is required
to take account of;
" (i) the advantages of preserving the traditional
characteristics of fishery activities in the 
frontier coastal, areas;
(ii) the need to minimize the difficulties encoun­
tered by the Party whose fishing possibilities 
may be reduced in the course of achieving the 
above mentioned balance;
(iii) 8,11 other relevant factors,"^ ^
Although not explicitedly mentioned, it may be envisaged, that a 
special dependency on fisheries might certainly be a factor to be 
taken into account in preserving, for instance, the traditional 
characteristics of fishery activities. .Alternatively., "all other relevant 
factors" is an open ended consideration and special dependency might 
thereby be categorised as being one such relevant factor*
It appears that recognition of special economic dependency and 
consequent preferential rights has not been dictated by any legal 
requirement to do so. Recognition has been in each instance both 
in intra-Gommunity arrangements and arrangements with non-Members,
of a ^  facto situation and has "been prompted by political rather 
than legal considerations* Accordingly, the European Community 
has like the international Community recognised special economic 
dependency and preferential rights, but similarly that recognition 
is not one granted as of legal right.
Recognition of Special Economic Dependency and Preferential Rights
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within a Municipal Legal System
Another legal context within which special economic dependency
and preferential rights are currently being debated is that of
Canada* Here the municipal system of a federal State is being
asked to acknowledge and accommodate the concepts, Newfoundland
is advancing on grounds of "special economic dependency" a claim for
preferential access to fish stocks vis-a^vis the other eastern maritime
provinces, Newfoundland is arguing that fish stocks in Newfoundland
a M  Labrador waters should be managed in a way that accommodates not
only historic fishing patterns, but also reflects community or
regional dependencies. Opposition to this claim has come, in
particular with regard to cod stocks found in the eastern and north
eastern waters of Nevjfoiindland and Labrador, from the other
eastern provinces, Newfoundland is advocating that northern cod
stocks should be reserved tO:
(i) "inshore and middle distance effort based on coastal 
communities in the area and to the extent it can 
be harvested by that effort;" and
(ii) "where, within the total allowable catch, a surplus 
to inshore effort can be clearly shown to exist,
it must be reserved to offshore effort landing
into Newfoundland ports for distribution to pro­
cessing plants which now operate on a seasonal 
basis and at about kOfa of capacity,"(70)
Newfoundland claims other Atlantic provinces have never developed the
dependency on these stocks that Newfoundland demonstrates,
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A situation has again emerged where preferential rights are not 
being granted as of legal right, and the claimant is consequently 
seeking recognition of a do facto situation, Newfoundland is like 
other cla5.mants, utilising special dependency as a political weapon 
in negotiations,
V/hat iTiay be concluded from the foregoing? The overrid big 
conclusion is that no legal system has to date accorded legal recog­
nition to the concepts of "special economic dependency" and "preferen­
tial rights". Within the international, community îmd the European 
Community recognition has been accorded, but that recognition has been 
a political response to a given set of circumstances. Recognition 
has yet to be accorded under the municipal system examined. Even if 
Newfoundland's claim be recognised, that recognition will similarly 
be prompted by political rather than legal considerations. That is 
the current position. Looking to the future, international law may 
in view of Article 71 of the Draft Convention be seen to accord legal 
recognition to the concept of "overwhelmingly dependent." Consequently, 
special dependency and preferential rights should not be dismissed 
lightly. They are obviously important considerations which have 
featured and will continue to feature in fishery negotiations,
VJhat constitutes special economic dependency and how may that 
dependency be articulated? These questions and other related issues 
are dealt with in Chapters Three and Four,
/ü
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CHAPTER THREE 
Special Dependency
Special dependency and preferential rights are closely inter­
related "• so much so that their separation may appear arbitrary. 
Nevertheless, especially since the IGJ's judgment in 1974» certain 
independent observations may be made regarding each. It is proposed 
within this Chapter to examine special dependency. Special dependency 
is considered initially as it is pre-requisite to preferential rights, 
The concept will be examined in the light of the Court's judgment and 
then in the context of claims that have been submitted and recognised 
as meriting preferential treatment.
Preferential rights should be granted in favour of "a coastal 
State in a situation of special dependence on its coastal fisheries ... 
only:
"at the moment when an intensification in the exploit­
ation of fishery resources makes it imperative to 
introduce some system of catch limitation and sharing 
of those resources, to preserve the fish stocks in the 
interests of their rational and economic exploitation."^ ^
In spite of qualifications that have been made on the Court's compe-
tence to deliberate on preferential right s, wh at  the Court said
must be examined. The Court, whether it is seen as a law-applying
body or a law-creating body, does represent a forum of judicial
opinion and its decisions should not be lightly dismissed merely
because it exceeded its terms of reference,
A special dependency on fisheries in itself would not, in the 
Court's view, give rise to preferential rights. The need to conserve 
fishery stocks requires not only to be present, but to be imperative. 
Conservation needs are, in the light of the Court’s judgment, a
//
complementary pre-requisite condition to special dependency» Special 
dependency and a need to regulate fisheries in the interests of 
rebuilding stocks, have to exist simultaneously. The Court, in 
stating this, was reiterating a requirement laid down in the 1958 
Resolution on Special Situations relating to Coastal Fisheries, 
viz:
where for the purpose of conservation it becomes 
necessary to limit the total catch of a stock or stocks 
of fish in an area of the high seas adjacent to the 
territorial sea of a coastal State .,, agreement should 
be reached in which the preferential requirements of 
the coastal State resulting from its dependence upon 
the fishery concerned would be recognised."
Although the IGJ declared that the above two conditions should 
exist before preferential rights come into operation, the legacy of 
the Court's judgment is not so much what it gives to the international 
community, but rather the problems which it highlights and leaves 
unanswered. Problems which become all the more acute when the required 
agreement with other States concerned is sought.
The following section identifies some of the problems that may be 
encountered in establishing a claim for preferential fisheries rights, 
e.g. acceptance of a need for conservation and acceptance by others of 
a claimant’s special dependency. So as to illustrate the nature of 
the problems which may arise, reference is made to both the 
Norvregian Case (1951) and the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (1974). 
(Although not concerned directly with preferential rights, both esses 
serve to illustrate some of the problems which may be encountered with 
regard to preferential treatment).
Initially there must be a need for conservation. Any claim for 
preferential treatment because of special dependency must be accom­
panied by evidence demonstrating that fishing activity must be controlled.
/o
in the interests of stock or stock(s) conservation.
Nhat happens, though, if scientists should differ as to whether 
the fishery stocks concerned are being fully exploited or are threatened? 
Not only may scientists disagree, but the scientific evidence submitted 
may be challenged. Driscoll and McXellax^^^ found that within NEAFC, 
for instance, States unable to accept,because of economic interests 
in the herring fishery, the scientific arguments advanced in favour 
of catch reductions stressed the "is^oompleteness" of the scientific 
evidence. States (Denmark is cited as a "good example") rather than 
advance any claims of "economic self interest" stressed the inadequacy 
of the scientific evidence. They did this rather than accept TAGs 
and then advance any form of economic intei'^ st as a relevant consider­
ation in the allocation of national quotas. Again, within NEAFC with 
regard to white fish, States could not agree on the need for TAGs, 
e.g. in respect of plaice and sole, in spite of scientific evidence 
that TAGs were required. The Dutch, in particular, expressed reserva­
tions on the need for the regulation of catches and their refusal to 
accept the IGJ’s scientists* recommended TAG led to the adoption of 
a NEAFC TAG in excess of that recoaimended,
B’ishery scientists and fishermen may differ as to the duration of 
conservation measures. An argument advanced recently illustrates the 
different approach that may be adopted by interested pa.rties. Fisher­
men have contended that it would be disadvantageous to thorn to allow 
the stocks to replenish to too high a level, as it would have reper­
cussions on the market price they would receive for their catch, i.e. 
plentiful fish supplies means low prices and low returns for fishermen.
Do all fishing stocks have to be fu].ly exploited? Tiie Court 
provided no answer to this question. Nor did it consider the effect
/y
that the regulation of a fully exploited stock could have on a stock 
not so exploited and not, therefore, subject to regulation,
Nhat about the conservation record of the claimant? Other 
interested States may regard this as a relevant consideration. A 
claimant which has a poor record may find tha.t this would be used to 
counter its arguments for preferential rights. As the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Case illustrates, Iceland’s recoM in the field of 
conservation was considered and was utilised by the United Kingdom 
and Germany in their efforts to undermine Iceland’s extensive fishing 
c3^ ii.ms, Iceland’s "volte face" within NEAFC was highlighted and 
introduced as evidence against hsr,^^^ The British, in other words, 
emphasised that Iceland had failed to utilise the International 
machinery which existed for conservation of fish stocks. How could 
Iceland profess to be concerned about conservation when she had failed 
to become a party to the Convention on Fishing and Consei'vation of the 
Living Resources? The British challenged Iceland’s denial that the 
fish stocks round IceD.and were in any imminent danger and submitted 
that all the necessary measures of monitoring and control which.could 
be taken under existing arrangements were in fact being taken.
The British further challenged the substance on which Iceland’s 
case was based. There had been, contrary to Iceland’s claim, no 
increase in UK fishing activity over recent years, nor did improved 
fishing techniques constitute any immediate threat to the Icelandic 
area. Furthermore, the increased tonnage and trawler building 
programme of the Icelandic Government and their plans for increased 
fishing capacity were hard to reconcile with I c el andears of 
increased fishing capacity by other States, Iceland’s expansionist 
domestic fisheries programme did not bear out the contention that the
ÜO
conservation needs of the area concerned were imperative*
The foregoing illustrates some of the problems that may beset 
any attempt to establish a. need for conservation. At the outset, 
scientific opinion may differ as to whether or not regulatory measures 
are necessary. Those interested in the fishery concerned may adopt 
a different standpoint from fishery scientists, both as to the need 
for conservation measures and the duration of their application. 
Scientific findings may be challenged as being inadequate and not 
justifying the preferential treatment claimed. In addition, even 
if the need for conservation is recognised, the conservation record 
of the claimant State may be influential in determining the success 
of a claim for preferential rights,
Ibe Comrt stated that while preferential rights implied a. certain 
priority over the rights of other States, they could not imply "tho 
extinction of the concurrent rights of other States'* and that in 
considering the rights of other States, particular regard, should be 
paid to the rights of those States which had engaged in the 
same fishery over a long period and which ha,d established an economic 
dependence on the same fishing grounds.
Consequently, with regaird to the concept of special dependency, 
two principal problems can immediately ba discerned, via: the need
to gain acceptance by other interested States of the claimant’s 
special dependence and the need to reconcile the special dependency 
of the claimant with the fishing interests of other States,
The difficulty of convincing other States of the claimant’s 
special dependency is well illustrated in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case. Preferential lights were not claimed by Iceland, but a claim
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of special dependency was advanced as justification for the extension 
by Iceland of an exclusive fisheries gone. Hence, the opposition 
which met Iceland's claim could he similar to those which may be 
used to refute a claim for preferential rights based on special 
dependency,
"First of all, let us get rid of the idea of Iceland as 
a nation of impoverished fishermen clinging precariously 
to life - Iceland, in fact, has a high standard of living 
Of course, I accept that the Icelandic economy is 
largely dependent on fish. But not entirely so by any
The United Kingdom rejected Iceland’s dependency on fisheries after 
an examination of the Icelandic economy, Iceland was characterised 
as being "by a n y  standards a moderately rich country", whether 
measured in terms of either the usual economic criteria (such as 
GNP per capita) or indicators of the standard, of living of its people 
(such as housing, education, welfare and consumer durables). On a 
comparison with other countries, the United Kingdom conclude that 
Iceland’s GNP had over the previous decade exceeded that of most 
European countries and the USA, and was tmce that of the UK, In 
real terms, Iceland had the highest growth rate of OECD countries.
In terms of consumer expenditure, Iceland’s consumer expenditure per 
capita had increased by 43% compared with the United States and the 
United Kingdom where the corresponding rates of groirth were 33% and 
19% respectively.
The United Kingdom recognised that Iceland’s prosperity was
closely linked to the yearly successes (and failures) of its fishing
indtstry. However, it was pointed out that the Icelandic Government
had realised the dangers of such a dependency and had consequently;
"adopted definite policies and made specific asnangemenix) 
for industrial diversification which were considered major 
steps forvraid towards lessening its dependence upon the 
fishing industry,"(8)
On the basis of its examination, the United Kingdom concluded 
that the Icelandic claim to the fish stocks should be viewed in a 
different light from that in which it had been presented, and that 
the dependence of Iceland on fishing had not only diminished but 
would continue to diminish in line with Icelandic Government policy; 
and, consequently, did not vindicate the taking of all the fish 
in order "to maintain a, reasonable rate of growth*"'-
The IGJ stated that not only the livelihood of a country’s people 
should be taken into account, biit that special dependency should also 
relate to economic development. However, what weight is to be 
attached to economic development? Is a State with a developed economy 
to ba denied preferential rights, while a State with a less developed 
economy is not? It is all very well for opposing States to point to 
the high standard of living enjoyed by the claimant State, but what 
if the high standard of living is enjoyed as a direct result of fishing 
activity? Are other States to dictate the economic domestic policy 
of another and force industx'ial diversification at a greater speed 
than originally planned?
Conversely, of course, a disadvantage of preferential rights is
that it may encourage dependency and the perpetuity of outdated fishing
methods. This was highlighted in the Anglo-No:rwegian Fisheries Case
when the United Kingdom observed that the economies of the time were%
"forcing Norway to bid.ng her technique of fishing more 
into line with that of other countries and this, in its 
turn, demands not a return to pre-war systems of pro­
tection of uneconomic methods, still less an intensifi­
cation of that protection, but a system of equal, and 
scientifically regulated exploitation of the fishdng 
areas under international agreement."(10)
Obviously, the acceptance of a claimant’s dependency by other 
interested States could prove difficult. Difficult because, in essence.
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both the claimant State and others interested in the relevant fishery 
adopt a subjective standpoint. The claimant wishes to malce gains 
over the other States, while the latter attempt to safeguard their 
own interests and thereby seek to deny or at least play down any 
claim of special dependency.
The difficulty of gaining acceptance of special dependency is 
currently reflected within the EEC negotiations, where in March I9BI 
the British claim for "preferential areas" beyond twelve miles was 
held to be unjustified on the grounds that 90% of the inshore fishing 
was concentrated in the twelve mile zone.
If agreement can be reached there still remains the problem of 
reconciling the various competing interests. How are the interests 
of the various States to be quantified? How is the special dependency 
of a fisheries community in a distant water fishery to be weighed 
against a coastal community's dependency? Again, no assistance is 
provided by the Court,
The need to reconcile the competing interests was recognised in
both the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and the Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case, In 1951 the United Kingdom, while denying that economic
interests had any legal c o n t e n t , d i d  state that ;
"there are economic interests on both sides, and if these 
matters were to be taken into account at all, the Govern­
ment of the United Kingdom would certainly be entitled to 
point, in its turn, to the interests of its own fishermen, 
to the dependency of the population of Hull, Grimsby,
Fleetwood and Aberdeen in which trawling can practicably 
be carried on, and to the serious effect which restrictive 
measures over these' areas would have on their development 
and on the food supply of our population,"(^2) ,,
Similarly, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case both the United 
Kingdom and Germany stressed the need for account to be talcen. of their
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respective fishing activity in the area.
If special dependency is satisfied, the reconciliation of the
(13)various interests should he done in an "equitable manner#" ' The 
reliance of British vessels on Icelandic waters for all or a significant 
part of their catch, the inability to diversify fishing activity away 
from such fishing grounds, the lack of alternative fishing opportunity 
which would in turn result in the scrapping of vessels and so constitute 
the loss of a considerable national asset, were all identified as 
relevant considerations to be quantified against Iceland's contentions* 
The impact of increased unemployment in areas, such as Humberside and 
Lancashire, was stressed as was the adverse effect on consumers that 
would follow from a reduction in the availability of fish supplies
Similar az'guments were advanced by the Federal German Republic in 
an attempt to establish its dependence on Icelandic waters,^ ^
The nature of the interests which the United Kingdom and Germany 
submitted for consideration only accentuate the complexity of recon­
ciling the interests of other States with the special dependency of 
the claimant*
These then are some of the problems associated vrith the concept
of special dependency. However, before most of these problems are
encountered, special dependency itself has to be established. As
the FGR stated in its Pleadings;
"Before making claims for higher preferential rights at 
the expense of other nations which depend on the same 
resources, Iceland should first establish that such a 
claim is not only advantageous for the Icelandic eponomy, 
but also really indispensable and the only way for 
Iceland's future economic development."(i6)
The responsibility lies with the claimant to establish its special 
dependency on fisheries.
V/hat constitutes special dependency? Special dependency is a
vague ill-defined concept and the Court, although according judicial
recognition, failed to give any indication as to how a coastal State’s
dependence was to ha measured, A yardstick against which dependency
may be assessed would be especially useful when it is recalled that
preferential rights are, according to the IGJ, not;
"a static concept, in the sense that the degree of the 
coastal State’s preference is to be considered as fixed 
for ever at some given moment",
but are rather only;
"a function of the exceptional dependence of such a 
coastal State on the fisheries in adjacent watez-s aiid 
may, therefore, vary as the extent of that dependence 
changes."(1?)
If the claim of special economic dependency is to be accepted and 
receive recognition as a legitimate consideration in fisherjf negotia­
tions, there must exist a means of deciding when the claim is valid. 
Certain criteria should be fulfilled by the claimant, so that the 
extent of dependency may be gauged. What criteria? Criteria which 
will be recognised as being relevant and generally accepted as 
applicable.
It is recognised that a precise formula for determining special 
dependency will probably prove impossible to postulate. Nevertheless^ 
it should be possible to produce some rule of thumb principles which 
a claimant of special dependency should advance in favour of its 
claim. Accordingly, it is now proposed to look at areas which have 
had their dependency to some extent recognised, viz* Iceland, the 
Faroe Islands, the Shetland Isles, the West Coast of Scotland and 
Ireland; at Newfoundland and Labrador which is currently claiming
a special dependency and finally other possible potential claimants.
The purpose of this is to see if any common characteristics amongst
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claimants may be highlighted as being relevant to a specie,! 
dependency claim* It is not imagined that claimants within different 
legal contexts should necessarily demonstrate any resemblance to each 
other. Nevertheless, a factual resemblance may verj*- well exist and 
a future claimant of special dependency will undoubtedly look at those 
claims of special dependency which have been recognised in an attempt 
to reinforce their claim.
Wliat factor's emerge as being of relevance? Factors, that is,, 
over and above the exploitation of the releva,nt fish stocks to the 
detriment of the fishermen from the area claiming special dependency. 
Several factors emerge as being of particular relevance and before 
these are discussed in detail the principal ones are identified below 
as being:
(a) the numbers employed in the fishing industry represent a large 
proportion of the total labour force of the area;
(b) the fishing industry is fundamental to the economy of the 
region as a whole « i.e. in the sense that the fortunes of the fisheries 
sector will be felt throughout the economy and will determine the health 
of other industries in the area;
(c) the alternative employment opportunities for those leaving 
the fishing industry are minimal. This will be particularly relevant 
if the area already has high unemployment;
(d) the maximum duration of fishing operations can be measured 
in hours rather than days;
(e) national government policy is to support and/or encourage 
the development of the fisheries sector; and
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(f) fishing is a "way of life",
The importance of the overall number employed, directly and 
indirectly, in the fishing Industzrjf and the relationship of the fishing 
industry to the economy of the area concemed, is apparent from the 
areas examined*
In respect of Iceland the importance of the coastal fisheries to
the whole (emphasis added) Icelandic economy was emphasised.
"The coastal fisheries are the conditio sine gua non 
for the Icelandic economy; without them the country 
would not have been habitable, It is indeed as if 
nature had intended to compensate for the barrenness 
of the country itself by surrounding it with rich 
fishing grounds."(^9)
This having been stated, the overall importance of the fishing 
industry to the economy was substantiated by six factors, viz:
(1) one fifth of the country's GNP was derived from the fishing 
industry;
(2 ) 80-9C% of Icelandic exports were marine products;
(3 ) foreign trade amounted to between 45-50% of the exports of 
the GNP;
(4) the country's need to impor*t minerals or fuel resources owing 
to an absence of any indigenous supplies;
(5) the need to import, with the exception of fish, mutton and 
certain dairy products, vital foodstuffs, because of geographical 
position and climatic conditions; and
(6) the dependency of manufacturing upon imported raw materials 
and the dependency of all Icelandic industries "on imports of machinery 
and other capital goods,"
OD
• In addition, the importance of fishing to particular regional 
communities was emphasised ifith the extent of the dependence on the 
fishing and fish processing industries being so characterised that a 
"failure of catch for several consecutive seasons would render them 
destitute as there are no alternative short-term employment possi­
bilities available,"
The simultaneous decline in the total Icelandic fishing catch and 
the substantial fall in the national income for I967 and I968 further 
illustrated it was alleged the importance of fisheries to the Icelandic 
economy.
Today the Icelandic fishing industry employs an average of 14,330 
persons (i.e. 5»330 in the primary sector and 9,000 in the secondary 
sector) out of a total population of 224,000, Translated into per­
centage terms the fisheries sector is responsible for employing 14-15% 
of the entire labour force.
Fisheries accounts for more than 20% of the GNP, while the value 
of fish exports is US %482,2, In 1978, exports of fish and marine 
products constituted 76% of exports (visible account) - the greatest 
p8,rt of the Icelandic catch is processed for e x p o r t , E v e n  taking 
into account other industii.es and invisible earnings, the fishing 
industry remains dominant within the economy as it constitutes almost 
50% of the total export value of goods and services. Foreign input 
into fisheries is considerably lower than, for instance, in the power 
intensive industries s.nd thereby the former account for a relatively 
high share in the groifth of the Icelandic economy, A reduction in 
catches and fish product prices have adverse repercussions on the 
Icelandic economy,
In respect of the Faroe Islands^^^^ almost 26% of employed persons
derive their income from the fishing industzy* - i.e. from 14,751
employed persons some 3,834 are employed in the fishing industry,
(23)and the Islands boast a fleet of over 308 vessels,
Similar factors were highlighted in respect of the Shetland Isles 
in a 1979 report^^^) which advocated that Shetland fishing vessels 
should receive preference within the Shetland fishing area principally 
because of the importance of the fishing industry to Shetland and "its 
very probable increased significance in the post-oil economy."
The fishing industry generated a total of 1,280 FTE jobs (FTE == 
"full-time equivalent"; part-time and seasonal jobs are expressed as 
the equivalent of full-time employment) in 1976, which constituted 
1 ^  of the total employed workforce. An estimated 72% of that 
figure were engaged in the fishing sector (catching and processing), 
17% in local services and %  in local manufacturing. Apparently, 
local government and oil supply bases generate more employment than 
that of fish processing. The role of ancillary activities is illus­
trated in the report. Employment in other activities is generated l/y 
the fisizing sector, e.g. ship repair, net gear repair, fish selling, 
specialised electronic maintenance, transport and other various 
services. The relationship between the fishing sector (comprising 
both catching and processing) and ancillary activities was qualified 
and the results Illustrated in the following table ;
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Percentage of Total Output of Industry 
Generated by Fishing Sector in 1976
Industry Percentage Generated by Fishing Sector
Fish sector 98,2%
Ship repair 49.6%
Utilities 13*1%
Distribution 12,1%
.Others All less than 1C%
(Source: McNicoll (1979)» 11 - see footnote (24)).
The ship repair industry thus is identified as being particularly
dependent on the demand generated by the fishing sector. This is a
decline since 1971» when the level of dependence was 91%. This
decline is seen as reflecting McNicoll's observation that:
"given the substantial flow of goods and services among 
the ship repair, fish catching and fish processing, 
these three industries combined, could be regaided as 
forming an industrial complex of great importance to 
the non-oil Shetland economy. The existence of such 
an indigenously“developed complex of essentially manu­
facturing activities is probably very unusual in small 
rural Scottish areas,"(25)
Goull, Goodlad and Shevas cited the total value of fish sales 
and of processed fish in 1976 as £4,506,000 and £7,263,000 and compared 
these figures with the annual income from other industrial activities 
pursued on the Shetland Islands, These other industries, agriculture, 
knitwear and tourism had an estimated annual income of £3,250,000, 
£2,000,000 and £1,750»000-£2,000,000 respectively.
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In 1976, total earnings for the catching and processing sectors 
were £2,133,000 and £1,088,300 respectively, while the annual a.vera.ge 
income for fishermen was £4,319 and £2,415 fish workers.
The fishing sector accounted, it was estimated, for 10.3% ( 6 „ Q ^  
for the catching sector and 3«^ for the processing sector) of the 
total household income from the income paying sectors of the Shetlemd 
economy, and that income generated l)y the fishing sector amounted to 
£4,4 million (14%) of the total income generated for the same year.
The importance of fi idling in the Shetland economy is further 
illustrated In the Report by reference to export figures: in 19?6,
£6 ,947,000 in value of processed fish (95*6%) from a total value of 
£7 ,263,000 was exported from Shetland, A further £289,600 worth of 
unprocessed fish was directly exported by the catching sector (i.e. 
value of landings made outside Shetland), Net fish and fish products 
accounted for 63% of all non-oil. exports from Shetland in 1976 (total 
value « £7f235,400) whereas total imports by the fishing sector amounted, 
to £2,539,000 thus providing the fishing sector vdth an external trade 
surplus of £4 ,695,800* A performance apparently not matched by any 
other local industry and of particular importance bec8,use "the level 
of economic activity in any region will depend on its ability to 
generate revenue from outside the local area,"^^^^
Coull, Goodlad and Shevas conclude that almost all the gross out­
put of the fishing sector was generated by its own sales and that "the 
Shetland fishing industry is almost totally independent of the level 
of activity in the other sectors of the economy," Consequently, "the 
fishing sector itself will not be greatly affected by any growth or 
decline in demand in other sectors of the economy", whereas "a decline
92
in the fishing sector will have considerable effects on the rest of
the economy, In other ords, a one-way inter-relations hip
exists between the fishing interests and the rest of the comunity*
Such is the nature of this relationship that even after considering 
the impact of oil-related activity which has admittedly been respon­
sible for a decline in the fishing Industry^^^^ the report concludes 
that this decline is temporary. The authors of the repozrt are 
confident that in the long-term, "the Shetland economy will again be 
heavily dependent on the fishing industzry and that the oil industrj^  
is a short-term feature of the economy,
This conclusion is based on two factors* Initially, in spite 
of having undergone a decline, the underlying structure of the industry 
"with its laxge degree of interaction within the local economy, has 
remained s t a b l e T h e  oil-related activity does not display 
the same degree of interaction with the local economy as the fishing 
industry doss and in addition, "the traditional fishing industry has 
more linkages with the wider Shetland economy than the recent oil-related 
a c t i v i t y , I n  any case, the level of oil-related activity will, 
it is anticipated, begin to decline in 1982, "as the construction 
projects are completed.Consequently, the report concludes that 
a re-adjustment of the local economy towards the fishing industry will 
be necessary "in anticipation of the eventual depletion of North Sea 
Oil and the end of the Oil era in Shetland.
The Clyde Estuary and the West of Scotland^ha^ a fishing 
Industry which forms either the major source of employment or a sub­
stantial and integral park of the overall employment picture* A 
closely related issue and one particularly emphajsised with regard to 
the West of Scotland is the non-availability of alternative employinent 
opportunities for those currently employed in the fishing industry.
The absence of alternative employment for the 800 full-time west 
coast fishermen and for 7 ^  of the 5^0 full-time fishermen in the 
Firth of Clyde is highlighted while the Islands of the Outer Hebrides 
are identified as requiring particular attention. The Islands 
extending some I30 miles from Barra in the south to Lewis in the 
north form "one of the most remote areas of communities in the EEC".
They boast a population of 29,000 and unemplojrraent rates fluctuate 
from south to north and may reach 1^.' ^
A similar analysis of the labour force in Ireland was undertaken 
in the Study partly sponsored by the European Commission, (the 
Irish Government was also responsible for the financing of the Study, 
which was undertaken by tie Economic and Social Research Institute, 
Dublin) and which was designed specifically to assess the economic 
and social situation of the future outlook for the fisheries sectors, * 
In 1963, 5»588 people were employed in the Irish fishing industry; 
yyfo were engaged wholly in sea fishing while the remaining 7Q^ were 
employed on a part-time basis. By 1969» the number of part-time 
fishermen had declined by about 3^ to 3*810, Tlie number of full-time 
fishermen had increased by 197? to nearly 6C^ over the I963 level.
Of those employed in the sea fishing industry in Ireland in 1977* 
two-thirds were employed part-time or occasionally while the remaining 
third were employed full-time. In I978, 1.03% of the total male 
working population was engaged in the Irish fishing industry. Also 
emphasised in the Report is the amount of indirect employment which 
may be generated by fishing activity by way of inshore operations, 
distri-bution, processing, etc. Although the authors of the Study 
acknowledged difficulty in ascertaining the numbers engaged in indirect 
employment, they were able to conclude that the number had increased 
throughout the last decade. Nevertheless, in spite of such growth,
it was found that in terms of national employment the fishing industry 
was responsible for the employment of a relatively small nuiaber. The 
overall conclusion of the Report was that the importance of the Irish 
fishing industry lies in its regional distribution. Accordingly, the 
Report on Ireland broke down the employment figures and examined them 
within a regional context and in doing so highlighted that it is within 
a regional context rather than a national context that claims for 
special dependency will have to be assessed*
In Ireland, for example, the greatest concentration of employment 
in sea fishing is in the west and north-west coastal areas, which 
together accoimt for nearly 60^ of the total employment in the industry* 
The west coast has 2 %  of all the fishermen in the State, the north-west 
coast 35^f the south coast 3i^t whereas the east has only 10^  of the 
total. It emerges from the Report that fishermen, although they form 
only a small proportion of the total labour force, form a relatively 
high proportion of the gainfully oceupi^ in their respective regions. 
Looking at individual counties, 20^ of the District Electoral Divissions 
(DEDs) in Donegal and Kerry, had fishermen compared with l6-l?^ for 
Louth and Wexford, 13^ Mayo and less than %  for Dublin,
Expressed in overall terms, the number gainfully occupied in 1971 
in the counties having fishermen was 752,000 out of a total labour force 
in the State in that year of 1,120,000, The total labour force in the 
DEDs with fishermen was 71,000, or 9«^ of the labour force in the 
counties in which these DEDs were located. Fishermen (5,688) accounted 
for 8,6^ of the labour force in the DEDs having fishermen, but this 
percentage varied from 195% iu Donegal to 1 ^  in Galway,"'lÿS in Wateifori 
and 2^ in Dublin and Wicklow.
It is apparent that fishing in certain areas constitutes an
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important occupation and the performance of the fishing industry 
will ha,ve widespread repercussions throughout the region as a whole.
Although a claim of special dependency has not been submitted by 
Brittany, the European Commission has sponsored a study similar to 
that carried out on Ireland^^^^ and the report is instrumental in 
determining the factors the European Commission consider to be of 
importance in assessing the contribution of fisheries to the region's 
economy, Brittany is the foremost French fishery region and has 
within it ky/> of all seamen at sea, 3 %  of the French fishing fleet 
and taking all vessels collectively its contribution towards national 
production is of the tonnage landed and 48^ of the value of 
landings,
Statistics illustrate the importance of fishing within the Breton
economy - in 1975, 13,000 seamen were engaged in non-industrial and
industrial fishing and 9,000 were employed in the upstream and dovm-
stream activities, viz; 22,000 jobs taking the fishing sector as a
whole, or 2.3^ of the total working population of the region, but in
the case of coastal regions this percentage rose to 7.5%» An overall
picture of the Breton fishery system and its recent development is
presented. The fishing system is seen in its broadest sense, i.e.
as the overall activities involved in catching "the natural biological
products of the marine environment," The report consequently declares
that it is interested:
"in fishing as an activity and also in the upstream and 
downstream activities directly linked with it, whereby 
the facilities available are kept in operation on the 
one hand, and the products landed are disposed oj^and 
processed on the other,"(38)
Brittany occupies, by virtue of the volume and diversity of its 
catches, a foremost rank in the fishing league tables, both at national
and European level, e.g. in 1977, in respect of sea fishing, Brittany 
with a tonnage of 231,500 tonnes and a value of 1,2 milliard Francs 
had a 44^ share of the overall tonnage for France and 48^ of the 
total value. The report then proceeds to give a brealcdown of catches 
by species and arrives at the conclusion that Brittany alone accounts 
for 48^ of the landed value, tailing all species together, whereas it 
only supplies little over 44^ of the tonnage produced.
The economic importance of fisheries in the Breton economy is 
considered. The economic importance being assessed with regard to 
ancillary employment, whether directly (through production), or 
indirectly (through the wealth thus created). The overall conclusion 
of the report is that with 11,000 shore jobs in Brittany directly based 
on fishing "a job at sea directly creates a job ashore.
With respect to indirect ancillary employment, it is recorded 
that the effect of such employment is more difficult to "identify since 
its relations with the fishing industry ,.. are not always precisely 
defined," Nevertheless, the authors of the report have, in spite of 
the lack of more precise data, concluded that the two jobs (i.e. the 
one at sea and one ashore), "give rise to a third job in the secondary 
and tertiary sectors of the region and a fourth at national level,
The report analyses the role of the fishery system in certain 
regions within Brittany and identifies the characteristics of the 
fishery system in each region. These include particularly, a break­
down of those employed either directly or indirectly in the fishery 
system, the position of fishing as a source of employment vis-a-vis 
other activities in the area.
It is apparent that the overall number engaged in the fishing
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industry, 'both directly and indirectly will be an important consider­
ation in assessing any claim of special dependency. Although the 
exact figure as to what percentage of the labour force that should 
be cannot be given it is obvious that the higher it is the more chance 
a claim of special dependency has of success. The importance of 
fisheries to the Faroe Islands with some 2 ^  of the Faroese labour 
force employed in fisheries is indisputable, V/hat may be concluded 
from the foregoing studies, though, is that claims of special depen­
dency will require to be voiced within a regional context. The United 
Kingdom, for instance, with only 0,1/^ of the total lalx>ur force 
employed in the fisheries sector cannot claim to be dependent on 
fisheries. However, if Scotland and England are compared, Scotland 
demonstrates a greater dependence on fisheries than does England 
(although Scotland and England and Wales have roughly the sajae number 
engaged in the fishing industry and ancillary industries these figures 
must be seen against the population of the respective countries, viz;
5 million in Scotland and ^Omillion in England and Wales),
The relationship of fishing vis-a-vis the rest of the economy is 
obviously another relevant consideration. As illustrated particularly 
by the study on the Shetland Isles, the fortunes of the fisheries 
sectors have ramifications throughout the whole economy, whereas the 
economic performance of other industries may have little, if any, 
repercussions for fisheries. If the fishing industry can be seen to 
be independent of other economic activity, yet simultaneously funda­
mental to healthy performance elsewhere in the economy, then the area 
concerned may be characterised as being dependent on fisheries.
What other considerations do the studies highlight as being of 
relevance? The proposed plan for the West Coast of Scotland and the
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report on Ireland both emphasise vessel size and the maximum length 
of fishing operations as being salient factors in identifying instances 
of special dependency. In respect of the West Coast of Scotland, the 
report highlights that the fishing vessels operating in the Firth of 
Clyde and West Coast of Scotland are generally smaller than those 
found on the East Coast of Scotland (particularly on the North East 
Coast),Consequently, vessels operating from West Coast of 
Scotland ports usually operate "close to their home port or at least 
to a port where daily landings are made," The report draws part­
icular attention to the fact that all fishing grounds in the West 
Coast area lie within four to eight hours of every fishing harbour in 
the area and that the West Coast vessels being smaller and having less 
powerful engines than their East Coast counterparts inflict less 
damage on the fishing grounds. Similarly, in respect of Ireland, 
the role of inshore fishing is emphasised. The majority of the 
Irish fleet is constituted of inshore and middle-distance trawlers 
which rarely stay at sea on any one trip for more than a few days.
The concentration on inshore fishing is illustrated by 1977 figures.
In that year approximately 72J% of the total catch by Irish fishermen 
was taken from within the Irish twelve mile zone. The dependence 
on inshore fishing is reflected naturally enough in the composition 
of the Irish fishing fleet. In 1977» for exajnple, there were 2,677 
vessels in the fleet of which 899 were wholly engaged in fishing, and 
1,779 were partially employed. Of the total fleet, less than half 
were motor vessels, the remainder being sail, oar or outboard engine 
craft. On the eastern coast of Ireland, vessels were found to be 
bigger than average, approximately 2 ^  over 18 metres. This is in 
contrast to the western areas where 99^ of the vessels are under 18 
metres. Almost 50^ of the boats in the western area are apparently 
under 6 metres.
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In Ireland it was found that reliance on fishing as a main 
oocupation^^^^ was closely related to the size of the boat, e.g. 
almost all those employed on boats over 12 metres declared fishing 
to be their main occupation, whereas less than 4cç% of those working 
on the very small boats stated this to be the case. In such cases, 
farming was found to be the most important alternative occupation with 
over one-fifth giving this as their main occupation. Employment in 
manual jobs was especially important for crewmen. In the 0,59 metre 
boat category, about l6^ of skippers and 8^ of crewmen described 
"unemployment payments" as their main source of income. Indeed some 
6-7^ of all persons questioned mentioned income derived from unemploy­
ment payments. Also looked at was the average number of weeks spent 
in fishing which was identified as 30. This figure varied from 21 
weeks for skippers of boats under 6 metres to 48 weeks for'skippers 
of vessels over 14 metres.
Receiving increased emphasis is the attitude of the national 
government to the fishing industry of the region. For instance, the 
report on the West Coast of Scotland and the Clyde Estuary concludes 
that as the entire area under review, with the exception of the east 
side of the Firth of Clyde, lies within the Highlands and Islands 
Development Board areas, this illustrates recognition by the national 
Government of the special problems which affect the area with regard 
to employment, communications and social services. The Government's 
recognition is the report's authors conclude reflected in that inhabi­
tants from within the Board area receive financial aid for the fishing 
industry from the Board, National government attitud^ ,^.may talce the 
form of supporting a continued dependency, i.e. an established depen­
dency on fisheries. Alternatively, a national government may encourage 
future dependency, i.e. potential dependency on fisheries, as in the
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case of Ireland, The report on Ireland looks at Irish Sea Fisheries 
within the European context and recognises that declared Irish 
Government support for the future development of the industry has 
been accepted by the EEG as entitling the Irish fishing industry to 
receive preferential treatment which has allowed it to expand in 
accordance with the Irish Government's development programme. 
Furthermore, the Irish report strongly suggests that recognition of 
the potential development of a region's future economic basis on 
fisheries would give weight to a claim for preferential treatment. 
Preferential treatment, that is for a limited time, so that the 
development envisaged may take place:
the EEC commitment under the Hague Agreement, while 
not open indefinitely, recognises that the Irish industry 
cannot be expanded overnight, in an efficient manner, to 
talce immediate advantage of the increased quotas. On 
the other hand, it is an Irish responsibility to see 
that necessary steps are taken to remove or reduce 
barriers to growth so that expansion in exports, employ­
ment and income contemplated by the Community action 
will be realised within a reasonable period of time,"
Having said that, though, the report continues that;
"further increases in Irish quotas would depend on per­
formance and that if development policies in Ireland 
result in the growth of an economically viable industry 
and if further growth is achieved then additional 
opportunities to participate in the Community pond
might be forthcoming
In the Brittany study, the incentive schemes introduced by the 
Government are highlighted as the Government's recognition of the 
region's special needs.
Thus it would appear that the national government's attitude 
towards the fishing industry may be of considerable relevance. How­
ever, immediately potential dependency is recognised a problem which 
will affect the practical expression of preferential rights arises, viz;
how much weight should be attached to economic forecasts and over what 
length of time should these forecasts extend?
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Of course, the attitude of the national government could work 
against the claimant and undermine its case for preferential treatment. 
If, for instance, it is a national government's declared policy to 
encourage industrial diversification and thereby reduce a region's 
dependency on fisheries, this may be seen as useful ammunition for 
denying preferential treatment.
The role which a national government may play suggests that final 
recognition of special dependency is political and that politically 
highly emotive arguments such as fishing is a "way of life" do have 
considerable sway. In respect of fishing reference is made to how 
in some areas it may assume "vital socio-economic importance 
while in other areas the fishing industry is identified as being a 
"traditional way of life,"^^^)
The "way of life" argument cannot obviously be quantified. 
Economists will argue that such an argument is without foundation 
when considering efficient exploitation of resources. It is a nebu­
lous and tenuous argument. It does not necessarily follow that what 
has been the case in the past should be perpetuated for the future - 
coal-mining could be described as a "way of life", but that has not 
prevented collieries from being closedJ
The "way of life" argument is, however, a politically highly 
emotive one and fishermen do have, in many countries, e,g, in the UK 
and France, considerable political clout. The success of fishermen 
in bringing pressure on politicians again backs the view that although 
certain primarily economic characteristics will have to be portrayed 
by the claimant, recognition of special dependency will, in the final 
reckoning, be essentially a political decision.
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Certain factors do emerge therefore as being of relevance if 
a claim of special dependency is to be sustained, viz; the percentage 
of the labour force employed directly and indirectly in the fishing 
industry, the overall position of the fishing industry in the general 
economy, the availability of alternative employment, whether or not 
fishing constitutes the main occupation of those involved, the number 
of "fishing days" and the commitment of the national government to the 
region in question. From the above case studies it has been possible 
to formulate some rule of thumb principles which may be utilised to 
assess special dependency. Again it is stressed there is no reason 
why a concept may be articulated in the same way within different 
legal systems. Nevertheless, as is apparent from the foregoing there 
does exist a factual resemblance in the characteristics displayed by 
c3ai raants of special dependency regardless of the legal context in 
which the claim is voiced.
To what extent does the most recent claimant of special depen™ 
dency, Newfoundland, display any of the criteria articulated above? 
Newfoundland is arguing that the fish stocks in Newfoundland and 
Labrador waters should be managed in such a way that reflects community 
or regional dependencies as well as accommodating historic fishing 
patterns. In particular, Newfoundland is advocating that northern 
cod stocks should be reserved to.
inshore and middle-distance effort based on coastal 
communities in the area and to the extent it can be 
harvested by that effort; and (ii) where, within the 
Total Allowable Catch, a surplus to inshore effort can 
be clearly shown to exist, it must be reserved to off­
shore effort landing into Newfoundland ports for dis­
tribution to processing plants which now operate on a 
seasonal basis and at about of capacity."(^6)
Neiffoundland *B claim for preference is founded on the argument that
the other eastern maritime provinces do not display a dependency on
the relevant stocks in the way that Newfoundland does.
The issues of fisheries jurisdiction and fisheries development
have been much to the forefront in talks between the Federal and the
Provincial Governments, Newfoundland has been advocating for greater
control over the fisheries sectors so that influence may be made with
respect "to the socio-economic impact which the fishing exerts
(lyj'S •
throughout the provincial economy,"^ ' Newfoundland is seeking a 
well-defined jurisdictional role for the fisheries s e c t o r , a n d  
believes tha,t:
"the Province must have a prominant role and, in certain 
cases, the paramount voice in decisions concerning the 
management of the fisheries resources in those areas ofyj^\ 
the Canadian 200 mile zone which are contiguous to it,"' ^
The new administration which took office in I98O is apparently 
more provincially-orientated than its predecessor and has indicated 
that the fisheries sector is to be the cornerstone of economic develop­
ment within the Province,
The Newfoundland and Labrador Government itself has formulated 
proposals for the development of Newfoundland's fisheries until I985, 
The five year development plan envisages an increase in fish landings 
in Neiffoundland of 64% (i.e. 637»000 tonnes (I98O) to It million 
tonnes (I985)) while the export value of fish will, it is anticipated, 
increase by 80% (^495 million to ^885 million). The impact of 
expansion in the fisheries will be felt in employment gains in the 
shore-based jobs in processing plants. It is estimated that the 
number of workers will increase from 19,000 during peak production 
periods to 22,000 and with the development of the off-shore and middle- 
distance fleets, it is envisaged that the plants themselves should have 
a longer operating season, Newfoundland's fishing industry can
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apparently provide an*.
"acceptable standard of living to upwa,rds of 25» 000 to
30,000 fishermen, plant workers and their dependents on 
an ongoing basis. Such a degree of prosperity mil 
ensure that the economic base of a large number of 
communities will be sustained and expanded concurrent 
with development potential in all sectors of the 
fishing industry,"(50)
The Discussion Paper of May further stated that;
"The vitality and course of development of the Newfound­
land fishing industry, more than any other sector of the 
provincial economy, determines the social and economic 
well-being of the Province, This activity is now and 
has been for centuries, the sole economic base and focus 
of social and cultural development for virtually every 
community in coastal Newfoundland, Therefore, decisions 
taken with respect to fisheries management and develop­
ment have a persuasive effect in all sectors of the 
economy and determine whether communities will thrive,"^ ^
However, these proposals are essentially outwith the scope of 
this study, I«/liat is of relevance, though, is that the provincial 
Government has recognised that the future economic development of 
Newfoundland should be based on the fisheries sector. The potential 
dependency of Newfoundland on fisheries has been recognised. Thus 
Newfoundland *s claim will have political backing. This alone will 
not obtain preferential rights for Newfoundland, Other factors vrill 
have to be shown to exist.
What are the characteristics displayed by the Neivfoundland fishing
industry that will substantiate a claim of special dependency?
Fishing has a long history in Newfoundland and indeed fishing in the
coastal waters of Newfoundland pre-dates the actual settlement of 
if 52^Newfoundland,^ ^ The late nineteenth century and twentieth century 
witnessed a diversification in the industrial character of Newfound­
land (e.g. pulp and paper production and mining were considerably 
expanded), and on the eve of Newfoundland joining the Cenadian Gonfed-
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eration in 194-9* fishery products accounted for 31% of total exports.
In spite of diversification, fishermen nevertheless still constituted 
31% of the labour force in 1945* Economic diversification has not, 
though, deprived fishing of a prominent position within the Newfound­
land economy, and "there are few territories in the world of comparable 
geographical size and political status in which the fishery occupies 
so important a p o s i t i o n , T h e  numbers employed in the fishing 
industry is estimated at being one-seventh of all persons occupied - 
in other words, approximately 14% of the working population derive 
their income from fishing. Inshore fishermen predominate the New­
foundland fishing scene. In 1977» there were 24,862 inshore fishermen 
compared with 1,24? offshore fishermen, i*e, almost 99fo of all 
fishermen were engaged in exploiting the immediate coastal waters*
The inshore fishermen live in small communities, scattered along the 
Newfoundland and Labrador coastline. Compared with the offshore 
sector, inshore fishing is much more labour intensive and "signifi­
cantly more supportive of the Province's population based in rural 
coastal a r e a s , H o w e v e r ,  in such areas the average income and 
productivity levels are much lower than for offshore fishing.
The numbers employed in the fishing industry is again highlighted 
as an important factor in assessing an area's dependence on the 
industry. The importance of NeTffoundland's fishing industry has, 
vd.th the extension of Canadian national jurisdiction over coastal 
waters, come up repeatedly in the form of discussions m  fisheries 
management within that extended jurisdiction. Decisions taken 
regarding the management and development of fishery resources are 
seen as having "a persuasive effect in all sectors of the economy and 
determine whether communities will t h r i v e , T h e  need to seize 
this opportunity of allowing Newfoundland fishermen preferential access
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to the immediate coastal waters, is regarded as a means of assisting 
the rural communities dependent on fishing to become economically 
self-suf f ic ient
Newfoundland's unemployment figure of twice the national average 
and earned incomes of only slightly more than one half those of the 
nation as a whole, are cited as other determining factors in estab­
lishing Newfoundland's special dependency,
Néwfoundland does therefore display a factual resemblance to 
those areas already considered* The Government(s), both State and 
Federal, recognise the importance of the fisheries to the economy, 
l^% of the population are employed in fisheries, there is little 
alternative employment available. Furthermore, the close proximity 
of Newfoundland to the fishing grounds of the North-West Atlantic 
cannot be ignored, especially as the inshore fishing is characterised 
by short-range operations.
Finally, Newfoundland views*
"the interest that some provinces have expressed in 
deploying freezer trawlers in the cod fishery as con­
trary to Newfoundland's interests producing an adverse 
effect on the economy. These vessels, which are proposed 
to be based outside Nei-jf oundland, would deny an essential 
source of raw material to our seasonal plants, consigning 
them to be marginal operations in perpetuity and frus­
trating the Province's plans to reduce seasonal employment 
in our rural communities. We are, therefore, adamantly 
opposed to any trawler effort directed at this stock 
which would not land the catch in Newfoundland ports 
and which might detract from the inshore effort."(59)
Consequently, it emerges that the manner in which the stocks are
exploited may be relevant in the argument for preferential irights,
Relevant that is if the exploitation is to be in a manner detrimental
to the interests of the party claiming preferential rights.
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Finally, can any claims of special dependency be anticipated?
In other words, are there areas which can be seen to possess some or 
all of the characteristics identified as being associated with 
special dependency which may submit a claim for preferential rights?
One such area from which a claim may be submitted, especially 
if Newfoundland's claim is successful, must be Prince Edward Island 
(PEl). Fishing forms the foundation of PEI's economy and in the 
industrially developed world, "there are so few regions where the 
fishing industry is relatively so important as it is in PEI."^^^^ 
Fishermen constitute ^  of the Island's total labour force. The 
majority of PEI fishermen are engaged exclusively in inshore fishing 
“ a total of 3*210 fishermen were resident in PEI in 1972 whereas the 
offshore vessels accounted for 104 men, most of whom were non-resident. 
In the Gulf of St. Lawrence it is the fishing activities of vessels 
from other Canadian provinces that present the greatest competition 
to PEI's fishing industry. Although the waters round the Island 
yield substantial catches of common commercial species of fish, the 
Island's fishing season is relatively short, compared to that of other 
provinces, this is especially true with respect to inshore fishing.
Although few, if any, men found full employment in the fishing 
industry, most were heavily dependent upon fishing for their liveli­
hood, Furthermore, the Island's geographical location and con­
sequent relative isolation, place it at a comparative disadvantage 
with respect to the development of manufacturing Industries. Con­
sequently, the Island is mainly dependent on its natural resource base 
for self-sustaining economic support. The importance of fisheries in 
the PEI economy is reflected in the fact that the fishing industry 
accounts for a larger share of commodity production than in any other
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Canadian province - even greater than in N e w f o u n d l a n d . I n  
respect of Canada as a whole, the primary and secondary sectors cul- 
minatively accounted for only 1.0% of commodity production. In the 
same year, I97O, the Prince Edward Island primary fish and secondary 
processing industries together accounted for 18% of commodity production,
It is apparent that Prince Edward Island does display character­
istics which could warrant a claim for preferential rights based on 
special dependency. Within the forum of the EEC claims of special 
dependency may be anticipated from Greece.' ^
Greece has some 46,500 f i s h e r m e n , a  figure which is surpassed 
only by one Community country, Italy, with approximately 65,000 
fishermen, Greece has therefore twice as many registered fishermen 
as France (22,456) and the United Kingdom (22,168), In 1978, the 
number of Greek vessels including those without engines and laid up 
vessels, was 26,076 while total fish production for the same year was
120,000 tonnes. The Greek fishing industry falls into four distinct 
sectors *
(i) the overseas fishery operating primarily in the East Central 
Atlantic ;
(ii) the offshore fishery operating in the Mediterranean;
(iii) the coastal fishery operating around the Greek mainland 
and islands; and
(iv) the inland fishery operating in inland waters.
It is from category (iii) that claims for preferential rights 
as a consequence of special dependency may initially be'«anticipated 
as coming. The majority of Greek fishing vessels concentrate on 
coastal waters and the inshore industry in terms of both the number*
1C9
of vessels and the number employed, is the largest sector in Greece, 
Vessels employing one to three men operate round the coastline and 
throughout the islands. Low incomes, particularly in the islands 
and rural areas, e.g. Amurakikos Gulf, are supplemented by fishing, 
tourism and farming. Frequently, all three are pursued.
An OECD survey highlighted that not only were 40% of those fully 
employed in agriculture also employed in some other occupation, but 
that in the country areas, 30^  of those employed in non-agricultural 
sectoïs were also employed part-time in agriculture.
Statistics are not readily available, but it is estimated that 
each Greek fisherman lands approximately 1^ tonnes of fish per man 
(this is compared with 40 tonnes per man in the UIC). Such low 
productivity suggests that Greek fisheries would have to be tackled 
I'd thin the context of a regional/social aid study. It further 
suggests that such areas could claim special dependency if it can be 
anticipated that a decline in their fishery operations or "over 
exposure" to competition from other vessels would be detrimental 
to their living standards. Very few Greek communities can apparently 
be classed as dependent on the fishing industry,although certain 
villages, e.g. Mikaniona and Ghalastra, near Salonica, are the excep­
tion to this generalisation. Apparently, though, Greek fishery 
statistics under-record landings from small vessels and, indee4» many 
of the vessels themselves are unrecorded. Consequently, more infor­
mation is required if claims of regional dependency are to be made. 
Statistics that are available show that certain Greek communities may 
claim preferential rights in their coastal waters on the grounds of 
dependency, but if any such claims are to be successful, the relevant 
data for such a claim has still to be completed, particularly as the
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FERU report highlights that assistance from the Commission depends 
on a clear presentation of a case,(^^)
Special dependency once established may give rise to prefer­
ential rights. The problems associated with preferential rights 
and the possible ways of articulating preferential rights are 
discussed in Chapter Four,
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Preferential Rights
The International Court of Justice though silent in 1974 as to 
how special dependency was to he defined was not so reticent in its 
characterisation of preferential rights. It is proposed in this 
Chapter to examine preferential rights as spelt out by the International 
Court of Justice and the form that international law demands they should 
take. Secondly, possible ways in which preferential rights may be 
articulated will be examined.
The International Court of Justice seized the opportunity in 1974
to elaborate the concept of preferential rights. Preferential rights,
according to the International Court, imply a "certain priority" for
the coastal State, but not
"the extinction of the concurrent rights of other States, 
and particularly of a State which ,,, has for many years 
engaged in fishing in the waters in question such fishing 
being important to the economy of the country concerned"
especially if it has "established an economic dependence on the same
fishing g r o u n d , I n  other words, what the Court was saying was
that a coastal State may be entitled to preferential treatment, but
it may not unilaterally and indiscriminately determine the extent of
its preferential rights. The Court was adamant that preferential
rights were not compatible with the exclusion of all fishing activities
iz')by other States'  ^and that a coastal State's preferential rights and 
the established rights of other States had to continue to co-exist.
The Court repeatedly stressed that preferential rights and the interests 
of other parties should be reconciled in "as equitable a manner as 
p o s s i b l e . N e i t h e r  the rights of the coastal State or those of 
other States were in the Court's opinion absolute;
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"the preferential rights of a coastal State are limited 
according to the extent of its special dependence on 
fisheries and hy its obligation to talce account of the 
rights of other States and the needs of conservation; 
the established rights of other fishing States are in 
turn limited by reason of the coastal State's special 
dependence on the fisheries and its own obligation to 
take account of the rights of other States including 
the coastal State and the need of conservation,"(4)
Preferential rights have to be articulated in a manner acceptable
to all those concerned at a particular time according to circumstances.
Acknowledgement and acceptance of preferential rights is not permanent.
The International Court clearly defined preferential rights as ;
"a function of the exceptional dependence of such a 
coastal State on the fisheries in adjacent waters 
and may therefore, vary as the extent of that depen­
dence changes,"(5)
Preferential rights therefore are not a "static concept in the sense 
that the degree of the coastal State's preference is to be considered 
as fixed for ever at some given moment . , The circumstances 
which give rise to preferential rights, viz: the level of the fish
stocks and special dependency, require to be re-assessed. The 
International Court was silent though on how frequently re-assessment 
should be undertaJcen, Re-assessment would like the initial negotia­
tions demand the involvement of all interested parties - i.e. the 
state of the stocks and special dependency must remain subject to 
scrutiny.
The International Court of Justice saw preferential rights as a 
temporary contingency measure applicable for the conservation of fish 
stocks. Once fish stocks have returned to acceptable levels, the 
need for preferential rights is negated. Essentially, the International 
Court said that preferential rights are applicable only as a response 
to a particular situation, that they must reflect the special depen­
dency of the coastal communities concerned, but simultaneously they
118
must not extinguish the rights of other interested parties» especially 
the rights of those States which demonstrate an established dependency 
on the relevant fisheries*
The International Court's articulation of preferential rights was
in line with the Resolution on Special Situations Relating to Coastal
Fisheries 1958^ *^  ^which provided that negotiations:
"may take place to establish agreed measures which shall 
recognise any preferential requirements of the coastal 
State resulting from its dependence upon the fishery 
concerned, while having regard to the interests of 
other States*"
The emphasis under international law is that there should be agreement 
amongst all parties concerned regarding the initial granting of pre­
ferential rights and that once granted preferential rights should 
while acknowledging special dependency simultaneously recognise the 
rights of other States participating in the fisheries. It is further 
apparent that the continued application of preferential rights is 
dependent on the conditions which prompted their initiation continuing 
to prevail.
Does the Court's articulation of preferential rights have any 
relevance today? It may be thought, with the advent of the exclusive 
economic zone that the answer is no. Admittedly under the Draft 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal States control the exploit- 
ation of resources within their exclusive economic zone. The coastal 
State regulates access by foreign vessels and Article 62 spells out 
the forms that such regulation may ta>ke. Articles 69 and 70, however, 
do deal with access by landlocked and geographically disadvantaged 
States and provide that access by such States should be regulated 
via bi-lateral, subregional and regional agreements. These agree­
ments are to take into account certain factors including, for instance,
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"the need to avoid effects detrimental to fishing communities or 
fishing industries of the coastal States;" and "the nutritional 
needs of the populations of the respective States," These agreements 
may therefore have to provide for the control of fishing activity by 
means which, in effect, recognise the preferential rights of the 
coastal State and/or the preferential rights of geographically dis­
advantaged States over the interests of other participating foreign 
States, Accordingly, while the relevance of the Court's articulation 
of preferential rights has currently diminished for international law, 
it may nevertheless have repercussions in the future and may be 
reflected in regional arrangements which will be the concern of 
international law.
Demands for preferential rights have emerged within the EEX! and 
Canada, Tiie way a concept is articulated in one legal system does 
not dictate how it should or will be expressed in another legal 
context. Nevertheless, the way one legal system chooses to give 
effect to a concept may provide a blueprint when another legal system 
seeks to articulate the concept. This, it is submitted, is especially 
true when within the various legal systems the conditions giving rise 
to claims for preferential rights manifest a resemblance to each 
other.
Preferential rights as a response to conservation requirements 
and special dependency have been characterised by the International 
Court of Justice, The Court's statement represents the only judicial 
pronouncement on preferential rights and it is most likely that those 
seeking to initiate preferential rights will look, before deciding on 
what form they are to take, to the Court's judgment. Compliance 
with the criteria laid down by the Court could in the absence of
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other guidelines enhance the likelihood of preferential rights being 
sucessfully claimed and recognised within another legal context.
It is now proposed to consider the possible options available 
for the expression of preferential rights so to be in accordance with 
the acceptable articulation of the concept under international law.
The examination will include reference to the ways that claimants 
of special dependency have suggested for initiating preferential 
rights* [Note: the EEC's articulation of preferential rights is,
for the most part, dealt with in the following Chapter.]
Preferential rights are essentially about controlling fishing 
activity. Fishing activity may be controlled in a variety of ways 
through, for instance, (i) licensing; (ii) closed seasons/closed 
areas; (iii) gear restrictions/minimum vessel standard; (iv) quotas 
- total allowable catches (TACs ) and (v) economic means of control. 
Nor need fishing activity be controlled by one method alone, for 
instance, a licensing system may be complemented by TACs and gear 
restrictions and, indeed, the effect of one method may be limited 
if other methods of control are not simultaneously applied. Briefly, 
what is the essence of each method?
(i) Licensing.
Under a licensing system fishing activity is restricted to only 
those vessels, vessel owners or fishermen who hold a licence,
(ii) Closed seasons/closed areas,
A closed season essentially involves the prohibition of fishing 
activity during a particular time in the life cycle of an identified 
species, e.g. during spawning, whereas a closed area means that a 
complete sea area is closed to fishing operations,
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(iii) Gear restrictions/minijimm vessel standard.
The principle of selective gear restrictions, e,g, minimum mesh 
size, is to affect beneficially the fish exploitation pattern, A 
similar effect is sought in the introduction of a minimum vessel 
standard whereby participation in the fisheries is dependent upon 
the vessel conforming to a required standard,
(iv) Quotas - total allowable catches (TACs]„
The settling of TACs simply involves the establishment, on 
scientific evidence, of the maximum catch level for a given species,
(v) Economic means.
It is possible to control fishing effort by economic means,
A tax may, for instance, be imposed on fishing effort. The raison 
d 'être of such taxation is simply to increase the cost of fishing and 
thereby reduce the total effort in the fishing and subsequently the 
overall catch.
Obviously, although concerned with the control of fishing effort 
the methods identified above do not in themselves give effect to 
special dependency. They nevertheless may be modified so as to 
reflect special dependency and consequently articulate preferential 
rights,
Which method is favoured by claimants of special dependency as 
the means of expressing preferential rights? The reports on the 
Shetland I s l e s a n d  the Clyde Estuary and West Coast of Scotland^ 
both favour expressing preferential rights for locally 'based fishermen 
via a licensing system. The most "prickly" of the problems associated 
with a licensing system include, inter alia: the type of licence to
be issued - should it be granted to the vessel or to the owner of the
J.Z2
vessel; how are licences to be al.located; and should the licences 
be transferable?
Arguments in favour of vessel licences include guaranteed 
security for investors. Vessel control is easier than individuals 
(i.e. vessels are easily identified), individuals do not offer a 
real indication of fishing effort and the suspension of a vessel 
licence is physically easier as the vessel itself may be prohibited 
from fishing operations. Those favouring granting individual fisher­
men a licence argue, in particular, that vessel licences become highly 
inflated and that consequently prospective entrants to fishing are 
deterred.
Regarding the allocation of licences, two principal decisions 
have to be taken, viz; (i) should licences be given away or should 
they be sold? And (ii) should they be allocated administratively 
or in a competitive process?
(i) V/hether a charge is made will depend on whether fishing is 
regarded as a right or a privilege. A licence fee will be charged 
if the right to the resource rent is recognised as belonging to the 
State “ the fee charged will reflect the portion of the resource rent 
due to the State, The revenue which accrues from such a rent may 
then be utilised to facilitate exit from the industry or readjustment 
within the industry of those vessels which do not receive a licence,
(ii) Allocation of licences - by auction or by administrative 
process? The most efficient vessels will, on average, earn the 
greatest livelihood for their operators. Obviously, those operators 
will be the most able to raise the highest licence fee or advance the 
highest bid at a licence auction. An advantage of the allocation of
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licences by auction is, of course, that it does allow the individual 
vessel owner to bid only to his maximum financial capacity. Conse­
quently, the auction of licences is the most economic way of effec­
tively capturing the resource rent from the f i s h e r y . I n  
contrast, the calculation of licence fees under an administratively 
operated system is done by those responsible for administering the 
system and unless knowledge is available relating to the cost 
structures of particular vessels, it is doubtful as to whether the 
licence fee calculated will successfully capture a significant portion 
of the resource rent. If expression is to be given to special 
dependency, then licences granting preference must be allocated 
administratively according to criteria which reflect that special 
dependency.
Should licences be transferable? Should a licence be disposed 
of at the discretion of the current licence holder? Transfer of a 
licence involves its sale or its passing to another* 
the decision as to whom the recipient should be lies with the current 
licence holder.
There are two schools of thought on the issue of transferability. 
One view is that the transfer of licences should be allowed and 
allowed at the discretion of the current licence holder, while the 
opposing view is that the transfer of licences should be totally prohib­
ited, Yet another view is that transfers should only be 5ü.lowed 
under specific conditions and only then with the sanction/approval 
of the licensing authority.
Advocates both for and against transferability hinge their 
case on the effects of transferability on the licence's market 
value. Those in favour are normally those who either possess a
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licence entitling them to limited entry, or are prospective buyers 
capable of competing on the open commercial market. New participants 
are, it is alleged, provided with a ready route into the fishery, 
when they purchase a licence from the current holder, A licence's 
market value in a limited entry fishery reflects (the argument goes) 
the economic health of the fishery as it will represent the current 
valuation of the anticipated earnings from that f i s h e r y , T h e  
purchase and sales of licences may establish a market for rights 
that will allow fishermen flexibility to adjust their holdings to 
the needs of their fishing units and to adjust the scale of their 
enterprises in the light of changing teclmology. The purchase of 
rights will, it is contended, diminish the fishermen's incentive to 
illegally extend the limits of the rights they hold. The marketing 
of licences is seen as important to vessel owners, in that neither 
the value of their fishing rights nor their invested capital will 
be lost in the event of the fisherman's death or retirement. An 
active market can provide a convenient mechanism for the regulatoi?y 
authority to increase or reduce capacity through sales or purchases, 
without causing involuntary dislocation,
Conversely, those opposed to the free transfer of licences 
contend that one should not be allowed to benefit from the sale of 
a privilege either granted or created by the State, In other words, 
a licence to fish is a privilege granted by the State and not a right. 
The sale of licences is seen as detrimental to potential par^kicipants 
because if transferred at a high price only those with either the 
financial resources or sufficient credit sales will be successful in 
obtaining a licence. Of equal importance in safeguarding the rights 
of current licence holders is the need to avoid a monopolisation of 
licences or a concentration of licences in the hands of any one party.
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This could be avoided by placing a ceiling on the number of licences 
which may be held by any one party.
Transferability may enable a limited entry system to be self- 
regulatory, but where there is concern over, e.g. geographical 
distribution of licences and an over-concentration of fishing 
capacity, transferability of licences does not appear acceptable.
In respect of giving expression to preferential rights because 
of a special dependency, a licensing system which allows the free 
transfer of licences may exacerbate the situation and be contrary 
to the interests of those claiming special dependency.
For how long should a licence be granted? Should it be renewed 
for instance annually? Licensing may discourage investment and 
interested groups consulted, i,e, on the Atlantic coast of Canada, felt 
that licences should be valid for five years so as to protect invest­
ment, allow planning and diminish u n c e r t a i n t y , O n  the other hand, 
there were those who felt that five year licences could prove an 
obstacle to the flexibility of management plans. There were those 
who felt that licensing, for rnoit^ l rather than legal reasons, should 
be done annually, A possible compromise solution would be to renew 
fishing privileges and licences annually, while the demand for actual 
data might be made only every three to five years. An obvious 
advantage would be a reduction in administration costs. The problem 
is to strike a balance between providing those engaged in the fishery 
sufficient time to embark on at least medium-term planning programmes 
and retaining the management scheme's flexibility.
V/hat if a fisherman does not exercise the privilege accorded to 
him? Should a licence include a participation clause? Ob'/iously, it
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is undesirable tliat licence holders should be allowed to "sit on" 
a privilege to fish, A participation clause might, in certain circum­
stances, produce adverse effects in respect of the fisheries effort - 
i.e. a participation clause might force a fisherman to invest capital 
and to fish merely to retain his privilege. Nevertheless, such 
results would be limited in their effect and a participation clause 
could, for instance, require a minimum quantity of fish to be landed 
or a minimum number of fishing days to be undertalten.
A participation clause in a licence granted in respect of special 
dependency would appear superfluous as special dependency could not 
legitimately be submitted as justification for a privilege if the 
privilege was left dormant. A participation clause would serve as 
a guarantee tliat all grants of preferential treatment were in effect 
put into operation.
The Coull, Goodlad and Shevas Report identifies the viable 
future of Shetland's fishing industry as depending on the exclusion 
of vessels exceeding 80 feet from fishing for all species, except 
herring and mackerel, within twelve miles of Shetland - such a pro­
hibition would apply equally without discrimination to Shetland and 
non-Shetland vessels,Accordingly, the declared objectives of 
the proposed fisheries management scheme are the;
"[c]onservation of fish stocks in order to promote a 
more rational exploitation pattern and regional preference 
for Shetland fishing industry"
and although other possibilities of controlling fishing activity are
suggested it is a licensing system which is favoured for giving
expression to "regional p r e f e r e n c e " S i m i l a r l y ,  the authors
of the proposed fisheries management programme for the Clyde Estuary
and the West Coast of Scotland see a licensing system as being the
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"most flexible form of control" and best suited to realising the 
plan's objective viz ensuring that "the size of the fleet, the power 
at its disposal and the methods used for the capture of fish are 
strictly controlled,
How do the authors of the respective reports propose to initiate 
the licensing system and what solution have they found to the problems 
which have been identified? In respect of the Shetland Isles, it 
is proposed that licences should be allocated not auctioned and that 
they should be granted to the ovmers of a fishing vessel rather than 
to the vessel or the skipper. Licences should, it is proposed, be 
allocated -^dthout "national d i s c r i m i n a t i o n " . T h e  author’s of 
the report advocate that every Shetland vessel should receive a 
licence upon application, i.e. "boats registered in Lerwick which 
are owned and operated by fishermen who are resident in Shetland.
The Shetland proportion of the licence allocation is estimated at 
being less than 20^ for most species or groups of species. The 
allocation of the remaining licences would be undertaken according 
to the criteria of "historic fishing patterns, selective fishing 
gear techniques and EEC regional p o l i c y . V e s s e l s  coming from 
the fishing ports of the North-East of Scotland would be included, 
however, those vessels which have only recently intensified fishing 
effort in the Shetland area would not be eligible for a licence,
The report further recommends that applications for licences from 
regions where fishing "is of considerable socio-economic importance 
should also be considered f a v o u r a b l y , N o  definition of "socio­
economic importance" is given.
In respect of the Clyde Estuary and the West of Scotland preference 
is proposed for those fishermen who operate from ports within the
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geographical area of the plan and especially to those who fish 
within the plan's designated area, either for the whole year or for 
at least a very suMtantial part of it.(^^^ A preference operated 
in this way could, providing licensing conditions were fulfilled, he 
enjoyed by vessels from other parts of the UK or from EEC countries 
"which habitually fish in the area."^^^^ Vessel size and horsepower 
would be included in the criteria adopted for the distribution of 
l i c e n c e s . T h e  authors of the plan recommend that for the 
"proper working" of the plan those having beneficial oiraership of 
any vessel claiming preference, should be domiciled within the geo­
graphical area of the plan. On the introduction of the plan only 
those persons domiciled within the registration districts concerned^^^^ 
who are the beneficial owners of vessels claiming preference, and 
whose vessels comply with the prevailing licensing requirements, 
would be entitled to claim preference.
Neither report visualises a licensing system as being the sole 
method of either controlling fishing effort or giving effect to 
regional preference. Coull, Goodlad and Shevas recognise the need 
for direct regulatory provisions "which aim to improve the exploit­
ation pattern and which can also aim at reducing the total catch." 
Accordingly, one of the primary recommendations of the report is 
that:
"the principle of unrestricted entry into the fisheries 
be abandoned, and replaced by a system where entry into 
all fisheries in the Shetland area should be by licence 
only, and that the licensing system should be coupled 
with a system of regional TACs and catch quotas."\2o)
To put this into practice, the report envisages the establish­
ment of an annual regional TAG based on scientific evidence for each 
species within the conservation area. Individual limits or quotas
-‘- y
per boat would be imposed if the licensed fishing efforts were 
exhausting the annual TAG too rapidly. This would allow the 
"spinning out" of the TAG for a full year and prevent a vessel from 
being laid up for a part of the year. Quotas would also be used 
to guarantee that a multi-species fishery did not over fish specific 
species. This secondary back-up control is designed to iron out 
potential imbalances in the licensing-TAG system. Licensed vessels, 
it is felt, should be capable of diverting seasonal fishing effort 
from one species to another. The linking of the licensing system 
to a quota system is seen as a means of preventing the annual nujmber 
of licences fluctuating in response to natural fluctuations in 
recruitment
Other proposals designed to express "regional preference" include 
the prohibition on fishing of all species (except herring and mackerel) 
by vessels exceeding 80 feet overall length within twelve miles of 
S h e t l a n d . T h e  report proposes that preference should also 
be granted to those operating selective gear techniques,
To ascertain the number of boats that might be licensed, the 
report suggests subdividing vessels into classes, e.g. 40-60 feet,
6O-8O feet, 80-100 feet and over 100 feet and combining licence units. 
For example, a 40-60 foot boat might represent three units. The 
overall number of vessels licensed to fish "should be the maximum 
number which can catch the TAG and remain economically viable," whilst 
the number of vessels engaged in fishing should be that which ensures 
that few vessels "do not make exorbitant profits" and that "an excess 
number of vessels are not allowed to fish since most wSWld only be 
marginally profitable,
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In the event of the demand for licences exceeding availability 
it is proposed that those who do not receive a licence should be 
awarded compensation while the introduction of an early retirement 
scheme is also f a v o u r e d . L i k e w i s e ,  the plan for the Clyde 
Estuary and West Coast of Scotland proposes that once the number of 
boats on the "preference list" has been established via the licensing 
system, these vessels should receive a percentage of the TAC as set 
by ICES ACFM. A quota would then be established on the normal basis 
of a man per boat per day q u o t a , T h e  primary object of such a 
management scheme would be to maintain at least the present level of 
earning and;
"to raise it when herring fishing in the Minches recom­
mences and to avoid at all costs further bans on fishing 
whether herring or otherwise which would have been so 
detrimental to the communities in the West Coast of 
Scotland,"
particularly as the West Coast fleet is limited to West Coast waters
and if "the possibility of maintaining a reasonable livelihood b%r
fishing in these waters is denied, they are left with nowhere to fish,"^^^'
Obviously control plays an important part in the management of a 
fisheries scheme. The Shetland Report recommends the establishment 
of a licensing authority where Shetland interests should be "adequately 
represented," and supports administration via a regional office in 
L e r w i c k , V e s s e l s  awarded a licence would be allocated a special 
code number with a separate series of code numbers being given to 
those vessels entitled to fish within the twelve mile limit. To 
assist aerial surveillance, each vessel could have its number promin­
ently shown on a board on top of the wheelhouse. Strict surveillance 
is recommended with the ultimate deterrent being that of licence 
confiscation. Other deterrents would include, inter alia, fines
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(36)and gear and catch confiscation.^ ^
The authors of the Clyde Estuary and West of Scotland report call 
for the effective monitoring of all catches and landings by vessels 
fishing within the area and for close co-operation between the 
Producers Organisation and the Government agencies involved,
Although outwith the report's terms of reference, effective monitoring 
is emphasised as being vital to the plan's success. It is stressed 
that not only should vessels entering the area report their presence 
and on leaving report their catch, but that these vessels should be 
required "to enter a nominated port for inspection," Fishing vessels 
from EEC countries, if landing their catches in Scotland, should, in 
the opinion of the report's authors, be subject to the same reporting 
controls as indigenous vessels, otherwise they should report their 
catches in the same way as other foreign vessels "so that quotas can 
be arranged accordingly.
The proposals considered above highlight that cert.ain information 
can be readily available before a successful licensing system must 
be instituted. Biological information is necessary so that both the 
OBY (Optimal Sustainable Yield) and the MSY (Maximum Sustainable Yield) 
may be determined,Information relating to fishing power is 
required, if for instance licences are to be issued on a basis pro­
portional to vessel size. If a licence constitutes a grant to catch 
a proportion of the TAC, then the catching power of vessels partici­
pating in the fisheries must be taken into account when licences are 
being issued,
A licensing system complemented by other regulatory means is the 
method most favoured for controlling fishing activity.
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Is there any such control system already in operation.which may
give guidance as to how some of the problems associated with a
licensing system may be tackled? British Columbia has had a
comprehensive licensing system for over a d e c a d e , W h a t  lessons
can be learnt from the British Columbian system about licensing as
a means for regulating the nurabers involved in fishing? The system
introduced to implement the British Columbian Salmon control programme^
was the Salmon Vessel Licence Control System, Initially, licences
were granted only to commercial fishermen, who had made recorded
landings of salmon in I967 and 1968, but subsequently licences were
granted to fishermen who had fished for any species during the base 
(4l ).years,  ^ Relaxation of the rules had an effect contrary to the 
original purpose of the licensing scheme as salmon fishing capacity 
was increased - i.e. many large halibut and trawl vessels which had. 
only fished occasionally for salmon became eligible for a licence.
In addition as non-salmon vessels were retired from the sa].mon fishery 
they were frequently replaced by an actual saDjnon fishing vessel.
Two main types of licence were issued, an *A* licence and a *B* 
licence. An *A* licence was granted to those vessels whose annual 
landings in either I967 or I968 exceeded 10,000 pounds of pink or chum 
salmon or the equivalent in other salmon species. Vessels whose 
annual landings were less than 10,000 pounds in the base years received 
a *B* licence.
The intention behind the introduction of two categories of licence 
was to identify (a) serious fishermen - i,e, those who obtained a 
reasonable income derived from the salmon fisheries, from (b) part-time 
or recreational fishermen who derived their primary income from another
(43)source,^ In addition to vessel registration both a peisonal and
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vessel licence were required. The personal licence fee is still 
/5 per annuR and the vessel registration fee /lO per annum.
An important difference between *A* and *B* licences was that 
the former class of vessels, if retired, could be replaced whereas 
the latter class could not, *B* licences ran for ten years before
expiring •» the hope being that those who opted for a *B* licence
would be encouraged to retire and that consequently the “B* licensed 
fleet would be phased out.
An 'A* licence had to be renewed annually and to be retained fish
sales had ' to be registered every second year. Fishing vessels which 
received neither an *A* or a *B* licence were granted a *C licence.
Licences were granted to the vessel and not to individual fisher­
men thus "freezing" the number of fishing vessels in the salmon fishing. 
Licences were transferable on the sale of the vessel. The administration 
of a personal licensing system and the pdliciiig of such a system was seen 
as too complex an undertaking. Transferability of licences was 
favoured in spite of reservations regarding, e,g. excessive specula­
tive gains. The market value of the salmon vessel would, it was 
argued, be considerably reduced and would involve considerable capital 
loss for the retiring fisherman if the licence could not be retained,
V/hat of those who did not receive a licence? An Appeals Committee 
was established to consider applications from those who had been denied, 
a licence. Appeals came from, e.g. fishermen who rented a vessel, or 
who were crewmen but did not themselves own a vessel. The general 
ground rules which were adopted by the Appeals Committee were laid 
down by an Industry Advisory C o m m i t t e e , T h e  Appeals Committee 
in its initial year considered in excess of 1,200 appeals, the majority
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of which were denied. Although, there did exist the option of a 
direct appeal to the Minister, this was rarely exercised,^
phase II of the Salmon Control Programme introduced in April 1970 
aimed at reducing the salmon fleet by three measures, viz* (i) a 
substantial increase in salmon vessel licence fees; (ii) the 
"phasing out" of the *B* class vessels; and (iii) the introduction 
and funding of a "buy back" programme with the revenue obtained from 
the *A* licence fees. Under Phase II licence fees were increased ' 
and an attempt was made to maintain the licence fee charge in pro­
portion to fishing c a p i t a l , D u r i n g  the ten year phase out^ "^^  ^
period, *B' vessels enjoyed full fishing privileges, *D' licences 
which apply only to packers were introduced in 1971*
Several of the original rules were modified under Phase II, e.g. 
a "ton for ton" replacement rule was introduced whereby every replaced 
vessel had to equal in capacity the retired v e s s e l . L o w  producers 
possessing *A* licences, who could not afford the increased fees were 
given the option of down-grading their licence and thereby could 
continue to pay a nominal fee, i.e. they could opt for a *B* licence. 
Certain operators were thus induced, if indirectly, into that 
category.
The special circumstances of Indian fishermen also received 
recognition. Many of those in the 'A* category were small producers 
and because of the increased burden which the additional fees would 
impose along with the overall lack of alternative employment opportunities 
in many of the isolated native communities, a special licence was approved 
for Indians. They were allowed to either pay the regular salmon 
vessel licence fee and be eligible for "buy back" or pay a /lO salmon
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vessel fee but not be eligible for "buy back". An 'A^ I* licence 
was thus initiated which provided that an Indian could freely sell 
his licensed vessel to either a native or white operator, but if 
sold to the latter the vessel would revert to *B' status unless all 
exempted licence fees were paid in full,^^^
The licensing system was supplemented by a "buy back" system.
The "buy back" programme was introduced in 1971 and operated on a 
voluntary basis. The objective of the scheme was to purchase licensed 
vessels and retire them from the fishing industry. The revenue which 
accrued from the increased licences provided the finance to operate 
the scheme, A fair market price was given for those vessels offered 
for sale, but there always remained the option to either continue 
fishing or to sell elsewhere on the open market. Any *A* category 
vessel could be offered to "buy back", whereupon it was appraised by 
two independent assessors. The price offered for the vessel was based 
on the average of the two assessments plus an additional %  bonus.
The fisherman, if not satisfied with the price offered, was free to 
withdravr his vessel. In the event of the vessel being purchased, it 
was ineligible for any BC commercial fishery licence. The proceeds 
from the sale of such a vessel elsewhere were reclaimed to the fund 
for further purchases. Three hundred and fifty-four vessels at a 
cost of /5»8 million were removed from the fleet between 1971 and 
1973. The vessels purchased were subsequently auctioned and /2,6 
million (i,e, 45^ of the purchase price) was recovered. The buy 
back programme soon encountered difficulties as a record salmon harvest 
in 1973 and a sharp increase in salmon prices related to the removal 
of vessels from the market forced up licensed vessel prices. The 
revenue derived from the fixed licence fee was insufficient to meet 
the prices expected by those fishermen offering their vessels for
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sale to the buy back programme. Consequently, in view of the
financial difficulties the scheme was discontinued in 1973 *^ ^^^
However, elements of the buy back programme are to be reviewed so
(51)
that the scheme may, when funds are available, be re-introduced.
Section 29(l) of regulations issued in 1977^^^^ further recog­
nised the special position of Indian fishermen and provided that:
"an Indian for the purposes of obtaining food (emphasis 
added) for himself and his family may, under a special 
licence issued by the Regional Director or a fishery 
Officer, fish by the method, in the watei's and during 
that period set out in the licence,"
Indians could, therefore, fish provided the cabch was not sold, but 
retained as food for his family, Indians view fishing, and unres­
tricted access to fishing, as a "basic right", and their request for 
exclusion from the licence and tonnage restrictions is founded on 
this belief. Although supporting the need, for the management and 
conservation of the marine resources, Indian groups maintain that the
existing licensing scheme is neither compatible with, nor broad enough
(
to protect,traditional native fishing rights,^ ' Recognition of 
the Indians' problem is limited. Nor is the problem exclusively 
economic.
The British Columbian system does demonstrate that a licensing 
system can control and reduce the numbers engaged in fishing. It 
also highlights that a licensing system in itself will not reflect 
preferential rights for specially dependent areas and may, unless 
modified, be contrary to the interests of those areas. The distinc­
tion between full-time and part-time or recreational fishermen may 
be of use in a commercial industry such as the salmon fishing, but 
in areas of special dependency it may be disadvantageous to many 
fishermen to grant licences on such a basis, as is illustrated by
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(54)the case of Newfoundland's licensing system.
For the purposes of obtaining a licence in Newfoundland, a full­
time fisherman is defined as one who is either the operator or crew 
member of a fishing vessel has consistently engaged in fishing through­
out the noirmal fishing season in his area, and has little other income 
except from possibly logging or farming. Any person who does not 
fall into such a category is to be classified a,s "part-time", New­
foundland Fisheries Minister, J, Morgan, has been particularly con­
cerned about the effect of the "part-time" classification for those 
21,000 commercial fishermen who will be so designated, Mr, Morgan 
has raised the question of whether the 11,000 full-time fishermen are 
to obtain a monopoly and if so whether the "part-time" fishermen,
because of their classification, are to be "squeezed out of the fish- 
( 55)ery,"^ / The criteria by which licences are to be allocated must 
be carefully chosen if special dependency is to be reflected.
Similarly, the British Columbian system highlights the need for
a licensing system to be complemented by other regulatory measures 
which again do not necessarily in themselves reflect special dependency 
but may be modified so to do.
To what extent may other regulatory measures be utilised to
express preferential rights and thereby reflect special dependency? 
"Closed seasons" and "closed areas" may be closed to all save those 
fishermen who enjoy preferential rights. Similarly, selective gear 
regulations may be designed to reflect preferential rights, e.g. line 
fishing may be permitted, but trawling prohibited. Quotas may also 
be used to give expression to claims of economic dependency, i.e. the 
allocation of the TAC for each species amongst those participating in 
the fishing activity may reflect preferential rights.
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As already indicated it is possible to control fishing effort by 
economic means, A tax which will effectively reduce the fishing 
catch must be imposed on operating costs and not on overheads,
If imposed on overheads, profits are reduced but vessels capable of 
meeting such costs are not prompted, even if profits are lowered, to 
reduce their fishing effort. Any effort reduction comes from mar­
ginal vessels retiring from the fleet,
A tax on all constitutive elements of operation may, however, 
encourage not only less efficient vessels to retire from the fishing, 
but prompt others to reduce their fishing effort. All elements of 
operation have to be taxed as a tax on only particular inputs encour­
ages the intensive use of the untaxed impute. A disadvantage of a  
tax on all variable inputs is that while feasible, it is expensive to 
administer.
Such a tax would be particularly inappropriate in a  regime designed 
to give effect to special dependency as the primary objective of the 
tax would be to promote efficiency, per se_, and consequently would 
only accentuate the problems of those claiming a special dependence 
on fishing.
An alternative economic instrument is that of a tax on the catch 
so that the fisherman receives reduced revenue for his catch. Should 
the tax be levied on a proportion of the gross revenue from the catch 
(i.e. on an ad valorem basis) then marginal vessels should ultimately 
be removed from the fleet. The effect of such a tax depends on whether 
it is envisaged as being of a temporary or permanent nature. If only 
temporary, then provided that the vessels can cover their costs they 
will continue to fish. A permanent tax on the other hand vrill herald
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the withdrawal from the fisheiry scene of those owners who cannot cover 
the full cost. The purpose of such a tax is to remove all financial 
incentive to expand fishing capacity. There are, however, constraints 
on the use of such a tax as a weapon to control fisheries. Adminis­
trative costs will be high if the catch is to be landed in more than 
one country. There may al.so be political difficulties if it is pro­
posed to realise a tax in one country which has been initiated in 
another. Furthermore, there is no accurate way of predicting how 
fishermen will respond to the institution of such a tax.
Obviously, such a tax would discriminate in favour of the more 
efficient fishermen and consequently could not serve as the vehicle 
to express the preferential treatment demanded because of a special 
dependency
Finally, the British Goluiabian system in identifying the special 
problem of the Indians highlights the need for the problems of specially 
dependent communities to be tackled within a comprehensive regional 
context, A licensing system alone will not effectively alleviate 
the problems of specially dependent regions. Furthermore, while a 
licensing system may be relatively permanent, if for instance vessel 
size is the criterion adopted for obtaining a licence and if reference 
is made to the ICJ's characterisation of preferential rights, it will 
be remembered that the Court saw preferential rights as a temporary 
measure. Accordingly, if the needs of communities specially dependent 
on fisheries are to be permanently affected, preferential rights should 
not be concerned exclusively with preferential rights of access. In 
other words, if the aim of preferential treatment is to be a permanent 
improvement in the position of specially dependent areas, what requires 
to be initiated is a fisheries management programme in which preferential
rights of access are only one aspect. The problems experienced by 
specially dependent communities cannot be solved exclusively by pre­
ferential rights of access, but rather by a coherent programme of 
structural measures. Regions specially dependent on fisheries may 
be entitled to preferential rights, but preferential rights should 
be broadly interpreted and extended to cover preferential rights in, 
inter alia, the allocation of financial assistance for the retraining 
of fishermen. The advantage of preferential rights of this nature 
over preferential rights of access is that they are not dependent 
upon a need to conserve fish stocks. This type of preferential treat­
ment for specially dependent areas has been introduced by the EEC.
Fish farming, for instance, is regarded as a possible source of 
employment for unemployed fishermen and the cost of retraining the 
latter may be financed the European Social Fund, The European 
Commission has made proposals for vocational training and in the field 
of fisheries employment seeks to improve "the transparency of direct 
and indirect employment in the fisheries" so as to obtain "a rough 
balance between the supply and demand of labour" and "to create employ­
ment in less favoured regions and to help young fishermen find employ­
m e n t . [ N o t e :  the social measures introduced by the EEC which
have particular relevance for those specially dependent communities 
are considered more fully in Chapter Five along with the other means 
by which the EEC has attempted to articulate preferential rights,]
As far as international law is concerned preferential rights 
giving effect to special dependency are in the light of the Inter­
national Court's judgment temporary, contingency measurëè applied in 
response to conservation needs and while reflecting special dependency 
they must simultaneously reflect the interests of other participating parties.
I4l
Again, while it is emphasised that there is no reason why a concept 
articulated in a particular way within one legal system should be 
similarly articulated within another legal framework, it is submitted 
that legal systems do not exist in isolation but interrelate. How­
ever, while acknowledging that one legal system may adopt a concept 
from another legal system, it has nevertheless to be admitted that 
the nature of the individual legal system concerned may give rise to 
particular problems. For instance, what a unitary State may initiate 
may be problematic for a federal State, while within a regional organ­
isation it will be particularly relevant as to whether it is a supra­
national or an intergovernmental organisation.
Chapter Five focuses attention on this as it is devoted to a 
detailed analysis of the EEC *s recognition of special dependency and 
its attempts to articulate preferential rights.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Special Economic Dependency and Preferential Rights - 
Characterisation and Articulation by the EEC
The purpose of this Chapter is threefold; (i) to describe briefly 
Community measures adopted in the field of fisheries; (ii) to identify 
and highlight those provisions which refer to special economic 
dependency and consequent preferential rights ; and (iii) to examine 
the articulation of special economic dependency and preferential rights 
within the EEC context. In other words, it is proposed to examine 
the various EEC fishery measures and deduce to what extent the Com- 
munity has recognised economic dependency and preferential rights.
The Community’s understanding of special dependency and preferential 
rights has been chosen for thorough analysis because it is within the 
Community forum that the concepts have, in recent years, received the 
most attention. Consequently, it is the EEC which may illustrate how 
a legal system other than international law has received the concepts 
of special dependency and preferential rights.
Special economic dependency and preferential ri.ghts have assumed 
particular importance within the EEC, Preferential rights or at 
least a consensus as to the form such rights should take, is the 
vehicle which will provide the EEC with a common fisheries policy. 
However, the inability to achieve agreement amongst Member States as 
to what should be the nature and extent of preferential rights is the 
obstacle on which the fishery negotiations have persistently stumbled 
in the past and on which they continue to founder.
The EEC internal fisheries^^^ policy has a dual character: (i)
a structural policy; and (ii) a marketing policy which employs the 
mechanisms of minimum prices, target prices and threshold prices to
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(o)
control the market,^ ^ It is the structural policy which is the 
concern of this Chapter.
The Treaty of Rome signed T%r the six original Members of the
( 3*)
EEC contained no specific provisions on fisheries'- ^ and it was 1970
before the principles of a structural fisheries policy were enunciated
in a Community m e a s u r e , A r t i c l e  2 of the Regulation spelt out the
basic principle viz that:
"the system applied by each Member State in respect of 
fishing in the maritime waters coming under its sover­
eignty or within its jurisdiction must not lead to 
differences in treatment with regard to other Member 
States,"
and in particular:
"Member States shall ensure equal conditions of access 
to and exploitation of the fishing grounds situated in 
the waters referred to in the preceding paragraph, for 
all fishing vessels flying the flag of a Member State 
and registered in Community territory,"(5)
In other words, the basic principle which was to apply between 
Member States was, "equal access" and non-discrimination. Never­
theless, derogation from equal access was allowed for five years and 
Member States could, within a limit of three nautical miles calculated 
from the baselines of the Member States concerned, reserve certain 
types of fishing "to the local population of the coastal regions 
concerned if that population depends primarily on inshore fishing.
The territorial application of Regulation No 214-1/70 was not
specifically defined, but it extended to the territorial waters and
(?)exclusive fishery zones of Member States'*'^  and to the French ovei"seas 
departments
Regulation No 2l4l/70 spelt out the basic principle of the EEC 
fisheries policy, viz: "equal access", but the principle was not
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ed.opted in absolute terms» Derogation was allowed and in providing 
the exception the Six accorded recognition to a special dependency 
on inshore fishexy.
The raison d'etre of Regulation No 2l4l/70 was prompted by the
•*e»»nrîMe«er»ex«3i '
need to ensure thotg
"the fishing industry should develop in a rational manner 
and that those who live by that industry should be assured 
of an equitable standard of living and a need to encou­
rage rational exploitation of the biological resources of 
the sea and of inland w a t e r s ,"(9)
and consequently the aim of the Regulation was to promote the "har­
monious and balanced development of the fishing industry within the 
general economy" and to encourage the "rational exploitation of the 
biological resources of the sea . The emphasis was therefore 
on encouraging the rational exploitation of biological resources. 
However, European inshore fishery had traditionally involved many 
small boats and the European Commission had to quell the fears being 
expressed by the coastal communities. The EEC was quite adamant, 
though, that it was not prepared to bolster and perpetuate declining 
economic activity;
"... a large number of social problems cannot be solved by 
means of the fisheries policy. This is especially true 
of fishing carried out not on economic grounds but as the 
only alternative - however inadequate - to unemployment.
Any attempt to solve these social and structural problems 
with the instruinents of a fisheries policy would have un­
foreseeable financial consequences and would ultimately 
weaken the considerable chances still open to community 
fisheries operating on modem lines."(il)
Nonetheless, the Regulation aclcnowledged the economic dependency of 
such fishing coifimunities, Economic dependency, however, was not 
defined. Admittedly, the population concerned had to "depend primarily 
on inshore fishing," but the Regulation was silent on what was to con­
stitute "depend primarily". Presumably fishing and related industries 
would have to be central to the economic life of the community in
1 5 0
question. Ho specific reference was made to the level of stocks in 
the waters immediately adjacent to such communities and Article 4 
granted derogation from "equal access" because of a dependency on 
inshore fishing alone.
The term preferential rights was not used in Regulation No 2l4l/yO 
hut communities dependent on fishing were, by implication, to have 
"preferential rights" in the sea area concerned. This preference 
could of course in practice be exclusive fishing rights. Preference 
could also be implied from the fact that Member States were not under 
any obligation to act upon Article 4. The exception which could be 
sought was a discretionary one. Nor did Member States enjoy un­
fettered discretion either as to the area or the types of fishing to 
which Article 4 could apply. Those were to be determined by the 
Council, acting on a qualified majority, following a proposal from 
the Commission. In addition, the measures adopted by Member States 
were to be such so as to;
"ensure an equitable standard of living for the population 
which depends on fishing for its living to contribute to 
increased productivity through a restructuring of fleets 
and other means of production, adapted to the evolution 
of technical progress together with intensification of 
the search for new fishing grounds sud new methods of 
fishing."(12/
The context of the preference under the Regulation was, as has 
been seen, relatively limited viz: "certain areas" within a limit
of three nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial seas 
for a limited period, i.e. five years from the date when the Regula­
tion entered into force (30 October 19?0),
Economic dependency and preferential rights were recognised by 
the EEC in its initial attempt to adopt a common fisheries policy. 
However, the concepts were granted not to afford protection but to
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provide Member States with an opportîinitjr to impl.einent measures which 
would improve the position of their fishing communities within the 
general economy and thereby reduce their dependency on fishing*
The derogation in Regulation No 2l4l/70 was intended as an interim 
stop gap measure*
Fisheries took on a new importance within the Community with
(i d)the advent of four^ ' ^  possible new Members and this importance was 
subsequently reflected in the Treaty of Accession* It was during the 
pre“Accession negotiations that the demands for preferential rights 
because of a special dependency were articulated within the Community 
context.
The equal access principle was not, in spite of the three mile 
derogation,acceptable to the applicant States and it was apparent 
from the outset that the applicants were not prepared to accept a 
"fait accompli" in respect of fishing*' ^  Of the prospective 
MePibers, the Irish and Norwegiansexpressed the greatest fear 
in respect of fisheries whilst the Danish identified the inherent 
problems peculiar to Greenland and the Faroe Islands* [Note; of 
the four, the United Kingdom placed least emphasis on fisheries,]
The Norwegians were the most explicit in their demand for any final 
fisheries text to reflect the interests of the new Members and recog­
nised that "Norway’s accession to the European Economic Community would
pose special pr'oblems because of the country’s geographical situation
(17^and economic structure,"' ^
Nliy the Norwegians emphasised fisheries in the negotiations and 
and the disadvantages of the EBU fisheries policy as it existed for 
the Norwegians was highlighted in the Minister of Fisheries Statement 
to the Norwegian Storting that;
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"Norway has placed great weight on explaining to the EEC 
that this (i.e, equal access within fishery zones of 
other Community States) arrangement is not acceptable.
In particular, it has been stressed that increased fishing 
within the fishing zone will cause fundamental changes in 
the economic structure and the distribution of population 
in fishing districts, increase the problems of over 
fishing and create very considerable problems for fishing 
in practice, particularly in the relationship between 
equipment on the sea bed and trawlers. The exceptions 
made in the Regulation for the local population fishing 
in the three mile limit for a relatively short transition 
period will have little practical significance for Noimay, 
It is therefore the Government's view that a change in 
the provisions of the Regulation on the structure of the 
industry must be sought, so that the interests of coastal 
districts can be safeguarded. One should note that free 
access to a country's fishery zone is of quite a different 
character and effect from the freedom of enterprise given 
to other industries by the Treaty of Rome, since the 
important part of this industry»’, the fishing fleet, is 
mobile. This means that the Regulation will have 
instant effect and may lead to a substantial concentra­
tion of fishing fleets in those ports nearest the big 
markets."(18)
Norway, throughout the negotiations with the Community, emphasised 
that the fisheries policy of the Community was unacceptable especially 
as the need to obtain "an economic basis" for those coastal populations 
where fisheries was to a large extent the basis of their livelihood, 
was regarded as an "essential national task,"^^^^
consequently, a Norwegian proposal for an alternative structural 
policy was submitted to the Committee of Permanent Representatives on 
4 May 1971, Initially the Norwegian Memorandum identified the 
characteristics of the Norwegian fishing industry and the differences 
between it and that of Community Members, Those features were:
(a) the dependence of coastal populations on the fish stocks near 
their coasts; (b) the participation of small boats in fishing activity; 
and (c) the number of processing factories along the coast. Thus, the 
Norwegian fishing industry was contrasted with that of the EEC fishing 
indust:qr in which (a) larger vessels participated; (b) the area fished
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was considerably greater; and (c) catches were landed in central 
markets near the consumer markets.
The Norwegian Government acknowledged that the EEC ®s fisheries 
policy was suited to the Community’s fishing industry but denied 
that it accommodated the interests of the Nonfegian fishing industry, 
and argued that a Community fisheries policy should not be founded 
on exceptions, but should be capable of universal Community applica­
tion, The Norwegians accordingly submitted that "an arrangement for 
fishing inside the fishing limits ought to be based on the rules per­
taining to the right of establishment as laid doim in the Treaty of 
Rome" (i.e. Articles 52-58)*
On this basis, the Norwegians argued that only those established 
in the coastal State should be allowed to fish inside that State’s 
fishing zone. This approach was justified on the grounds that 
fishing constituted the exploitation of a natural resource and that 
in other instances of natural resource exploitation within the Com­
munity establishment in the Member country concerned was insisted 
upon. Consequently, it was concluded that it was:
"... natural to adopt the same approach when dealing with 
fishing inside fishery limits, particularly when a 
divergent solution would be contrary to an a,pplleant 
country’s vital interests,"
If applied to fisheries, the rules of establishment would provide 
the coastal State with the right to insist on residence as a necessary 
requirement, A corporation engaged in fishing activity would be 
required to register in the coastal State, have 5 ' ^  of its capital 
owned by residents of the coastal State and the majority of its 
directors resident in the coastal State, Similarly, fishing vessels 
would require to be registered in the coastal State. This was the
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only satisfactory solution for the Non-regians and if not forthcoming 
Norway declared Member States sliould be allowed to "x'eserve their 
fishery zones for their ovm nationals,
Similarly, the Irish at a ministerial meeting between their
negotiating delegation and the Community stated that :
"access to fishing grounds is*a matter of particular 
concern to Ireland because the Irish fishing industry 
is based on inshore fishing and Ireland has no deep-sea 
fishing fleet,"(21 )
The Irish reservation to the fisheries policy was based exclusively
on the "free access" p r i n c i p l e T h e  absence of a deep-sea fishing
fleet meant that the Irish fishing industry was entirely dependent on
inshore fishing and it was feared that not only would Irish fishing
waters "be cleared out" but that the financial benefits enjoyed by the
Irish ports would be transferred to foreign ports.
Consequently, the Irish were opposed to the five year derogation 
provided by the Community as it was not "sufficient to protect the 
interests of Irish fishermen." The Irish, on realising the full 
social and political implications of the Community's fishing policy, 
proposed that the Irish access conditions (i.e. as under the 1964 
Convention) should continue and that a reconsideration of fisheries 
within the E)EC should be postponed until after enlargement. This 
proposal received support from the British who originally suggested 
a six mile limit for all Member countries.
In June 1971 the Community did recognise that the equal access 
issue would, in the light of the prospective enlargement, have to be 
reconsidered :
"the Community ... is aware of the great importance 
attached to them (i.e. fisheries) ~ especially from the 
economic, social and regional points of view. It is 
also aware that in this matter the situation is not
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identical in all the regions of the enlarged Community 
.c, The Community recognises that the prospect of 
the enlargement may lead to the reconsideration of 
certain terms of the regulations in force in the 
Community, without endangeiing the basic principles 
behind them,"(23)
The Commission, in mid-June 1971, suggested that within a zone 
six miles from the baselines of the territorial sea, each Member State 
should, for a period of five years, enjoy the right to identify certain 
areas in which their fishing vessels would enjoy the exclusive right 
to fish. Thereafter, i,e, on the expiry of the five years, a 
Community system would be i n s t i t u t e d , T h e s e  proposals were to 
apply to all Member States except Norway for which a separate regime 
was to be established. The Council wa,s therefore prepared to modify 
but not abandon indefinitely the "equal access" principle.
Specific Community proposals were presented to the four applicants 
on 9 November 1971  ^ A transitional ten year period was proposed. 
During the initial five years, Member States could retain exclusive 
fishing rights within a six mile zone. Thereafter, free access would 
be practised in all waters save in "certain strictly limited geograph­
ical areas," Norway alone could retain an exclusive twelve mile 
limit for the ten years. The Community was prepared to concede 
exclusive rights for those areas where the local population was 
dependent on coastal fishing. No criteria were spelt out as to 
which areas would be granted such concessions, though reference was 
made to areas "without hinterland," The areas which the Commission 
had in mind were only Norway north of Trondheim, the Orkneys, the 
Shetlands, the Faroes and Greenland, Ireland was not apparently to 
receive concessionary treatment.
The Irish, however, did not reject as the Norwegians did the
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Coramimity*s transitional arrangements completely, but declared that 
the problem of "common access" would need "definite and continuing 
provisions." The British did not favour a transitional period, but 
proposed instead continuing arrangements which would be subject to 
review. The British also opposed the more restrictive arrangements 
of the second five year period and sought criteria other than "without 
hinterland" so as to extend special protection to areas other than the 
Orkneys and Shetland Isles,
Yet another set of proposals was produced by the Commission in 
November 1971, This time the suggestion wa>s that a basic six mile 
exclusive zone should apply for ten years, but that in waters adjacent 
to particularly sensitive areas the exclusive zone would be twelve 
miles. After the expiry of the ten year period, the Commission 
suggested that special treatment should be available (a) only to 
those areas in which the local population depended essentially upon 
fishing, and (b) only if the Council of Ministers voted unanimously in 
favour of such treatment. The United Kingdom rejected this proposal. 
The problem was one of reconciling prima facie the irreconcilable, viz; 
the Community’s concern that absolute equal access should operate after 
the ten year period and the demands of the British inshore fishing 
industry for a twelve mile exclusive limit.
Agreement was finally reached between the Six and Ireland, Denmark
( 25')
and the United Kingdom on 12 December 1971 following compromise 
on the procedure to be adopted when the ten years expired. This com­
promise is contained in Arbicle 103 of the Act of Accession and provides 
that before 31 December 1982;
"the Commission shall present a report to the Council on 
the economic and social development of the coastal areas 
of the Member States and the state of the stocks. On 
the basis of that report, and of the objectives of the
common fisheries policy, the Council acting on a pro­
posal from the Commission shall examine the provisions 
which could follow the derogations in force until 31 
December I982."
The Treaty of Accession, while retaining the principle of free
access, amends for all Member States Article 4 of Regulation No 2l4l/70.
Accordingly, Member States may ;
"until 31 December I982 restrict fishing in waters under 
their sovereignty or jurisdiction, situated within a 
limit of six nautical miles ... to vessels which fish 
traditionally in those waters and which operate from 
ports in that geographical coastal area"(26)
(i.e. not only to local fishermen and not only for five years).
The derogations were not though to prejudice the special rights ;
"which each of the original Member States and the new 
Member States might have enjoyed on 31 January I97I in 
regard to one or more other Member States; the Member 
States may exercise these rights for such time as ( 0^7') 
derogations continue to apply in the areas concerned,
Nor were Member States obliged to act in accordance with Article 100(1)
or required "to make full use of the opportunities presented ,
Extended limits of derogation were allowed though for certain specified
areas within the States of Denmark, France, Ireland and the United
Kingdom, These areas were those:
"where the baselines are not in themselves a sufficient 
safeguard or where the stocks are already fully exploited 
the fishing will be limited to British vessels and to 
those with existing rights to fish there for certain 
species of fishp"(29)
and were identified viz:
"Denmark - the Faroe Islands; Greenland; and the West 
Coast from Thybor^ri to Blaavandshuk ;
France - the coasts of the departments of Manchej Ille- 
et-Vilaine. Cotes du Nord; Finistère and Morbihan;
Ireland - the nor-bh and west coasts from Lough Fdÿlè to 
Cork Harbour in the south-west; the east coast from 
Garlingford Lough to Camsore Point, for crustaceans and 
molluscs (shellfish);
Tlie United Kingdom - the Shetlands and the Orkneys; the 
nojrth and east of Scotland, from Ca,pe Wrath to Beri-rick;
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the north-east of England,from the river Coquet to 
Flamboroug'h Head; the south-west from Lyme Regis to 
Hartland Point (including twelve nautical miles around 
Lundy Island); County Down*"(30)
Article 102 provided that the Council, from the sixth year after 
Accession, would act on a proposal from the Commission to "determine 
the conditions for fishing T-rith a view to ensuring protection of the 
fishing grounds and consei?vation of the biological resources of the
Special Dependency and Preferential Rights under the Act of Accession
The Act of Accession left intact the principle of equal access 
as expounded by the original Six* The derogations allowed were granted 
only for a definite period of ten years and were not compulsory. 
Essentially, the preferential rights scheme devised was a "six plus six" 
formula. For instance, in respect of the United Kingdom, within the 
six mile inner zone particular fisheries could be restricted to British 
vessels and those which (a) had fished traditionally in those waters, 
and (b) operated from ports in the geographical coastal area concerned. 
No definition was offered, though, as to what was to be understood by 
"vessels which traditionally fished." Nor did the Act indicate whether 
the coasts referred to were those of metropolitan or main territorial 
units of a State, or the fishing districts into which the coast could 
be divided for administrative or marketing purposes.
In repeat Ihcee areas which were to receive special treatment, 
fishing limits were extended to twelve miles. The inner six mile 
limit was increased to twelve miles according to whether the stretch 
of coast in question was recognised as meriting special protection.
The criterion adopted for identifying such areas appears from statements 
in the British Parliament to have been the inadequacy of the baselines
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"to afford sufficient safeguard" or "the full exploitation of the 
s t o c k s I n  all areas not afforded special treatment, equality 
was to apply, i,e. Member States reserved the right to exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction within their maritime waters provided that 
any regulatory measures applied extended on a non-discriminatory 
basis to all Community vessels.
By 1972 the EEC had been forced to recognise that a special 
economic dependency could justify a temporary derogation from the 
principle of equal access. This more explicit acknowledgement of 
special dependency and preferential rights was, as is apparent from 
the pre-Accession negotiations, due to political rather than legal 
considerations.
In January 1976 Regulation No 2l4l/70 was codified by Regulation
10l/76,(^^) The objectives of the Regulation were essentially the
{ 35')same as those of its predecessor, ' but the unilateral declaration
of 200 mile fishing zones by non-Members precipitated a revision of
the Community’s fishery policy later in 1976. On 27 July 1976 the
Council of Ministers announced its intention to establish a 200 mile
Community fishing zone^^^^ and. on 3 November adopted a Resolution^
declaring that as from 1 January 1977:
"Member States shall by means of concerted action extend 
the limits of their fishing zones to 200 miles off their 
North Sea and North Atlantic coasts,"(38)
and that:
"the exploitation of fishery resources in these zones by 
fishing vessels of third countries shall be governed by 
agreements between the Community and the third countries 
concerned."
The Resolution of 3 November was necessary to protect the interest of 
those mari.time regions within the Community which were most threatened
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"by exclusion from the waters of non-Heinhers,^^^^ Member States were 
responsible for extending their fishery limits to 200 nautical miles. 
This was done by the United K i n g d o m , I r e l a n d t h e  Federal 
Republic of G e r m a n y a n d  Denmark (including the Faroes and 
G r e e n l a n d b y  1 January 1977» whilst other Member States 
extended their limits subsequent to that date.^^^ A Community 
pool was accordingly established with a uniform fishing zone envisaged 
for all Member States in respect of their North Sea and Atlantic 
coasts. The uniformity is of course somewhat theoretical because 
limits cannot be extended as far as 200 miles off some coasts, 
especially in the North Sea, because of the presence of neighbouring 
States. Limits have, where appropriate, been established up to the 
median lines,
Simultaneous to the extension of Community limits vis-a-vis 
non-Members, the Commission submitted to the Council a proposal for 
a Regulation establishing a Community system for the conservation 
and management of fishery r e s o u r c e s . I n  the preamble to the 
proposal, the Commission emphasised that over-fishing of main species 
stocks demanded a Community system aimed at the "conservation and 
management of fishery resources that will ensure balanced exploitation," 
The Commission acknowledged though that any resource management scheme 
would have to recognise the needs of those areas heavily dependent on 
fishing, otherwise restrictions on fishing activity could have "par­
ticularly serious social and economic repercussions," Those dependent 
areas were identified as the Irish coastal communities and those of the 
northem parts of B r i t a i n . T h e  Commission's proposal also sought 
"special provision" for inshore fishing so as to enable "this sector 
to cope with the new fishing conditions resulting from the institution 
of 200 mile fishing zones,"
I6l
The conservation of stocks in mind, khe Commission introduced 
to the Community the concept of total allowable catch (TAC), The 
overall TAG was to be calculated annually for each stock or group 
of stocks and would be apportioned then amongst Member States and 
third countries on the basis of their fishing performances over a 
specified reference period. The Commission proposed an extension 
of the twelve mile coastal band to all Members with access,at least 
until 1982 being granted to those possessing "historic rights," 
Application beyond I982 was envisaged if the Council agreed. The 
Commission proposed that restricted fishing could extend beyond the 
six mile zone to a comprehensive twelve mile belt in which fishing 
could be restricted either to vessels which operated from local ports, 
or which had traditionally fished in the area,^^^
V/hat of those areas which the Commission identified as requiring 
"special protection"? The Commission proposed that within the TAG 
a special priority should be reserved for those a,reas, i.e, Ireland 
and the northern parts of Britain - where tha social and 
economic implications of fishing were particularly great, A portion 
set aside from the overall catch, known as "a Community reserve", was 
to be divided to meetihe "vital needs" of particularly dependent areas.
Under the draft Regulation, TACs were to be introduced when it
became "necessary to limit the catch" of one species or a group of
species. The TAG established, the Council would determine the
overall catch to be taken by Member States, The catch was to be*
"equal to the total allowable catch in waters under the 
sovereignty or within the jurisdiction of Member States 
minus the total of any catches allocated to non^Mcmber 
States ™ plus the total catch from waters not under the \
sovereignty or within the jurisdiction of Member States,"'
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A "Community reserve" wtis to be established for each species.
The size of this reserve was to be determined by*
"reference to the vital needs of fishermen in Ireland 
and the northern regions of the United Kingdom and to 
the size of the reduction in catch compared with previous 
activity,"
In 3.976, the Community eîcplicitly recognised "special dependency" 
aï# was willing to give expression to it within a Community context.
As seen under the Commission's proposals, al3. Member States were to 
have an exclusive belt of twelve mil.es within which only the historic 
rights of non-nationals v/ould have to be accommodated, whilst those 
areas dependent socially and economically on fishing would have this 
dependency reflected in the distribution of the total allowable 
catches. However, the opposition of the United Kingdom and Ireland 
prevented the Community from expressing special dependency in the 
way envisaged. The United Kingd.om e,nd Irish demands were for coastal 
zones of variable width to a maximum of 50 miles in which British and 
Irish fishermen could exercise exclusive or dominant rights,
The difference between the Commission, representii'jg the Commxuiity, 
and the Member States in question was not over the recognition of 
special dependency on fisheries, but as to how this special dependency 
should be accommodated within the Community context. The Member 
States concerned were interested in obtaining and being seen to obtain 
a "good deal" for their fishermen, whereas the Community, although 
recognising the plight of coastal fishing communities, wished to 
adhere as far as possible to the principles of equal access and non­
discrimination, Obviously, the other Member States were not willing 
to concede to the British and Irish demands. An argument advanced 
against the claim that a high percentage of "Community pool" fish 
was taken from British waters was thab no one State, because of the
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migratory nature of fish, should assert a claim for a volume of fish 
to he regarded as its exclusive contribution.
The effect of the migratory life-cycle of fish has been high­
lighted by the Community since 1976 in an attempt to demonstrate 
that an effective Community management policy cannot operate exclus­
ively on a national level. The argument runs that mature fish caught 
in the waters of one Member State may have spawned and imtured in the 
waters of another Member State. For instance, although mature cod 
and herring are found in United Kingdom wateim, they spawn in non-UK 
waters. Consequently, if the mature fish are to be caught, the United 
Kingdom is dependent, for the maintenance of adequate stocks, on other 
Member States practising conservation.' ^ Accordingly, the point
consistently highlighted by the Community is that the maintenance of 
stocks important to fishermen in one Community country may require 
another Community country to impose control over the fishing of the 
species in question while the stocks are within its jurisdiction.
Eventually, however, in respect of special dependency and its 
articulation within the Community, a compromise was reached in 1976,
A "Gentleman’s Agreement" was concluded at an informal meeting of 
Foreign Ministers in the Hague at the end of October 1976, which was 
formally ratified on 3 November 1976 - i.e. at the same meeting at 
which it was formally agreed to extend Community fishing limits to 
200 miles. The Hague Compromise declared that the preferential rights 
of inshore fishermen in Scotland, North and South-West England would 
be recognised in future negotiations on the allocation of EEC fishery 
resources, wîiilst the Irish fishing industry would be allowed to develop 
in line with the Irish Goverrunent*s fisheries development programme, 
which aimed at increasing the 1975 catch of 75,000 tonnes to 150,000
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tonnes in 1979* The particular difficulties confronting Greenland
(53)were acknowledged and were to.he taken into account,'
(54)In December 1976, the Commission submitted a draft Regulation' 
laying down interim measures for the conservation and management of 
fishery resources as from 1 January 1977* These measures were to 
apply until a definite Community regime was adopted, or at the latest 
until 31 December 1977. It was proposed that Member States should not, 
except in certain limited conditions, adopt unilateral measures, that 
TAGS would be established ifith individual quotas allotted to Member 
States, though additional quotas could be decided on where necessary. 
Enforcement procedures were laid doini, but the actual enforcement was 
to be undertaJcen by Member States, The United Kingdom rejected the 
Commission’s proposals on the grounds (a) they failed to taJce account 
of British needs and oljectives, and (b) they contained no provision for 
adequate conservation measures to be adopted during the interim period. 
However, in addition to an inability to reconcile the United Kingdom 
and Irish claims for exclusive coastal bands with the opposition of 
other Member States, the quotas proposed by the Oommission were not 
acceptable (quotas in themselves were acceptable) and it was felt that 
to agree to an interim regime might set too many precedents. Conse­
quently, the Council agreed that for January 1977 (this was ultimately 
extended for the whole year) Member States, pending the conclusion of 
the Interim Arrangements, should limit their catches to 1976 levels.
In other words a"standstill" was agreed. Member States could, in 
circumstances of "extreme necessity and urgency", impose unilateral 
conservation measures provided, that is, that such meai’ü#es were 
applied without discrimination, either - in, f c m  ox» to all
Community nationals, A Member State proposing to adopt a unilateral
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conservation mefxsure t'ras required to seek Council approval® The 
European Court of Justice has sulisequently held this obligation to 
be of a "legally binding" character*
The text of Annex VI of the Council Resolution (i.e, the "Hague
Resolution”) reed;
"Pending the implementation of the Community measures at 
present in preparation relating to the conservation of 
resources, the Member States will not take any unilateral 
measures in respect of the conservation of resources.
However, if no agreement is reached.for I97? within the 
international fisheries Commissions and if subsequently 
no autonomous Community measures could be adopted immed­
iately, the Member States could then adopt, as an interim 
measure and in a form which avoids discrimination, appro­
priate measures to ensure the protection of resources 
situated in the fishing zones of their coasts.
Before ad.opting such measures, the Member States concerned 
will seek the approval of the Commission, which must be 
consulted at all stages of the procedures.
Any such measures shall not prejudice the guidelines to 
be adopted for the Implementation of Community provisions 
on the conservation of resources,"
(57)Community conservation measures were, however, introduced,  ^
Article 102 of the Act of Accession charged the Council to determine 
by the end of I978 the "conditions for fishing with a view to ensuring 
protection of the fishing grounds and conservation of the biological 
resources of the sea," The Council has failed, however, to establish 
a Community regime and Member States have continued to introduce uni­
lateral conservation measures, the legitimacy of which has not been 
questioned provided that they are not of a discriminatory effect,
In January 1978, the Council of Ministers acknowledged that Member 
States could, in the absence of a Community policy, adopt non-discrim- 
inatory "appropriate" measures to ensure protection of the resources 
in their zones. Such measures were not, however, to prejudice future 
guidelines for a Community conservation regime and Commission approval
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was to be sought at all times. Hot all measures adopted by Member 
States have met with approval and several have been the subject of 
cases before the European Court of Justice.
A comprehensive fisheries policy is envisaged by the EEC and 
the initial goal of the fisheries negotiations, which opened formally 
in the autumrx of I98O, was to achieve a common fisheries policy which 
could be put into effect "at the latest on 1 Janua::y 1981,"^^^^ This 
goal was not achieved and the negotiations held througîiout I98I con­
sistently floundered on the contentious issue of "access". The 
British in autumn I98O demanded a twelve mile exclusive zone and 
priority beyond to a maximum of 50 miles, French opposition to 
British demands was especially strong and the French Minister of 
Transport, M. Daniel Hoeffel, declared, that his first objective was 
to defend access to the European fishing resources for French fisher­
men and that any exclusion of fishermen from their traditional fishing 
grounds would be unacceptable to him.(^^) The French were adamant 
that equal access should be implemented and rejected proposals, which 
would have given Member countries exclusive fisheries zones extending 
to twelve miles (historic fishing rights, e.g* Breton fishermen would 
have been allowed to continue fishing off the coast of Cornwall, though 
only for a limited period) on the grounds that Community la>7 was on 
their (i.e. the French) side.
Consequently, 1 January, because of the failure of the December 
negotiations, came and went without a common fisheries policy becoming 
o p e r a t i v e , I n  January, though, some apparent progress was 
reported.
Areas in the Irish Sea and around Orkney and Shetland, were being
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considered as limited access areas within which boats exceeding 80 
feet in length would be prohibited from catching demersal fish. 
However, although the Scottish Fishermen’s Federation (SFF) supported 
the proposed designated areas as being "essential for the wellbeing 
of the majority of Scottish inshore skippers," it was contended that 
the preferential areas were not big enough and that there was a case 
"for other areas to be considered to provide the same kind of limited 
access,
Although the January negotiations failed to produce a common 
fisheries policy, there was some evidence that at least the hard-line 
opposition of the French might be softening, and French officials were 
reported as saying that France was willing to reach a compromise 
solution over access to UK waters. The French were apparently 
willing to concede in principle the twelve mile limit for British 
fishermen, but in return they sought permanent recognition of French 
fishermen’s "historic rights" in some UK inshore waters, viz* west 
of the Hebrides, the Irish Sea, Cornwall and the Channel,
Fishery negotiations were scheduled for February, but prior to 
these Anglo-French bilateral talks were held from which it transpired 
that the French Government would favour a ten year deal on fishing 
while the United Kingdom strongly favoured a permanent deal, Ttie 
UK were, however, prepared to concede that if the time came when 
there was a general call for changes in a previously agreed policy, 
that could affect the situation.
The issue of preferential areas remained an obstacle throughout 
the February negotiations, Britain was prepared to concede that 
certain French and other Community fishermen could enter UK waters,
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principally the waters off the south and south-west English coasts, 
French rights in the Irish Sea. and the west of Scotland were to he 
scrapped and an exclusive twelve mile limit enforced for UK fishermen, 
Britain sought a "no go" area in which access would be effectively 
limited to local boats (i.e. boats in excess of 80 feet would be 
prohibited) for the Irish Sea and a stretch of water from the Shetland 
Isles to Lewis. The French, apparently willing to accept the Scottish 
"preference area", remained opposed to the Irish "no go" zone. The 
"preference area" proposed also brought concern from English fishermen 
that the continental boats would push southwards and crowd the fishing 
grounds there (the English vessels would, of course, be excluded from 
the preference areas). The British, for their part, showed a willing­
ness to concede to the French suggestion for a ten year fishing agree­
ment, provided a vacuum did not follow the expiry of the ten years,
The French rejected the British plan for protected areas on the grounds 
that it would be "economically disastrous" for sectors of the French 
fleet, which would be "virtually eliminated" from rich fishing grounds 
in these zones, whereas the British were prepared to resist any attempt 
to water down these "preference areas" by licensing the entry of certain 
large b o a t s , T h e  main contentious issue in British eyes was the 
French demand for "windows" in the Irish Sea and off the west of 
Scotland and Essex coasts. The British opposed the 'hdndows" parti­
cularly in the Irish Sea and west of Scotland declaring that preference 
was "vital to local communities dependent on fishing for a liveliliood„"
Tlie task of producing a solution to the deadlock fell to the 
Dutch, The so called Braks Plan^^^^ provided that watej:^  up to twelve 
miles in the Scottish box (i.e.round Orkney, Shetland and the northern 
Scottish coast) could be reserved for boats under 80 feet in length
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while beyond that, larger boats from other parts of Britain and other 
Member States could be admitted under a licensing system. The 
British, however, opposed, the plan alleging that the scheme envisaged 
would be almost impossible to police. The French, for their part, 
were although willing to seek a compromise solution as5.amant that it 
was absolutely necessary "that the principles of freedom of access 
and recognition of historic rights be r e s p e c t e d , T h e  February 
negotiations broke up without agreement being reached and consequently 
the Braks Plan was dismissed as being no longer a viable proposition.
An EEC Summit was proposed for March and in the preceding weeks 
the Commission submitted fresh proposals. The plan proposed by the 
Commission envisaged a temporary twelve mile zone as claimed by the 
United Kingdom, with all fishing rights claimed by other Member States 
being preserved, i.e. the status gu£ regarding the existing twelve mile 
zone under the Treaty of Accession would be retained. New twelve mile 
zones might be permitted and the rights of other States fishing in 
those areas could be scaled down if it was necessary to satisfy the 
needs of the coastal region. Beyond 50^30' North, the Commission 
suggested a surveillance area, albeit a loose surveillance zone, in 
which large trawlers would, if in possession of a licence, be allowed. 
However, there was to be no restriction on the number of licences 
issued.
Fisheries dominated the EEC Summit held at Maastricht, the 
Netherlands, on 23 and 24 March I98I, but again no agreement was 
forthcoming, a,nd an emergency fisheries council meeting convened on 
27 March similarly broke up without any seirlous attempt to settle the 
dispute. No further progress has been made throughout I98I so con­
firming Lord Carrington's forecast of May I98I that it was unlikely
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that a common fisheries p o lic y  would ho achieved before the end of 
the year.(^^)
The EEC fishery negotiations highlight the probler/is that may 
arise when any attempt is made to give expression to special dependency 
via preferential rights. However, although the GFP negotiations to 
date have proved fruitless, specially dependent regions do receive 
preferential treatment within the Cormunity, Consequently, it is
now proposed to examine the preferential rights chosen by tlie EEC to 
articulate special dependency.
The Preferential Treatment given to Specially Dependent Regions
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within the EEC
Tile Community gives expression to special dependency‘in three 
principal ways, viz: (i) in the allocation of quotas; (ii) fishing
plans; and (ill) social measures. Each of these will now be examined,
(i) Quotas,
The Commission, in 1976, proposed that in respect of the alloca­
tion of Community stocks, a Community reserve should be established 
the size of which was to be determined "by reference to the vital 
needs of the fishermen in Ireland and northern regions of the United
/•71'N
K i n g d o m . ^  Although TACs amongst Member States were agreed upon, 
in principle, it was not until I98O that the Commission's proposed 
TACs were accepted by all Member States. The negotiations re TACs 
were protracted and cha,racterised by a constant tlwax’ting of the 
Commission *s proposals,
The initial Community proposal was that the Council of Ministers 
would set an overall catch figure for Member States, This overall 
figure was to be calculated by subtracting from the TACs for Community
1?1
waters any catches allocated to non-Member States, the catches made 
by EEC vessels in non-Gommunity waters were then to be added to the 
TAGS, The overall catch figure established, the Council would 
determine the Goiiuiiimity reserve, following which the TAG would be 
apportioned amongst Member States, The quota for each species to 
be decided in correspondence to the Member State's catch of a pax-
(72)ticular stock over a past reference period.'
Tlie British opposed the quota allocation and British fishermen 
continued to demand a mile exclusive zone, while the British 
Government campaigned for an exclusive twelve mile belt and variable 
belts beyond that to a maximum of 50 miles in which dominant preference 
would be exercised by British fishermen.
Throughout 1977? attempts were made to establish an acceptable 
Community regime and each proposal submitted acknowledged the need ' 
to recognise "special dependency" and reflected efforts to tidce 
account of that dependency. However, the proposals were constantly 
rejected bjr the British who argued that no account was taken of (a) 
the contribution of Member States to catches, and (b) losses sustained 
through exclusion from the grounds of non-Gommunity countries.
Detailed proposals relating to catch quotas for I978 were made in 
October 1977*^^^^ The Commission in making its calculations used 
the NEAFC (North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission) key. The 
advantage of the key being that account could be taken of coastal 
preference and other special n e e d s . T h e  Commission's proposals 
gave Ireland two-thirds of its 1975 catch and maintained j.v as far as 
possible, "Northern Britain's" traditional catch. Eventually In 
November 1977, in the face of continued opposition from Britain, 
the Commission presented an assessment of main species losses suffered
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in the Horfch Atlantic and North Sea through exclusion from the 
waters of non-Memher States between 1973-76. The Commission, 
while acîcnovrl edging tie losses, declared that not all losses should 
be compensated, since the States concerned would still ha.ve had some 
overall reduction of their total catch even if they had exclusive 
access to their 200 mile zone. Consequently, the Commission suggested 
that in addition to quotas, losses could be compensated through the 
substitution of as yet unexploited species structural programmes, 
and through research into the under-exploited stocks of the Southern 
Hemisphere,
In December 1977? the Commission' indicated its initial figures 
for the allocation of the Community TAG which was estimated as being 
2,254,000 tonnes. The United Kingdom was offered the largest share 
(29^) of 540,000 tonnes. This was far short of the United Kingdom's 
demand for 962,000 (45^). Inability to reach agreement led to the 
negotiations being suspended and the "clock being stopped". This 
was prompted as doubts were expressed over the continued validity of 
the Hague Agreement (it referred specifically to "the year 1977") 
and the Accession Treaty provided that the Council was to determine 
the conditions for fishing and conservation by 1977 at the latest. 
Consequently, although 1978 dawned, it was for those engaged in the 
fishery negotiations 1977.* In 1978, the Commission issued proposals 
which represented, in the criteria to be used for calculating national 
quotas, a shift from those employed in the original proposals. The 
Commission proposed an overall cutback for 1978 of 7 %  o f  the 1973-76 
total catch and the Community reserve idea was abandoned. The 
"vital needs of the local populations of Ireland, of the northern 
parts of the United Kingdom and of Greenland , , were to be taken
1?3
into consideration, tut as part of the criteria to he employed in the 
allocation of stocks between Member States, The United Kingdom was 
to receive some 31^ of the total EEC TAG, but although this represented 
an improvement on the original offer, the British expressed disappoint­
ment that the quota increase was to be made up of "paper fish", i.e. 
horse mackerel and catches outside EEC zones.
In January 1978? at an informal meeting in Berlin., the Ministers 
of the Member States, excluding the United Kingdom, agreed on interim 
proposals and declared themselves willing to act in accordance with 
the proposals, regardless of any continued UK r e s i s t a n c e H e n c e ,  
until 1980 the United Kingdom acted independently of the other eight 
Member States. The UK allocated itself a quota based on that share 
of the national TAG which it considered it should have, while the 
other Community Members fixed a TAG and quotas acceptable to themselves 
- catches for 1978 were not to exceed those of 1977. However, although 
quotas were accepted by all Member States in 1980,^^^) the commission 
has refrained from submitting a formal proposal on the quotas for 
1981, Figures have been calculated, though, which illustrate the 
weight given to the Hague preferences and which demonstrate the pre­
ferential treatment which would be received accordingly. Political 
figures in respect of quotas have appa,rently been agreed upon, though 
the writer found Commission officials expressed reservations on this, 
feeling that the issue of quotas has taken a temporary back seat and 
that once the access issue has been solved, the dispute over TACs 
will re-emerge to dominate negotiations.
Method employed in the calculation of quotas so as to reflect 
special dependency. As already mentioned, the "special needs of regions 
where the local populations are particularly dependent upon fishing and
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the industries allied thereto . are to be taken into account 
in the calculation of quotas and it may be recalled those areas were 
identified in the Hague Resolution as Ireland, Northern Britain 
and Greenland. The preference for each area is determined accord m g  
to certain criteria. In respect of Ireland and the United Kingdom, 
the relevant year is 1975.^^^^ The Irish preference is calculated 
by doubling the 1975 Irish catch figures. This reflects the 
Community's acceptance of the Irish Government's fisheries development 
plan under which the 1975 figure was to be doubled by 1979. The 
United Kingdom's preference, however, is determined by the landings 
in 1975 by vessels of less than 24 metres (80 feet in the United 
Kingdom) in the northern parts of the United Kingdom. Landings in 
Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man and the relevant northern 
England ports, by vessels of less than 24 metres are taken as the norm 
at which vital needs are satisfied* In other words, the United 
Kingdom's preference is based on a guarantee figure - i.e. that of 
catches in 1975 “* whereas Ireland receives an absolute preference.
The preference for Greenland is reached on an ill-defined formula and 
although not openly admitted within the Community, the size of the 
preference is arrived at through a process of bargaining and negotiation, 
Greenland is thus involved in establishing the extent of its preference 
'in a way which the other preference areas are not, A different method 
is employed to calculate the preference for each of the three Hague 
designated preferential areas. Quotas are used also to reflect special 
dependency of a different character. In Ireland's case, for instance, 
the dependency is "potential" although, admittedly, the psychological 
dependency may already be established, whereas the United Kingdom's 
dependency is established in fact, viz: on the past performance of a
mature industry.
l?5
The mechanics of calculating the quotas so as to express the 
"Hague Preferences In addition to a dependency on fisheries,
the calculation of quotas must also taJce into account "traditional 
fishing activities ,* « and the loss of catch potential in third 
country w a t e r s I n  respect of internal and joint stocks, 
traditional fishing activities have been interpreted, as the fishing 
8,verage by Member States in the base period 1973-78, with the removal 
from the 1978 figures of fishing that exceeds the quotas proposed 1:^' 
the Commission for that year. Account is also taken of quota ex­
changes between Member States, Industrial catches, (i.e. direct 
fishing for industrial purposes of fish fit for human consumption) 
and excess by catches of human consumption fish in industrial figures 
are also removed from the annual catches 1973-78.
Regarding compensation for third country losses, the Commission 
takes account of jurisdictional losses with respect to third country 
stocks and joint stocks, Tiie jurisdictional losses are calculated 
by reference to traditional catch figures defined as the average 
catches 1973-76,
Initially, the average catch for 1973-78 is calculated for each 
Member State, adjustment being made to take account of (a) the indus­
trial catch of edible fish, and (b) catches in excess of the I978 
quotas. These figures are translated into percentages and the 
resultant modified 1973/78 percentage distribution of average catches 
is then applied to the shares of the total allowable catches available 
to the Community for the year in question, allowing first of all for 
differences between the magnitude of the Hague transfers in that year 
and in the 1973-78 reference p e r i o d , T h e  Hague transfers are 
calculated then for each of two groups of stocks, viz; (i) cod,
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haddock, salthe, whiting, red fish, plaice and mackerel; and (ii) 
other fish for himan consumption (except h e r r i n g ) , T h e  Hague 
Preferences are calculated on the basis of the criteria already 
identified and are subtracted from the resources to be distributed 
to Member States
The Commission then calculates the Hague transfers of each of 
the two groups of stocks. The Hague transfer is the difference 
between the allocations taking into account the Hague preferences, 
and the allocations which would have been made in the absence of the 
Hague preferences. The negative values are then equalised so that 
each Member State contributes to the Hague transfers in proportion to 
its total 1981 catch possibilities, i.e. in internal and joint stocks 
and in third country stocks (see Appendix III for the effect of this 
calculation),
Compensation for third counticy- losses is also equalised amongst 
Member States * 1973/76 catches. The Hague regions are not included 
in this calculation. The equalised jurisdictional losses (or gains) 
added to the result from the Hague transfer equalisation calculation 
gives a figure for each Member State, Jurisdictional gains are not 
equalised for industrial species. The Commission has recently stressed 
that quotas once agreed by the Gouncil^^^) should have staying power,
A standstill figure, i.e. in percentage terms, is being encouraged. 
Obviously, this does not produce a static figure in that if the TAG 
is either increased or decreased, the United Kingdom's share will 
correspondingly increase or decrease. The foregoing is an outline 
of the general methods employed, but in the case of stocks allocated 
to only two countries, distribution is done by bilateral agreement, 
[Note: the tables reproduced in Appendix III illustrate the applica-
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tion of the method employed and demonstrate the effect of the Hague 
Preferences in the allocation of quotas,']
The criteria employed for the allocation of quotas have not 
escaped criticism. The Economic and Social Committee has, for 
instance, expressed the view that the weighting of the 1973-78 ref­
erence period by not talking account of recent changes in Member 
States' fishing patterns, could lead toihe perpetuation of situations 
"which no longer o b t a i n , w h i l e  in respect of the "special needs 
of coastal regions" ESOG, although favouring the criterion, criticises 
the Commission for lack of analysis. The Committee is of the view 
that a more general approach would, be favourable to that adopted 
the Commission, The Committee feels that the approach on a stock ‘by 
stock "basis results in cases of Member States being penalised on one 
stock (so as to favour coastal regions) and again on another stock 
because of a substantial reduction in the TAG, The Economic and 
Social Committee would consequently favour:
"a more general approach where "by the burden of the 
sacrifice to be made in the interest of the coastal /oq\ 
regions is not borne solely by a few Member States."^ ^
An assessment of the criteria employed in the allocation of quotas lies
beyond the scope of this study being as it is written by a lawyer.
What is of importance within this context is that it is in the 
allocation of quotas that the EEC can be seen as putting preferential 
treatment, merited because of special dependency, into practice.
Other Community instruments have, however, been utilised to reflect 
"special dependency" and it is to the means initiated in 1977, viz; 
fishing plans, that attention is now turned.
1?8
(ii) Fishing Plans
Fishing plans were submitted as a means of controlling fishing 
activity in the Commission proposal of October 1977.^^^^ The 
proposal essentially vxas that Member States wishing to fish in an 
area in which the Council of Ministers sought to control the fishing 
effort, should submit to the Council a fishing plan which would taJce 
into account the quota allocated for the species concerned. In such 
a fishing plan, vessels would be identified (by name, registration 
number, overall length and engine number) the number of vessels to 
be deployed would be indicated, or alternatively the number of fishing 
days per vessel or group of vessels would be given. The plans would 
be subject to Commission approval and, on the basis of the plans sub­
mitted, a "forward fishing plan" would be adopted for each of the 
Member States concerned. In respect of approved fishing plans, 
authorisation would be granted 'by the Commission to each participating 
vessel. The notice of authorisation received by each vessel would 
define the species to be caught, the place and the permitted time of 
fishing. Any infringement of the plan would lead to the vessel's 
authorisation being cancelled.
The Commission regarded fishing plans as one of the best possible 
means of regulating the fishing of endangered species or those species 
"whose exploitation is of special importance to coastal populations. 
Although principally designed to protect endangered species or important 
species in zones up to twelve miles from the baseline, it was conceded 
that plans might be produced for areas beyond the twelve mile limit.
While fishing plans must not discriminate between fishermen of 
Member States, account must be taken of the fact that:
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"vessels, which because of their limited range of operation, 
can only exercise their activities close to the coast, 
should have priority in the coastal area,"
The overall aim of a fishing plan is to define the total effort 
compatible with the available quotas and must "ensure that the quotas 
can be fished effectively by the interested fleets," Vessels under 
twelve metres between perpendiculars can be exempted from fishing 
plans provided that their total catch capacity is taken fully into 
account. An example of a Community fishing plan is that introduced 
in respect of the west of Ireland herring (ICES areas Vll(b) and (c), 
excluding Donegal Bay) in 1978. [Note: the plan relating to the
herring fishing west of Ireland is reproduced in Appendix IV of this 
study.]
Vessels under twelve metres between perpendiculars were excluded 
from the plan's application^and the use of purse-seine for herring 
fishing was prohibited in the sea area covered by the plan. Vessels 
over twelve metres but not exceeding 24 metres between perpendiculars 
were allowed to fish, Accoi-dingly, 80 Irish vessels were identified, 
as being entitled to an aggregate catch of 500 tonnes to be fished in 
150 fishing days from 1 July 1978 until 31 August 1978, and 5»000 tonnes 
in 1,750 fishing days from 1 September I978 to 3I December I978, The 
plan also authorised participation in the fishery of 44 Dutch vessels, 
subject to the proviso that (a) no more than fifteen, exceeding 24 metres 
between perpendiculars, could be in the area at any one time, and (b) 
their entitlement of 4,000 tonnes had to be talcen in 1,000 vessel 
fishing days from 1 July 1978 to 15 October I978. The maximum number 
of days on any herring voyage was for both Irish and Dutch vessels, 
five days, and the maximum authorised catch per vessel on any voyage 
25 tonnes.
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Although the west of Ireland fishing plan is the only one to have 
been introduced, the Commission did envisage that fishing plans should 
be established on an annual basis, with all Member States responsible 
for ensuring observance. The coastal State to whose waters the plan 
applied wou3.d, however, retai.n final responsibility for ensuidng 
c omplianc e,^  ^
The effect of the West of Ireland Fishing Plan and the way in 
which it gave expression to preferential rights because of special 
dependency, A fishing plan must apply to all vessels nevertheless, 
it may be utilised so as to discriminate in favour of the coastal 
State's fleet and, in particular, the smaller vessels. The West of 
Ireland Herring Fishing Plan, in effect, provided an exclusive 20 
mile zone over much of the area for all Irish vessels as none of them 
exceeded the limit for this purpose, viz; 24 metres between perpen­
diculars whereas none of the Dutch vessels qualified for entry. 
Similarly, the maximum authorised catch of 25 tonnes per vessel per 
five days voyage favoured the coastal area of the waters concerned.
The normal Dutch operation - i.e. voyages beginning and ending in the 
Netherlands - would have been effectively ruled out. Dutch vessels 
must either have had to arrange to send their catch back to the 
Netherlands by a carrier vessel (which would have had to be one of 
the named vessels in the plan) or alternatively the catch must have 
been landed in Ireland.
Fishing plans can, as illustrated, allow preference to be given 
to coastal regions. However, it must be asked whether the method 
employed by the West of Ireland Fishing Plan was fair in its applica­
tion to both the Irish and Dutch vessels. The same maximum catch per 
voyage was set for all participating vessels, A maximum, however,
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which was gectred to the performance of the smaller vessels. Such 
an inequilibrinm was surely an invitation to the Dutch to break the 
rules J
Quotas should ideally be allocated in ratio to vessel size and 
then written into the licence granted to each vessel, Alteraatively, 
the number of vessels from each Member State concerned could be 
restricted to a number which is compatible with its available quota, 
taking into consideration the period available for fishing.
Pishing plans, if they are to be a viable means of regulating 
fisheries, must set a realistic operation activity for each partici­
pating vessel. Pishing plans could play a constructive part in 
fisheries regulation if related to one particular stock and ideally 
covered the entire area over which that stock is fished. Consequently, 
in respect of stocks subject to quota, the need to have a breakdown of 
national quotas could be avoided and the problem of having to reconcile 
competing catch interests would not arise. Problems would continue, 
however, in respect of the North Sea, There, several areas might 
submit their o;m plans and issues such as the quantity to be fished, 
the number of vessels permitted to operate and which vessels should 
be accorded preferential treatment, would still have to be settled.
Vrtiy have fishing plans not been more frequently utilised within 
the Community context? The answer is essentially political. The 
power of vetoing, either in total or partially, the fishing plans 
proposed by Member States would lie with the Commission. Consequently, 
Member States have been reluctant to grant the Commission such competence.
Fishing plans have not, in principle, been abandoned by the Com­
munity - as is reflected in the Committee on Agriculture's call for a
JLO^i
( 94)resolution on the common fisheries policy.^ The Committee
recommend the use of a variety of instruments to effect fisheries,
e.g. fishing plans, reserved zones, seasonally closed zones for
particular species and regulations covering equipment and types of
fishing. The application and effect of fishing plans and reserved
zones would vary, the Committee acknowledged, (i) in the extent of
their geographical application, and (ii) in the degree of preference
accorded to the local coirnnunities and to vessels of limited size and
range of operation. In particular, a fishing plan should pay
attention to the;
"biological characteristics of the fishing stocks, the 
normal patterns of fishing and the resulting economic 
realities and to the social requirements and particular 
dependence on fishing."
The committee further recommended the establishment of regional zones
of variable extent so as to "protect the interests of particular
communities highly dependent on fishing," In such regional zones
the fishing of certain species would be reserved to littoral boats
of a certain capacity and in delimiting such zones account would be
taken of "regional and social, factors and traditional patterns of
fishing within these regions," In addition to regional zones, a
twelve mile belt is recommended in which;
"(a) preference shall be granted to vessels of limited 
size and range of operation and local inshore vessels; 
and (b) limited access to non-coastal vessels shall be 
granted, such access being quantified and determined 
by reference to traditional fishing patterns on the 
basis of a significantly long reference period and after 
taking into account the needs of conservation policies 
and the preference granted to local inshore vessels."
It is apparent from the foregoing that the EEC has clearly .recog* 
nised the need to give effect to special dependency and its attempts 
to do this are further reflected in the structural/social measures 
proposed for the fishing industry.
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(ill) Social Measures
A 1979 Community Report on the peripheral coastal regions of the
Gommunity(^^) stated that little real progress had been made "in
finding effective solutions to the problems of such regions and that
the imbalance between them and the more prosperous regions of the
Community" had continued "to grow rather than diminish*" Consequently,
the Commission was urged;
"to consider means by which the inhabitants of the peri­
pheral maritime regions should be enabled to develop their 
resources and improve their quality of life so that they 
will be able to benefit from opportunities for living and 
working in the region of their choice that are comparable 
to those enjoyed by the inhabitants of Europe's most 
prosperous areas,"
It was stressed ttiat the development or regeneration of the regions
was not something which could be accomplished overnight, but would
require "long-term programmes based on comprehensive understanding
of the totality of the problems ,,," A regional approach is further
reflected in the objectives of Regulation No IOI/76, viz;
"the harmonious and balanced development of the fishing 
industry within the general economy ,,. the ratioïial use 
of the biological resources of the sea ... the rational 
development of the fishing industry within the framework 
of economic growth and social progress, and-.^à an equitable 
standard of living for the population which depends on 
fishing for its livelihood" by "increased productivity 
through restructuring of fishing fleets" ^nd "adaptation 
of production and market requirements."(9o)
In July 1980, the Commission presented to the Gouncil^^^^ the most 
comprehensive series of structural/social proposals submitted to date 
in respect of f i s h e r i e s , T h e  proposals include the adaptation 
of the production infrastructure, common measures for restructuring 
and developing the fleet and aquaculture, the common co-ordination of 
research, the adaption and development of fish processing and the 
institution of a social action programme. It is proposed, for instance.
that financial assistance should be granted to supplement national 
aids promoting the redeployment of fishing effort',, vizs (i) explor­
atory voyages to be conducted loy vessels flying the flag of a Member 
State either within or outside Community waters; and (ii) joint 
venture operations of a temporary or long-term nature between Com­
munity and non-Member countries'fishing undertakings. The proposal, 
designed to encourage experimental fishing and co-operation with 
non-Member countries within joint ventures, is seen as being in 
response to a need "to reduce the fishing effort in the traditional 
areas and to employ vessels which would otherwise be used
The draft Regulation further stipulates the type of assistance 
a Member State may make towards exploratory fishing voyages, A 
Member State may, for instance, contribute to the cost of voyages by 
their vessels if certain conditions are fulfilled.
Also proposed is a Council Regulation on a common measure for
restructuring, modernising and developing the fishing industry and
developing aquaculture. The proposals are seen as confirming the
Community's concern to assist an industry which;
"... has been buffeted structurally but intends to continue 
playing an important role in the provision of food and the 
maintenance of employment in particularly sensitive regions, 
where it is an important source of i n c o m e , "(TOI)
The Commission identifies the principal objectives of a common restruc*
turing policy as;
"vessel profitability, and more generally, the constant 
adaptation of production facilities to improve the 
industry • competitively and the standard of living 
of those working in it."
The Commission recognises that the attainment of such objectives 
has become increasingly difficult and acknowledges that the industry 
"cannot be expected to cope with all these difficulties without help,"
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Consequently, the funds should be put to the most effective use to
encourage the gradual adjustment of the industry. In addition to the
measures already proposed (i.e. the Directive on immediate adjustment
of capacities and the Regulation on the encouragement of experimental
fishing and co-operation with non-Gommunity countries) the Commission
advocates the adoption of measures designed to assist firms :
"to move out of a situation of instability in which poor 
returns, or even no returns at all, on investments make 
it virtually impossible for owners to find the funds to 
finance replacement and modernisation of fleets,"
Any attempt- to reduce the instability and risks experienced by the
fishing industry demands an assessment at Community level of available
fish resources, "so that foreseeable national or regional production
and the fleet capacity necessary to secure this production can be
assessed," Accordingly, the Commission envisages that the proposed
cOBunon measure would Institute arrangements covering:
"(a) the definition by each Member State of a multi­
annual outline programme enabling the Commission 
to assess both the initial structural situation for 
both fishing and aquaculture and the development plans 
formulated by the Member States;
(b) a procedure for aunual review of the programmes to 
assess actual structural development and make any neces­
sary changes to the guide programme;
(c) the establishment of projects at the initiative of 
the producers who will remain principal economic subjects 
of the restructuring and development operation. For 
fishing the main feature of the programme is the esti­
mation of the fishing capacity of the various types of 
fleet in each Member State and of the importance of 
renewing these,"(T82)
Such programmes would be regularly monitored and to ensure the 
optimum use available of financial resources, all the projects 
receiving aid should, it is recommended, be subject to a common 
framework of "special technical and economic conditions,"
Assistance which would allow the partial renewal of the semi-deep 
sea fleet and which would facilitate the development of more efficient
vessels in Iceland and Greenland "where inshore fishing has a limited
capacity" would be encouraged« Projects to receive priority in the
allocation of financial assistance will include, jji^ ter alia, the
building of inshore and semi-deep sea vessels to replace particularly
old and obsolete vessels; modernisation of vessels which, for example
(i) do not exceed 33 metres between perpendiculars and are based in ;
"coastal areas where the population is particularly 
dependent on fishing, especially for types of fish 
which are not specified and which are located in 
areas not too remote from the zones specified,"
or (ii) are operated on a group basis in "an economically and techni­
cally operated framework." Although vessels exceeding 33 metres may 
be eligible for assistance, aid would be subject to a specified con­
dition relating to the ratio between tonnage to be constructed and 
that to be broken up (the proportion will be determined in future 
implementing measures) , )
Aid granted from EAGGF (European Agricultural Guidance and
Guarantee Fund) would take the form of capital subsidy for physical
investment projects - maximum aid would be 2^, though derogation
would be made with regard to;
"Greenland, Ireland, Northern Ireland ... traditional 
fishing areas suffering from sluggish economic and social 
development, self-financing difficulties and their remote­
ness from the centre of the Community,"
and the Community contribution would be The 5C^ maximum would
also be applied in respect of projects for the construction of
artificial barriers which were intended to "facilitate restocking in
inshore zones because of the long-term benefits that this will bring
to communities living from fishing,"
Projects, the proposed Regulation stipulates, would have to be 
carried out by persons "natural or legal" who satisfied certain con­
J .O /
ditions, e,g, in the case of fishing, natural persons would have to 
he engaged in fishing work for at least five years, have dra>m aud 
he drawing at least half their income from these activities and 
"shall have devoted and be devoting at least half their total working 
time to them," whereas in the case of legal peinons at least S %  
of their total turnover would have to be related to fishing during 
the immediate preceding five y e a r s , T h e  planned duration of 
the EAGGF operation is five years.
The proposed Regulation also makes provision for the development 
of aquaculture. The principal emphasis in the selection of develop­
ment areas is on the basis of local experience and economic 
viability of the undertalsings already operating. Aquaculture is 
seen as being of considerable importance within the EH)G 's proposed 
structural measures. The breeding of species of high commercial 
value being required because of the shortage of certain stocks and 
the increasing demand for these species. The Commission, whilst 
acknowledging that in certain regions of the Community there has 
already been some development (particularly in respect of molluscs 
and other shellfish) maintains the potential is extensive, especially in 
those regions where the remoteness of markets has hindered development. 
These areas are now being opened up as a consequence of modern techno­
logy and improvements in the transport network; hence, the Commission 
advocates the need for such development to be supported and stresses 
that "Community aid will be vital if the necessary incentives are to 
be taken.
The total estimated Community expenditure under the proposed 
Regulation has been calculated as being 124 million EUA (rounded) on 
vessels with a lengbh of between 12 and 33 metres, and 67 million EUA
i m
(rounded) on vessels in excess of 33 metres; that on aquaculture 
has been estimated as 42 million EUA (rounded); on the construction 
of artificial reefs 5  million EUA, with a further fixed 5 million 
EUA to be spent on assistance, training and research centres,
Vocational Training
Essentially, there are two proposals relating to vocational 
training. Initially, a common approach for the development of such 
training in the fisheries sector is advocated and this, the Commission 
envisage, would be supported and supplemented by the introduction of 
a Community action programme utilising, for instance, the European 
Social Fund. The Commission's common approach will consist of 
certain elements, including, inter alia, (a) the introduction of 
compulsory vocational qualifications for access to the occupation;
(b) the general introduction of a minimum level of basic vocational 
training in fishing; (c) the extension of the system of educational 
and vocational guidance to cover the fisheries training sector; (d) 
refresher courses for instructors in fisheries training; and (e) 
availability of continuous training for fishermen. The successful 
implementation of a common approach to vocational training depends, 
the Commission stresses, on the production of a qualitative and 
quantitative forecast of training requirements based on likely labour 
requirements according to speciality and kind of fishing, Tlie 
back-up programme already mentioned would be worked out in order to 
implement the joint programme and would act as a support to the Member 
States' own measures and those organised by the fishing industry 
itself, (These proposals will have to be developed in more detail 
before being submitted in a draft Council Resolution),
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Employment
In the field of employment, the Commission seeks to improve 
"the transparency of direct and indirect employment in the fisheries" 
so as to obtain "a rough balance between the supply and demand of 
labour" and "to create employment in less favoured regions and to 
help young fishermen find employment."
The Social Action Programme
Guidelines for a social action programme were communicated to 
the Council on 1? November 1980.^^^^) The social action programme 
would be concerned with employment, the equipment of centres of 
assistance, training and research, safety conditions and the equip­
ment of ships, the working conditions of the workers concerned.
The Commission feels that tO;
"a great extent the future situation of fisheries in the 
Community beyond the present restructuring phase will
very probably be affected "by frequent changes in fishing
activities and a very considerable increase in produc­
tion costs"
and concludes that "the success of the Community fishing industry is 
closely linked to its ability to adapt,"
As regards training, for instance, the Commission states that the 
imbalanced pattern of traditional training with an over emphasis on
navigation and fishing techniques constitutes a "handicap both for
purposes of achieving the objectives of the common fisheries policy 
and for the fisherman who wishes to change either his speciality or 
his job." Consequently, fisheries training will have, it is concluded, 
to adapt with a view to "improving and widening its scope," In respect 
of employment, the Commission foresees the possibility of two contrary 
trends emerging, viz; (l) a fall in the workforce for certain cate-
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gories affected by restrictions on fishing activities, and (2) an 
increase in the workforce for other categories (fishing of certain 
species, access to new zones, aquaculture). The Commission concludes 
that increased competition due to the decline in accessible stocks 
and increased productivity raises, e.g. the risk of accidents at 
work.
Initially, though, "it is necessary to examine the employment
market in the fisheries sector, identify present needs and forecast
future developments." Accordingly, it is emphasised that;
"conceited studies with owners and fishermen's represent­
atives should be carried out at least once a year in 
Member States ,.. analysing the employment mairket and 
determining how it is likely to develop ,,. These studies 
will relate to the country as a whole and to sub-areas 
corresponding to coastal regions, they will refer to 
direct and indirect employment and how they have evolved 
and will need to be directed towards determining the 
likely consequences of production trends on the various 
categories (at sea and on land),"
In coastal regions of underdeveloped or declining fishing activity, 
the Commission suggests the introduction by Member States of measures 
as part of their employment market policy - to maintain jobs, re­
organise or create jobs, especially for young fishermen under 25 years.
The EEC's structural/social measures highlight recognition of 
the fact that the problem of those areas specially dependent on 
fisheries should be tackled via a comprehensive regional policy. A 
regional policy which includes not only provision of preferential 
fishing rights, but includes, e.g. retraining schemes and incentives 
encouraging diversification of the local economy.
It is obvious from the foregoing that the European Community 
recognises that a special dependency on fisheries may merit preferential
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treatment. The articulation of preferential treatment still presents 
problems for the Coimnunity, The Community still has to reconcile 
preferential rights with equal access. Had fishing been covered 
in Articles 52 to 66 of the EEC Treaty (i.e. Articles on right of 
establisliment and the freedom to provide services) then the situation 
would have been different. pishing vessels would be entitled to 
establish themselves in the waters of other Member States and would, 1 
provided not discriminated against on the grounds of nationality, be 
subject to the regulatory provisions prevailing in that area. A 
requirement of residence, such as that included in the West of Scotland 
Plan, might be opposed unless it could be shovm that it was necessary 
to ensure observance of fishery r e g u l a t i o n s , I f  treated within 
the chapter on the freedom to provide services fishing plans on the lines 
proposed by the Commission, though with realistic quotas corresponding 
to vessel size, could have been utilised to give preference to coastal 
regions. A limitation on the maximum fishing days could be imposed 
requiring the landing of catches in the coastal ports, thereby ensuring 
that they and the allied industries benefited from the preference. 
Preference, though, should not be granted alone. Simultaneous to 
preferential treatment being granted measures, e.g. those aimed at 
restructuring the industry, should be introduced so as to reduce the 
dependence of the area concerned on fishing. Preferential rights in 
respect of fishing activity should only be one aspect of an overall 
comprehensive regional policy.
Whether, and in what circumstances an area will be eligible for 
preferential treatment is an issue to which the Community should address 
itself, especially as there is no indication that the Hague Resolu­
tion was intended to be exhaustive in its identification of areas
-i.y/c
meriting special dependency, A definition of economic dependency 
or at least the establisliment of an agreed yardstick against which 
dependency could be assessed becomes, as far as the Community is 
concerned, all the more urgent as future enlargement is considered. 
Economic dependency could be invoked by areas within existing Member 
States to protect their fishing grounds against the fishing activity 
of the Spanish long-distance vessels. Similarly, it is possible 
that the new Member States might wish, on the grounds of special 
dependency, to regulate the operations of the long-distance fishing 
fleets of existing Member States.
The enlargement of the Community to twelve Member States will 
bring an additional 149,686 fishermen^^^^^ 'and will swell the total 
number of fishermen to some 303,337. Greek and Portuguese fishermen 
concentrate D.argely on coastal waters and consequently highlight the 
need for the Community to postulate some definition of special depen­
dency. Hindsight would suggest that with respect to enlargement it 
could be advantageous to invite Spain and Portugal to join in the 
fisheries negotiations even before they are fully fledged Members of 
the Community, The participation of more fishermen in Community 
waters will probably involve a reduction in catches for the existing 
Members, The question is which Members will have to bear the reduc­
tion? Participation in negotiations would allow the Community to 
exercise some control over the size of Spanish and Portuguese fishing 
fleets and prevent those countries developing an increased bargaining 
strength. Even if active participation by the Spanish and Portuguese 
is ruled out, their possible membership should be taken "into account 
when quotas are being calculated. In the event of negotiations failing, 
it would undoubtedly be more acceptable to increase an existing Member's 
allocation than to decrease it.
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It is apparent from this Chapter that the European Community 
has recognised special economic dependencyc However, although the
Community's recognition has become more ejqplioit it has, neverthe­
less, been of a facto situation. There is no evidence to show 
that the Community has felt legally obliged to recognise special 
dependency. An absence of any legal requirement on the part of 
the Community to recognise a particular situation is borne out by 
the Hague Resolution. In each instance under the Hague Resolution, 
recognition was for dependency of a different character - the United 
Kingdom's dependency was "established" whereas that of Ireland was 
"potential". Apart from specific identification in the Hague Reso­
lution, the Community has provided no formula against which special 
dependency may be assessed.
The only possible positive criterion advanced by the Community
has been the reference to:
"vessels which because of their limited range of 
operation can only exercise their activities close 
to the coast, should have priority in the coastal 
area,"
and this in the West of Ireland fishing plan led to a restriction on 
fishing activity by reference to vessel size. A reference to vessel 
size is further reflected in the current proposals on preferential 
treatment - access to the preference areas would be limited to vessels 
of 80 feet and under registered length. This, admittedly, would 
afford protection to inshore fishermen, but preference, on the one 
hand, must not be the cloak behind which inefficiency is allowed to 
perpetuate. However, in the Community context, vessel size appears 
as being relevant not only in assessing special dependency, but æ  a 
characteristic of the preferential treatment granted.
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In summary, the practice of the EEC provides evidence that 
recognition of special dependency is essentially political and, 
in addition, illustrates that preferential treatment of any region 
vis-a-vis another demands acceptance by the latter and any other 
interested parties. The Community provides examples of how pre­
ferential treatment may be articulated, viz; in the allocation of 
quotas, fishing plans and social measures, and also highlights some 
of the problems which may be encountered in giving practical expres­
sion to special dependency. Pishing plans, for example, although 
in principle a viable means of giving expression to special dependency, 
should not be seen to be over biased in favour of small vessels and thus 
putting unrealistic obstacles in the way of other participants.
It is evident from the Community's experience that preferential access 
to fishing stocks in itself will not solve the problems of specially 
dependent areas and that what is required is a comprehensive fisheries 
management policy.
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Footnotes
(1) The Community has a comprehensive external fisheries policy vis- 
a-yis non-Memhers0 Framework agreements with non-Memhers are of 
three types (a) those based on the principle of reciprocal fishing 
rights, e.g. I98O agreement with (i) Sweden; (ii) Norway; (iii) 
Canada (in the form of an exchange of letters) and (iv) the Faroe 
Islands - OJ No L 22.6, 29 August I98O. In I9SI attempts at 
agreement with Canada were constantly vetoed but an exchange of 
letters was finally concluded on 29 December I98I - OJ No L 379/38, 
31 December 1979; (b) those based on the principle of access to 
surplus “ the only agreement belonging to this category is that 
concluded on 3 June 1977 with the United States - OJ No L 3.41, 9 
June 1977; and (c) those based on tlie principle of non-r'eciprocity 
where the Community contributes finance, e.g. agreement with 
Guinea-Bissau - OJ No L 226/33, 29 August I98O. For discussion
on the external competence of the EEC in fisheries see, e.g. A.W, 
Koers, "The External Authority of the EEC in Regard to Marine 
Fisheries," (1977) l4 CML Rev. 269; R. Churchill, "Revision of 
the EEC's Common Fisheries Policy II," (I98O) 5 EL Rev. 95;
Colleen Swords, "The External Competence of the European Economic 
Community in Relation to International Fisheries Agreements,"
iîSLJSZ2Z^ . 31-
(2) See Regulation IOO/7 6 « OJ L 20, 28 January 1976 which established 
a common organisation in the market of certain species of fish. 
Species covered include herring, haddock, whiting, cod, mackerel, 
plaice, saithe, anchovies, hake, sardines, red fish and certain 
kinds of shrimp. Regarding the mechanics of the market - the 
price it is anticipated which will be realised on the open market, 
is set as is a "withdrawal price" (i.e. the minimum price below 
which producer organisations may not sell fish for human consum­
ption). The withdrawal price is generally set so that fish are 
withdrawn from the market at between 60fo and 90^ of the guide 
price. In respect of certain fish products, e.g. fresh sardines, 
an intervention price is established at between and of
the guide price. In the event of the price for such products 
falling below the intervention price for three successive days, 
national authorities of the Member States purchase the products 
at the intervention price - see, e.g. Council Regulation (EEC)
No 234/81, 20 January I98I fixing the guide prices for the products 
listed in Annex I(a) and (c) to Regulation (EEC) No IOO/7 6 for the 
1981 fishing year - OJ No L 37/1» 10 February I98I. Imports from 
non-Member countries are also regulated by a price control system 
designed to prevent foreign imports from undercutting Community 
products.
(3 ) Belgium, the Federal German Republic, France, Italy, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands. The establishment of a common market in 
fishery products was provided for in the Chapter (Title III) on 
Agriculture. Article 38(1 ) of the Treaty of Rome defines 
"agricultural products" as being "the products of the soil and of 
fisheries and of products of first stage processing directly 
related to these products," Regulation (EEC) No 214-2/70 of 20 
October 1970 on the common organisation of the markets in the 
fishing industry - JO 1970 No L 236/5, 27 October I97O - was sub­
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sequently consolidated by and superseded by Regulation No 100/76 - 
OJ No L 20/1, 28 January 1976.
(4) Regulation (EEC) No 2l4l/70 of 20 October 1970 on the establish­
ment of a common structural policy for the fishing industry -
JO 1970 No L 236/1, 27 October I97O,
(5 ) Ibid, Article 2(3) provided that Member States were to define
under their own legislation the maritime waters coming under 
their sovereignty,
(6) Ibid, Article 4. In the event of the fishery resources in the
Member States ' maritime waters being threatened by excessive 
exploitation the Council, acting on a Commission proposal, could 
adopt the necessary conservation measures including, inter ^ia, 
restrictions on the catching of certain species, authorised zones, 
fishing methods and the use of certain tackle - Article 5.
(7 ) i.e. Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands - three mile territorial 
sea; France - three mile territorial sea, twelve mile exclusive 
fishing zone (extended to twelve mile territorial sea in 1971); 
Italy « six mile territorial sea (extended to twelve miles in 1974), 
All five coastal States of the original Six were parties to the 
1964 European Fisheries Agreement recognising, subject to certain 
reservations, a maximum fisheries zone of twelve miles. The
last chance of the Community to take advantage of the opportunity 
to decide upon a limit of uniform application has been described 
as "not wholly consistent with the idea of a Community," Had 
the opportunity been taken "maritime waters" could have been 
defined as "those situated within a limit of twelve nautical 
miles or such other breadth as, not being contrary to international 
law, may be determined from time to time by the Council ..."
A. Laing, "The Common Fisheries policy of the EEC," revised 
reprint from (1977) Fish Industry Review, Vol I No 2, 7"8 and 
10-11, A Draft Council Resolution was submitted on 27 April 
1978 calling on all Member States, which had not already done so, 
to extend their territorial seas to a twelve mile limit - OJ No 
G 14V u ,  21 June I978.
(8) A list of French overseas territories is give in Annex IV, EEC 
Treaty,
(9) Regulation No 2l4l/70 ™ Preamble and Article I.
(1 0) The European Commission had been prompted to develop a programme 
for the regulation of fisheries when the production of the Six 
began to stagnate and by I966 Community sufficiency levels had 
declined significantly for certain important species such as 
herring (71^) and tuna {kOfo)»
(11) Report on the Principles of a Common Fisheries Policy (European 
Parliament, Working Documents 1967-68, Doc 1?4) 1^ January 
10.
(12) Regulation No 2l4l/70, Article 10.
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(13) Nor>;ay participated in the Treaty of Accession negotiations hut 
although a signatory to it, failed to ratify it following the 
results of the national referenduin held in September 1972.
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom boasted some 43,536 
fishermen and caught 2,604 thousand tonnes* This was, to increase 
the number of fishermen in the Community from 114,286 to 157,822 
and the volume of fish ca.ught from 2,738.1 thousand tonnes to 
5,342.1c The applicant members further changed the character
of the EEC's fisheries in that they brought many more inshore 
fishermen - the United îCingdom, Denmark (including Greenland), 
Ireland and Norvray caught 63.6^, 68g^ ,^ 9V> and 7 V  respectively 
of their total fisheries catch from within 200 miles of their 
coasts, whereas the corresponding figure for Belgimi, France, 
the Netherlands and West Germany was 5 3 % t 2 7 % » 36^ and ^  res­
pectively.
(14) Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom each claimed a three mile 
territorial sea and a twelve mile exclusive fishing zone. Norway 
claimed a four mile territorial sea and a twelve mile exclusive 
fishing zone.
(1 5) By coincidence the main provisions of the Community's initial 
fisheries were adopted in a Council Resolution on the day that 
negotiations were opened with the applicant States, i.e. 38 June
1970.
(16) Norwegian arguments advanced during the negotiations have to be 
taken into account because although Norway did not sign the Treaty 
of Accession, the Norwegian stance did influence the final text
of the Treaty.
(1 7) Norway's Application for Membership to the EEC - First General 
Reporb EG (I967), 4l4.
(18) Mr, Einar Moxness *s statement during debate in Norwegian Storting 
on 24 November 1970 - cited in (1971) 8 CML Rev. 227.
(19) Mr. S, Stray, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the Nor­
wegian Government (1971) 8 CML Rev. 71.
(2 0) Norway's alternative structural policy proposals contained in 
(1971) 8 CML Rev. 509.
(21) Dr. Hillary, 21 September 1970.
(22) Ireland was a party to the 1964 European Fisheries Convention and 
although Belgian, British, French, Dutch, West German and Spanish 
fishermen were permitted to fish for specified types of fish in 
designated areas of the outer six mile zone, the inner six miles 
were reserved exclusively for Irish fishermen.
(2 3) Agence Europe, 22-6-71, No 833, 6.
(24) Agence Europe, 17-6-70, No 83O, 4,
(2 5) Norway finally consented to the fishery arrangements on l4 January
1972.
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(26) Act of Accession, Article lOO(l),
(27) Ibid, Article 100(3),
(28) Ibidy Article 100(4), Of the three new Member States, Prance
and Germany availed themselves of Article 100(1), The Dutch
and Belgians adhered to the original policy of equal access while 
Italy claimed a six mile limit only in respect of the waters 
round Sicily,
(2 9) G, Rippon, 830 H,C, Hansard, 13 December 1971, col 15.
(30) Act of Accession, Ar'bicle 101 - substituted by Ar-ticle 21.
Adaptation Decision of 1 January 1973 “ OJ No D 2/6 (decision 
was necessary because of the non-accession of Norway),
(31) "Sixth year after accession" was interpreted by the European Court
of Justice as expiring on 3I December 1978 - Joined Cases 185-204/78
Pirma J, Van Dam en Zonen and Others [19791 ECR 2345; [I980I 1 GMLH
350.
(32) E. Brown, "British Fisheries" (I972) 25 Current Legal Problems 64,
(3 3) Supra note (29). An area which did not receive special treatment 
because of the protection offered by the straight baselines was 
that of the Minche and the Clyde, Application of the straight 
baseline system with respect to the Minche meant that baselines 
were drawn westwards off Cape Wrath round the Atlantic coast of 
the Outer Hebrides and accordingly the "inner six mile zone" was 
pushed outwards,
(3 4) OJ No L 20/19, 19 January 1976.
(35) The objectives of Regulation No IOI/7 6 may be summarised as
(i) "... to promote harmonious and balanced development of (the 
fishing) industry within the general economy and to encourage 
rational use of the biological resources of the sea and of inland 
waters" (Article l). Measures adopted to this end were to "...
promote the rational development of the fishing industry within
the framework of economic growth and social progress and .., ensure 
an equitable standard of living for the population which depends 
on fishing for its livelihood" and aim at "increased productivity 
through restructuring of fishing fleets" and "adaptation of pro­
duction and marketing conditions to market requirements" (Article 
9 ). (ii) "Rules applied by each Member State in respect of fishing 
in (its) maritime waters shall not lead to differences in treatment 
of other Member States" (the maritime waters referred to are those 
within the 200 mile limit claimed by ESC countries as of January 
1977). "Member States shall ensure, in particular-, equal conditions 
of access to and use of (their) fishing grounds ,,, for all fishing 
vessels flying the flag of a Member State and registered in Gommun- 
ity territory" (Article 2(1)). (iii) In the event of "a risk of 
over-fishing of certain stocks .., the Council .., may adopt the 
necessary conservation measures" which may include "restrictions 
relating to the catching of certain species, to areas, to fishing 
seasons, to methods of fishing and to fishing gear" (Article 4),
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(36) The Commission issued proposals in September 1976 recommending 
that Member States should extend their fishing limits round the 
North Sea and North Atlantic coasts to 200 miles as from 1 January 
1 9 7 7  « "Communication on Future External Fisheries Policy and 
Internal Fisheries System", Com (76) 500 final - submitted to the 
Council 23 September 1976.
(37) Council Resolution on Certain External Aspects of the Creation of 
a 200 Mile Fishing Zone in the Community with effect from 1 
January 1977" OJ No G 105/1, 7 May I98I.
(38) This action was not to prejudice similar action being taken for 
other fishing zones within Member States' jurisdiction. No 
proposals have as yet been made with respect to the Mediterranean. 
Only 7 %  of fish caught by the Community is caught in the Mediter­
ranean, The Community's main fishing grounds lie in the NE 
Atlantic - 70^ of the Community's catch is caught there with only 
%  and 2^ being caught in the NW Atlantic and mid-eastern Atlantic 
respectively.
(39) The exclusion of distant water vessels from the fishing zones of 
non-Member countries would it was soon realised produce adverse 
repercussions for the EEC. The UK loss was calculated (the cal­
culations did not talce into accotant the outcome of negotiations on 
access to non-Gommunity waters) at 213,000 tonnes for 1978, i.e.
36% of the total UK catch in the period 1973^76, Relatively, 
Germany's loss was greater with a total loss estimated at 173,000 
tonnes, i.e. 5 2 %  of the total catch. The French losses were 
estimated as being 52,000 tonnes, 20^ of the catch,
(40) Fishery Limits Act 1976.
(41) Maritime Jurisdiction (Exclusive Fishery Limits) Order 1976,
(42) Proclamation of the Federal Republic of Germany on the "Establish­
ment of a Fishery Zone of the Federal Republic of Germany on the 
North Sea," 21 December 1976, Bundesgesetzblatt, PIT, 29 December
1976, 1999 - English translation in Churchill, Nordquist and Lay, 
New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol V, 118-119 ,
(43) Law No 597, 19 December 1976 on the "Fishing Territory of the 
Kingdom of Denmark'®; Order No 628, 22 December 1976 on the "Fishing 
Territory of Denmark"; Order No 598, 21 December 1976 on the 
"Fishing Territory of the Faroes"; and Notice No 629 of 22 
December 1976 on the "Fishing Territory of Greenland", English 
translation in Churchill, Nordquist and Lay, New Directions in the 
Law of the Sea, Vol V, IO9-II7 .
(44) France in February 197/ under Law No 76-655 of 16 July 1976 passed 
legislation to establish a 200 mile economic zone. This was 
effected with regard to the French North Sea and North Atlantic 
coasts by Decree No 77-13, 11 February 1977 - JQR 7, 12 February
1977, 864. English translation in Churchill, Nordquist and Lay, 
New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol V, 3OI-302 and 303,304, 
Decree No 77-l697 25 February 1977 extended limits in respect of 
St, Pierre et Miquelon - JOR 7, 27 February 1977, 1102. Dutch 
fishery limits were extended in November 1977 “• Royal Decree of
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23 November 1977» 8tb 1977 Nos 345 and 665. Partial English 
translation in (1978) 9 Netherland Yearbook of International Law, 
385-386. Belgian limits have not yet been extended, adoption 
having been deferred apparently until agreement on other aspects 
of a revised common fisheries policy has been achieved, R, 
Churchill, "Revision of the EEC's Common Fisheries policy,"
(1980) 1 E,L. Rev, 9 , n.39.
(45) Some Member States have extended fishing limits to 200 miles in 
areas other than specified in the Resolution, The United King­
dom, for example, has extended limits to 200 miles off the coasts 
of a number of territories for whose external relations they are 
responsible ~ Bermuda, Proclamation of the Acting Governor of 
Bermuda, 20 May 1977, UN I^islative Series ST/LEG/SER B/IO Pre- 
liminary Issue, 13 June 1978, 272; and the British Virgin Islands 
UKTS No 1 (1979),
(46) Proposed Regulation on a Community System for the Conservation and 
Management of Fishery Resources, submitted to the Council, 8 
October I976 - OJ No G 255, 28 October I976.
(47) The northern part of the British Isles has since been defined as 
Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man and the adjoining English north­
east coast as far south as Bridlington « Doc, Com (80 ) 452^Jdjnal,
16 July 1980 ; Joint answer to Widtten Questions N œ ’459/80 and 
831/80 - OJ No C 322/2, 10 December I98O,
(48) Supra note (46), Article 6.
(49) Ibid, Article 4(1).
(5 0) The British opposition to the Commission's proposals was essen­
tially because of the following: (i) the catch figiares used by 
the Commission as a basis for the plan were alleged to be not 
only unreliable in themselves, but also inadequate. The figures 
were limited to 1973 catches and did not take account of subsequent 
reductions in catches; (ii) no account, it was submitted, was 
taken of the fact that almost 60^ of the total catch by EEC States 
occurred in what the British designated the "British" zone;
(iii) nor was account taken that the United Kingdom was the main 
net loser from the establishment of 200 mile zones by non-Member 
States, Fish landings from the Icelandic and Norwegian zones had 
amounted to 330,000 tonnes. In economic terms the loss for the 
United Kingdom was high, the catches having been of cod » fish of 
a high market value; (iv) only 3*^ of the United Kingdom catch 
came from the zones of other Member States; and (v) the United 
Kingdom fisheries were destined primarily for human consumption 
and not industrial purposes and were, it was alleged, more worthy 
of encouragement than industrial fishing.
(5 1) In respect of cod, relatively few one-year olds are found in the 
British sector of the North Sea.
Sample Caught in EEXÎ Waters 
Xfo by nationaT”zone)
UK Denmark W. Germany Netherlands
One-year olds 13.6 20,3 54.1 12,0
Two-year olds 38.4 8.4 37.9 15^2
Three-year olds 77*0 6.6 6.7 9*2
(Source* ICES)
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The life-cycle movement pattern of other species are illustrated 
by migration maps included in Appendix II of this study,
(52) See, e.g. "Fish Can't Read", European Communities Commission Back­
ground Report, ISBC/B 34/78, 28 April I978 and Michael Berendt, 
"Revision of the Common Fisheries Policy", paper given at the 
Conference on Technology and the Challenges of the World's New 
Fisheries Regime, London, 10 June I98O - reproduced in European 
Community No 7» July I98O, 11-13,
(53) The Hague Resolutions of 3 November 1976 other than that re the 
200 mile zone have not been published,
(5 4) Com (76) 660 final, 3 December 1976.
(55) Emphasised by European Court of Justice in Case 6l/77, R^ Sea 
Fishery Restrictions Commission v Ireland [19781 ECR 4l7 : "'%19781 
2 CMLR"50^
(56) Case 141/78, French Republic v United Kingdom [19791 ECR 1629;
[1980] 1 CMR 6 . . .
(57) e.g. Regulation R/388/77 - OJ No L 48, 18 February 1977.
(58) For fuller discussion of this question see R. Churchill, "Revision 
of the EEC's Common Fisheries Policy", (I98O) 1 E.L. Rev. I7 .
(59) Cases 3,4 and 6/76, Officier van Justifie v Kramer [I976I ECR 1279; 
[1976] 2 GMLR 440 - for what is understood by "conservation measure". 
Case 61777, Re Sea Fishery Restrictions; EC Commission v Ireland
[19781 ECR.. 4 l 7 T l " Î 9 7 n T i % Ë r ^  --------  —
Case 88/77 Minister for Fisheries v Schonenberg [19781 ECR 473:
[19781 2 c m i F 5 1 9 7 ~ ' ~ ~ “—  “—  ---- - -------
Case l4l/7F3hrench Reuublic v United Kingdom [19791 ECR 1629:
[1980] 1 CMLTEl—      —  — —
Case 32/79 Ro Fishery Conservation Measures; EC Commission v United 
Kingdom [I981I 1 CMLR 219.
Case 604/79 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom, 
unreported.
UK measures to which the EEIÎ took exception were;
(i) The Fishing Nets (North-East Atlantic) Order 1977 - SI No 440
(1977)
(ii) The Norway-Pout (Prohibition of Fishing)(No 3 )(Variation)
Order 1978 - SI No 1379 (1979)
(iii) The Herring (Irish Sea) Licensing Order 1977 - SI No I388 
(1977) replaced in SI No II76. The Irish Sea Herring 
(Prohibition of Fishing) Order 1979
(iv) The Fishing Nets (North-East Atlantic) Variation Order 1979 
- SI No 744 (1979 replacing SI No 946 (1978)
(v) The Immature Nephrops Order 1979 - SI No 742 (1979). The 
Nephrops Tails (Restrictions on Landing) Order 1979 - SI No
743 (1979).
(60) Council Declaration of 30 May I98O - OJ No G 158/2, 27 June I98O.
(61) "The Scotsman", 17 November I98O.
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(62) The fishery negotiations received a further set back in January 
1980 when Finn Gundelach, the Commissioner responsible for 
Agriculture and Fisheries, died suddenly. Responsibility for 
fisheries (now separated from Agriculture) has been assumed by 
the Greek Commissioner, G. Gontogeorgis,
(63) R , McGoll, Assistant Secretary SFF, reported in "Aberdeen Press 
and Journal", 24 January I98I.
(64) The Commission's proposal to terminate the ban on North Sea 
herring fishing may have gone some way in shifting the French 
stance.
(65) The principal reason for there not to be a vacuum was that by the 
end of the ten years, Spain would probably be a Member of the 
Community and would bring "a huge fishing fleet from which other 
countries would need some protection."
(66) Mr, G. Younger, Scottish Secretary, "Press and Journal", 11 
February I98I,
(67) So called after the Dutch Minister, Mr. Braks, responsible for 
submitting the plan.
(68) "Press and Journal", 12 February I98I, The German and Dutch 
supported the French and opposed any preferential treatment for 
British fishermen in the twelve to fifty mile zone and demanded 
that "the principle of equality in conditions of access should 
be recognised beyond twelve miles,"
(69) The Commission concluded from available evidence that 90^ of the 
inshore catch was taken from within the twelve mile zone and that 
any claim for preferential treatment beyond this limit was unjus­
tified ,
(70) Lord Carrington, on possible tasks during British Presidency of 
the Council of Ministers, reported in national press, week 
beginning I8 May I98I,
(7 1) OJ No C 255» 28 October 1976.
(72) The Commission's proposals were produced in March 1977 “ EEC 
Draft Regulation R/6I6 /77, 15 March 1977*
(73) Com (77) 524 final, I7 October 1977,
(74) Under the NEAFC system, 45^ of the TAG was divided in proportion 
to the national catches for the years I963-6 8 ; 4E% in proportion 
to the catches for 1969-73 with 10^ being reserved for minor 
adjustments,
(75 ) R M Z Z Z .  2 December 1977.
(76) Iceland gained a 26^ increase in its previous average catches a,nd 
consequently withdrew support for the United Kingdom and joined 
the other Member States.
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(77) Bi?itain received approximately 36^ 0 of the TAG - an increase 
achieved hy a reduction in the allocation given to West Germany 
and Denmark,
(7 8) Commission Staff Paper, "Quotas I98I", SBC (35) 10,5» 3, 21 January
1981,
(79) Annex VII, paras, 3 and 4, Council Resolution, 3 November 1976.
(80) Annex. Ill of the Commission Communication, Com (80) 338 final,
12 June 1980 as amended by the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Proposals on Quotas, Com (80) 452 final, 16 July I98O,
(81) See "Quotas I98I", supra note {7 7)•
(82) Council Declaration of 30 May on the Common Fisheries Policy, 
supra note (15).
(83) For the purposes of the various calculations, the French catch 
possibilities in the waters off St. Pierre et Miquelon have been 
assimilated to the Hague Preferences,
(84) The United Kingdom figure does not include the catch already 
included within the preference - i.e. it only takes account of 
catches by vessels in excess of twenty-four metres and non-pre- 
ferential areas.
(85) A different method of calculation is employed to herring because 
of zero TACs, limited TACs allocated to one country and problems 
relating to the opening of limited TACs after a period of closure.
(86) Problems may be encountered when a preference is necessary in 
respect of a stock in which the 1975 guarantee and twice the 1975 
(i.e. for Ireland) catches exceed the TAG. In such circumstances 
the preference is calculated on a proportional basis,
(87) "Quotas 1981", supra note (77).
(88) OJ No G 348/8, 3I December I98O.
#*ii« I#mi,làhLi o m m t m i  n* mi iijiu tmwui ■
(89) iMd, 9.
(90) Com (77) 513 final.
(91) Preamble to the proposal for a Council Regulation establishing 
Community fishing plan for directed herring fishing in certain 
zones - OJ No I4l/l0, 16 June 1978.
(92) Twelve metres between perpendiculars was taken as being equal to
42 registered length or 13.75 metres overall length,
(93) The plans drawn up in respect of the Shetland Isles and the West
of Scotland were done in accordance with the Commission's pro­
posals, see Chapter Three.
(94) Working Document 608, 1978-79» 8 January 1979.
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(95) Doc 113/79 EP Working Documents, 1979=80.
(96) Supra note (34).
(97) Com (80) 420 final, I8 July I98O.
(98) Pre-1980 measures which effect the fisheries industry include
Regulation 17/64/EEC - OJ No I, 34/586, 29 P'cbruary 1964 author­
ising the provision of Community funds to assist investment in 
agricultmre and fisheries; Commission Regulation No 1852/78/EEC,
25 July 1978 - OJ No L 211 /30; 1 August 1978 extended by Commission
Regulation No 59277^EBC“p 2^"March 1979 - OJ No L 78/5, 30 March
1979 and by Council Regulation No I713/8O/EÊF/' 2? June I98O -
OJ No L 167/50, 1 July 1980 under which the Commission has granted 
aid for restructuring the inshore fishing industry and has, for 
example, granted 5*356 million EUA for 22 aquaculture projects. 
Amended communication of 12 June 1978, Com (78) 24/ final - OJ 
No 148, 23 June 3.978,proposes a Council Directive on ce”o4.ain 
measures to adjust capacity in the fisheries sector. The
proposal is concerned with essentially three issues, (a) the
temporary or permanent reduction in production capacity; (b) 
information and promotion campaigns to encourage the consumption 
of fishing products and, in particular, fish of lesser knotm 
species or fish of stocks are wider fished than, at present; and
(c) social measures to benefit the fishermen who are affected by 
the x'eduction in production capacity,
(99) Article 1 of the proposed regulation provides that; "in order 
to improve market supplies and the utilisation of the fishing 
capacities made available by restrictions on catches, Member 
States may implement measures to encourage the redeployment of 
fishing effort towards catches of hitherto little exploited species 
or towards the prospection of new fishing grounds" and this may
be done by; "exploratory fishing voyages to be accomplished by 
vessels flying the flag of a Community Member State « co-operation 
with operators in non-Member countries through joint ventures." 
Member States, it is proposed, would forward to the Commission a 
plan outlining; "a detailed description of the redeployment oper­
ations to be undertaken, in particular their direction and the 
areas and vessels concerned; the incentives envisaged to promote 
the implementation of these operations and an estimate of the cost 
of each of these operations" (Article 3(1)) and they would also be 
required to "communicate such laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions as may affect" the implementation of the Regulation 
and in the light of information received, the Commission would 
decide whether or not the proposed project would qualify for 
Community assistance (Article 3(2) and (3)).
(100) The voyage must be under-baken by fishing vessels of a length 
between perpendiculars of not less than 33 metres; must be for 
a minimum of 50 fishing days with one or more landings; there 
must be one or more scientific observer on board... Similar rules 
are laid down in respect of the granting of a co-operation premium 
by Member States to participants in joint fishing ventures. The 
Community contribution to any expenditure considered eligible for 
assistance would not exceed 5 W o  (Article 11(2)), The estimated 
cost to the Community of providing assistance for exploratory
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fishing and joint ventures has been calculated as being a total 
17 million EUA, Ajnended Financial Estimate of the Commission 
Proposals on Structural Policy in the Fisheries Sector, Com (30) 
787 final; 2 December I98O.
(101) Supra note (96),
(102) (in respect of, e.g. the establishment of training and research 
centres, Member States would gather, because of its general 
nature, the information required and transmit it to the Commission 
in a "descriptive outline setting out the investment forecasts for 
the area,") An outline programme would include information re­
garding the existing situation of the fishing industry and any 
possible discernible trends, in particular as regard.s the various 
categories of vessels malcing up the fleet; an overall estimate
of the fishing capacity of such vessels; an estimate of the 
future capacity of the fleet as calculated on the basis, e.g. of 
an estimate of the number of vessels to be withdrawn from fishing, 
with an indication of their fishing capacity and an estimate of 
the number of vessels to be laid up periodically.
(103) Supra note (96), Article 11,
(104) Ibid, Article 10.
(105) Provision is made in Part IV Fisheries Act I98I for development 
of fish farming within the United Kingdom.
(106) Com (80) 787, 6-7, 2 December I98O,
(107) Commission Communication to the Council on the Social Aspects in 
Community Sea Fishing Sector, Com (8 0) 725 final.
(108) Residence should only be demanded in the provision of services as
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CHAI^TER SIX 
Conclusion
The purp)0se of this study has been to a^ ssess the legal recognition 
which has been awarded to the concepts of special, economic dependency 
and preferential rights as claimed in respect of fisheory resources. 
Attention has been focused, in particular, on the recognition awarded 
by international law and European Community law. As far as inter­
national law is concerned, it is apparent from the instances looked at 
of recognition of special economic dependency and preferential rights 
that neither concept is recognised as law by the international community. 
It is not denied that the concepts have been recognised; they have, 
but they lack legal ceartainty and there is no evidence that preferential 
rights must be negotiated given the existence of a particular set of 
circumstances. If special economic dependency and preferential rights 
were legal principles, preferential rights would require to be negotiated 
once a prima facie case of special economic dependency appeared to exist. 
This, however, is not the case. The International Court of Justice 
was wrong in 1974' in asserting that the concepts had acquired the 
character of international custom. The Court failed to demonstrate 
that recognition of special economic dependency was anything other than 
recognition of a de facto situation - recognition, that is, which was 
in effect a political response to certain circumstances, rather than a 
response prompted by legal necessity. The International Court, as 
already highlighted in Chapter Two, never raised the question of whether 
States felt under any legal obligation to act in the way that they had 
done. The Court took, in an attempt to achieve credibility for its 
conclusion, recognition by States of special economic dependency at 
face value. The evidence produced by the Court was weak. Rather
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than demonstrating that special economic dependency gave rise to 
preferential rights, the evidence relied upon by the Court only served 
to demonstrate that the concepts were recognised and accepted by 
relatively few States and that such recognition was limited geograph­
ically to a particular area, viz: the North Atlantic, Nor was the
Court's judgment lex ferenda, Tlie Court did not anticipate accurately
# I i|Mi #1 I
the future development of the law. As already emphasised, preferential 
rights possessed by coastal States are of a different kind to those 
articulated by the Court, Preferential rights are enjoyed by coastal 
States because they are coastal States and not because of any special 
economic dependency they may demonstrate. The International Court of 
Justice failed to substantiate its case that special economic dependency 
and preferential rights were strict legal concepts which required to be 
recognised as of right and respected by other States.
The International Court of Justice, although not required to do 
so, took up these concepts and fashioned them unjustifiably as legal 
concepts. Nevertheless, although lacking legal status, special 
economic dependency and preferential rights have been accorded some 
recognition by the international community. They have been recognised 
as important considerations in international relations. Increasingly, 
as the need to control fishing activity has become all the more neces­
sary, the claim of special economic dependency has been used as a 
weapon in political bargaining. It is only with the need to control 
fisheries that claims of special economic dependency have been advanced, 
l'îhen special economic interest received judicial recognition, for 
instance in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (1951),^^^ that recog­
nition only related to fishery limits in so far as the extent of 
fisheries jurisdiction was determined by the breadth of the territorial
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sea. In 1951 fisheries jurisdiction was still accepted as being an 
incidence of territorial waters’ jurisdiction. Furthermore, the 
Court's recognition of economic interests was limited. Economic 
interests were only to be used as supplementary evidence in determining 
the width of the territorial sea if the coastline concerned possessed 
certain geographical characteristics. The Court's judgment was later 
reflected in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone, viz: that where the straight baseline method was used in respect
of the territorial sea because of, for example, a deeply indented 
coastline, account could be taken "of economic interests peculiar to 
the region concerned the reality and the importance of which are 
clearly evidenced by long u s a g e , H o w e v e r ,  in neither 1951 nor 
1958 was account required to be taken of "economic interests ..."
The reluctance to accord legal status to special economic depen­
dency was clearly illustrated by the United Kingdom in the An^^- 
Norwegian Fisheries Case, The United Kingdom characterised special 
economic dependency as being "founded on political and national senti­
ment or prejudice," The UK was particularly reluctant to allow the 
crystallisation of special economic interests into law and accordingly 
stated that before she would enter into an arrangement, whereby exclu­
sive fishing rights outside the three mile limit were recognised, she 
would require to be satisfied that the facts of the situation were so 
exceptional that the arrangement could not be Invoked by other countries 
as a precedent applicable against them (i.e. the UK),^^^ The UK, 
throughout the 1951 case, emphasised that any extension beyond the 
normal limit of the territorial sea would have to be based on excep­
tional circumstances. The conclusion that economic interests did not 
require to be taken into consideration is vindicated by the Norwegian
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plea that ;
"England ought to show her goodwill and take up nego­
tiations with a view to securing the conditions 
of life for the thousands of families who cannot 
make their livelihood on the long coast from Vester- 
alein to the Finnish border,"(5)
The UK, for its part, was not prepared to allow special economic
interests to be elevated to that of a legal principle which could be
invoked as of right. The UK argued that the concept of special economic
interests lacked any legal content and, even if Norway had made out a
convincing argument for the talcing into account of economic interests,
the argument would nevertheless have been irrelevant.
Special economic interests on the basis of the Court's judgment 
and the 1958 Convention, could only be of supplementary assistance 
when geographical conditions demanded and only then when the special 
economic interests were evidenced by long usage. In 1951 and 1958 
special economic interests only affected fishing rights in so far as 
they affected the determination of a State's territori.al waters. In 
the early 1950s special economic dependency claims had not entered the 
negotiating forum. Claims of special economic dependency were heard 
simultaneous to the birth and development of separate fishery zones - 
separate, that is, to the territorial sea.
Separate fishery zones are a phenomenon of the last thirty years. 
Advancing technology produced sophisticated fishing vessels capable of 
intensive fishing activity, while an increase in world population led 
to an additional demand for fresh fish. Ultimately, it was realised 
that the resources of the sea were not infinite and that fish stocks 
could be irrevocably damaged unless fishing activity was controlled. 
Consequently, the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea did establish 
a means to express claims of special economic dependency, vis: the
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Resolution on Special Situations Relating to Coastal Fisheries,
The Resolution acknowledged that there were peoples who were;
"overwhelmingly dependent upon coastal fisheries for 
their livelihood or their economic development, or were 
dependent on coastal fisheries for the animal protein 
of their diet and whose fishing methods are mainly 
limited to local fishing from small boats."
In such situations which were of "limited scope and exceptional 
nature" if conservation was necessary to limit the total catch of a 
stock or stocks of fish, negotiations could be entered into so as to 
reflect special dependency, while regard still required to be paid to 
the interests of other States, It was recognised, therefore, that 
a special economic dependency could, in the event of conservation needs, 
lead to the negotiation of preferential rights, provided that the 
interests of other States were safeguarded. Recognition was given, 
but it was given in the form of a resolution only. This suggests 
that States were not willing to grant legal recognition and were not 
prepared to declare that conservation needs complemented by special 
economic dependency should, as of right, lead to preferential rights 
being negotiated for the special dependent claimant. All the inter­
national community was prepared to conclude was that dependency, accom­
panied by a need to conserve stocks, could give grounds for the 
initiating of negotiations. No obligation was written into the 
Resolution, negotiations of preferential rights were to be entirely 
optional, special economic dependency in itself could not produce 
preferential fishing rights - there had to be a need to conserve fishing 
stocks, and the rights of others engaged in the fishing activity had to 
be respected and not extinguished.
Any recognition by the international community of special economic 
dependency since 1958 has been done via bilateral or multi-lateral
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agreement. The practice of States to accord such recognition in 
written agreements, weakens any assertion that special economic 
dependency and preferential rights are rules of customa.ry international 
law. State practice, through the mode of recognition applied, 
indicates the contrary. Nor is there anything in the agreements 
recognising such economic dependency, e.g. in the I96I Exchange of 
Notes,between the UK and Iceland, and the 1973 Arrangement relating 
to Fisheries in Waters surrounding the Faroe I s l a n d s , t o  suggest 
that the parties concerned were recognising anything other than a 
factual solution.
The failure of both UNCI^ I and II to provide an acceptable 
uniform breadth for the ,territorial sea heralded an increase in claims 
for a fisheries zone beyond the territorial sea. Initially, such 
claims were, as already seen, essentially for a twelve mile exclusive 
fisheries zone with provision being made, albeit temporary, for the 
continued fishing by foreign vessels in the outward six mile zone - 
if, that is, these vessels had been in the habit of fishing in the 
area during preceding years. However, just when territorial waters 
and fishing zones might again have been assimilated, the coastal State 
thrust seaward gained fresh impetus and, against the protracted nego­
tiations of UNCLOS III, coastal State fisheries jurisdiction extended 
seawards some 200 nautical miles.
The coastal States’ extensive action was expressed either as an 
exclusive economic zone or a fisheries zone, and is reflected and 
re-affirmed in the I98I Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
Nevertheless, although the Draft Convention might be expected to be the 
death knell of special economic dependency and preferential rights, the 
provisions governing access to a coastal State's exclusive economic zone
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provide otherwise. This was highlighted in Chapter Two and the 
conclusion must be that, though special economic dependency and 
preferential rights have currently receded from the international 
fisheries stage, neither concept is extinct under international law. 
Indeed, as again brought out in Chapter Two, the concepts may through 
the Draft Convention actually attain the recognition as international 
law which is currently denied to them. However, such recognition, 
should it be accorded, is still in the future. VHiat can be said is 
that the international legal system does not recognise the concepts 
of special economic dependency and preferential rights as legal concepts, 
The concepts have been recognised as important concepts in international 
fishery negotiations, but that recognition has been, and currently 
remains, a response to political demands rather than to legal necessity.
What recognition has been accorded to special economic dependency 
and preferential rights by Eliropean Community law? In the context of 
the European Community's negotiations for a common fisheries policy, 
special economic dependency and preferential rights are especially 
"sensitive issues," The Community's recognition of the concepts was 
thoroughly examined in Chapter Five and it was apparent that the 
Community has become increasingly more explicit in its recognition 
of special economic interests and that the problem confronting the 
Community is how preferential rights should be articulated. However, 
although the Community has awarded recognition to special economic 
dependency, there is no evidence to suggest that the Community's recog­
nition is anything other than a political response to a particular set 
of circumstances.
The Community in its recognition, for instance, of Ireland's 
special dependency on fisheries, recognised the potential dependency
2X3
as presented by the Irish Government in its development programme 
for the Irish fishing industry. However, although actual dependency 
was potential, psychological dependency may indeed have been "estab­
lished" and in recognising Northern Britain's dependency on fisheries, 
the Community recognised an established dependency, in other words, 
a d£ facto situation.
The EEC has been forced to recognise that a special economic 
dependency on fisheries may permit derogation from the principles 
of equal access and non-discrimination. This recognition has come 
about, though, not because of any legal requirement, but through 
political necessity. Fishing is a highly emotive political issue 
and those representing communities claiming special dependency have 
got to be seen to be pressing the case of their constituents. Not 
only are the national representatives of fishing areas particularly 
vocal politically but fishermen, like farmers, are a well organised 
pressure group and a high proportion of their number constantly shadow 
the fisheries ministers in the corridors of Westminster, Strasbourg 
and Brussels, This constant deference to the needs of national 
fishermen further emphasises that it is political considerations 
which have compelled the European Community to recognise special 
economic dependency and consequent preferential rights.
It may be concluded that European Community law has not recognised 
special economic dependency and preferential rights as legal concepts. 
However, while they do not possess legal status, they have been 
recognised as relevant and important considerations which the Community 
in its efforts to obtain a common fisheries policy must take into 
account. In a nutshell, the European Community has recognised 
special economic dependency and preferential rights because it has
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been politica3.1y expedient to do so and not because of any legal 
obligation, European Community law, like international law, has 
not accorded legal recognition to the concepts of special economic 
dependency and preferential rights. Both legal systems have 
recognised the concepts as demanding important consideration, but 
neither has defined special economic dependency and preferential 
rights in anything other than vague terms, A claim of special 
economic dependency meriting preferential rights will demand, if it 
is to be successfully sustained within any legal system, the existence 
of certain factors. Special economic dependency has, however, only 
been characterised as "overwhelmingly dependent",and "demonstrating 
a special dependence." No yardstick has been produced whereby a 
dependency on fisheries can be assessed, hence, why in Chapter Three 
an attempt was made to identify the pertinent character3.stics which 
must be present before a successful claim of special dependency will 
be sustained. The list produced did not ranic the characteristics 
in order of importance, nor was the list intended to be exhaustive. 
However, certain key considerations which could contribute to the 
assessment of special economic dependency were identified. At this 
stage it is again worth stressing that different legal systems need 
not necessarily articulate concepts in the same way. Nevertheless, 
legal systems do interrelate and this interrelation may be intensified 
when the factual situations which the concepts are utilised to express 
are found to be similar. Put simply, in an effort to define and 
legitimise a concept within one legal system, reference imiay be made 
to the characterisation and articulation of the concept within another 
legal system. Consequently, in Chapter Three, claims of special 
economic dependency within different legal systems were considered in 
order to ascertain whether or not they shared a factual resemblance.
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On the basis of both the 1958 Resolution on Special Situations 
Relating to Coastal Fisheries and the International Court's judgment 
in 1974, special- economic dependency emerges as of secondary importance. 
Primary importance is attached to regulation of fish stocks. Special 
economic dependency in itself does not constitute sufficient justifi­
cation for preferential rights. The fish stocks in the relevant 
waters are required to be conserved and then and only then may special, 
economic dependency be invoked to substantiate a claim for preferential 
rights.
The study of special economic dependency claims demonstrated that 
the following may be of potential relevance in gauging an area's 
dependency on fisheries: the number employed in the fishing industry
and ancillary industries; the proportion of the total labour force 
which this represents; the role of the fishing industry in the 
economy « i.e. its relationship with other industrial activity and the 
effect that performance within the fishing industry has on the health 
of other industries; the availability of alternative employment; 
the overall employment picture of the claimant area; the size of 
fishing vessels; the maximum length of a fishing trip; the attitude 
of the national government to the fishing industry of the area; and 
the political weight of fishing interests in national policies. No 
precise formula can be laid down, but the case studies undertaken at 
least highlight some rule of thumb principles which may be applied as 
and when claims are advanced.
Of course, special economic dependency must not only be established, 
but accepted and such acceptance is often difficult to obtain, as was 
illustrated in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case. In that case, both 
the United Kingdom and Germany challenged Iceland's claim that she was
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overwhelmingly dependent on fisheries, Iceland, it was argued, was 
not "a nation of impoverished fishermen clinging precariously to 
life" and although "largely dependent on fish" she was "not entirely 
so by any means.
Preferential rights no less than special economic dependency 
require to be accepted by all parties involved in the relevant fisheries. 
The International Court of Justice characterised preferential rights 
in the way that the 1958 Resolution on Special Situations of Coastal 
Fisheries had already implied, that they should be understood, vis; 
contingency measures to be applied when the rational and economic 
exploitation of fish stocks was urgently required. On the Court's 
judgment, preferential rights are not to be regarded as static but 
are to vary according to the extent that the special economic depen­
dency of the area varies. Obviously, therefore, there must-be 
reassessment of special economic dependency. However, how frequently 
assessment should be made, the Court did not say.
The principal problem with preferential rights, as highlighted 
in Chapter Four, is their actual form. Preferential rights imply a 
certain priority, but not the extinction of the concurrent rights of 
others. Preferential rights are essentially about controlling fishing 
activity and control may be administered in a variety of ways, e.g. via 
TACs, closed seasons and selective gear. Although these may be modi­
fied to reflect special economic dependency, the most favoured method 
to date of expressing preferential rights has been that of a restricted, 
licensing system with the receipt of a licence being determined by 
vessel size. However, as demonstrated in Chapter Four, the intro­
duction of a licensing system which reflects special dependency presents
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several preliminary problems, such as how licences should be allocated 
and. whether they should be transferable or not.
In the final analysis, the purpose of granting rights must be 
examined. If it is merely to replenish fish stocks then preferential 
rights of access will allow economically dependent regions to enjoy 
preferential rights for a limited time only. If, however, the aim 
is to alleviate • the dependency of communities on fisheries, or to 
facilitate and improve their competitiveness in international fisheries, 
then a broad definition must be given to preferential rights. Pre­
ferential rights, it is submitted, should not be confined to prefer­
ential rights of access, but should allow specially dependent areas 
preferential consideration in any structural management programme.
This conclusion is borne out by the experience of the EEO which demon­
strates that the problems of specially dependent regions should not be 
tackled in a piece-meal ad hoc fashion, but via a comprehensive regional 
policy. Preferential rights of access should, in other words, only 
be one aspect of a fisheries management scheme and should accordingly 
be accompanied by preferential social measures of the type proposed by 
the EEC for specially dependent regions.
The overall conclusion from this study is that special economic 
dependency and preferential rights have not been granted legal status 
either by international law or European Community law. They have, 
nevertheless, been recognised as important considerations in international 
and Community negotiations and, although neither system has defined 
either concept in concrete terms, it is apparent that the successful 
sustainment of special economic dependency and preferential rights will 
depend on the existence of certain circumstances and the adherence to 
certain principles.
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APPENDIX I
Current Limits of Territorial Seas, Fishing Zones 
and Exclusive Economic Zones
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STATE TERRITORIAL 
SEA (miles)
PISHING ZONE 
(miles)
ECONOMIC ZONE 
(miles)
Albania 15 0 - 9 7 6 )
Algeria 12 (1963)
Angola 20 (1976) 200 (1976)
Argentina 200 (1967)
Australia 3 (1878) 200 (1979)
Bahamas (The) 3 (1878) 200 (1977)
Bahrain 3
Bangladesh 12 (1974) 200 (1974)
Barbados 12 (1977) 200 (1978)
Belgium 3 Up to median line
(1978)
Belize 3 (1878) 12 (1978)
Benin 200 (1976)
Brazil 200 (1970)
Bulgaria 12 (1951)
Burma 12 (1968) 200 (1977)
Cameroon 50 (1974)
Canada 12 (1970) 200 (1977)
Cape Verde 12 (1978) 200 (197s)
Chile 3 200 (1947-5 2)
China 12 (1958) 12 (1970)
Colombia 200 (1978)
Comoro Islands 12 (1976) 200 (1976)
Congo (People's 
Republic) 200 0 9 7 7 )
Costa Rica 12 (1972) 200 (1975)
Cuba 12 (1977) 200 (1977)
Cyprus 12 (1964)
Denmark 3 (1966) 200 (1977)
Djibouti (Rep.of) 12 (1971) 200 (1979)
Dominica 3
Dominican Rep,■ 6 (1967) 200 (1977)
Ecuador 200 (1966)
Egypt, Arab Rep. 12 (1958)
El Salvador 200 (1950)
Equatorial Guinea 12 (1970)
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STATE TERRITORIAL 
SEA (miles)
FISHING ZONÎü 
(miles)
EGONOMIG ZONE 
(miles)
Ethiopia 12 (1953)
Fiji 12 (1976) 200 (1981)
Finland 4 (1956) 12 (1975)
France 12 (1971) 200 (1977)
Except Mediterr­
Gabon 100 (1972) anean
Gambia (The) 12 (1969) 200 (1978)
German Dem, Rep, 3 Up to median line
(1978)
Germany, Fed, Rep, In accordance 200 (1977)
with international 
law
Ghana 200 (1977)
Greece 6 (1936)
Grenada 12 (1978) 200 (1978)
Guatemala 12 (193'+) 200 (1976)
Guinea 200 (1965) 200 (1980)
Guinea-Bissau 12 (1978) 200 (1978)
Guyana 12 (1977) 200 (I977)
Haiti 12 (1972) 200 (1977)
Honduras 12 (1965) 200 (1951)
Iceland 12 (1979) 200 (1979)
India 12 (1967) 200 (1977)
Indonesia 12 (1957) 200 (1980)
Iran
straight baselines sur 
rounding archipelago
12 (1959)
Iraq 12 (1958)
Ireland 3 (1959)
Israel 6 (1956)
Italy 12 (1974)
Ivory Coast 12 (1977)
Jamaica 12 (1971)
Japan 12 (1977)
Jordan 3 (1943)
Outer limits of the super­
jacent waters of the con­
tinental shelf median line 
in Sea of Oraan (1973)
200 (1977)
200 (1977) 
200 (1977) provisional
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STATE TERRITORIAL 
SEA (miles)
PISHING ZONE 
(miles)
ECONOMIC ZONE 
(miles)
Kampuchea
Kenya
Kiribati
Korea, Dem.People's 
Rep.
Korea, Rep.of
Kuwait
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Malaysia
Maldives Islands
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Monaco
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Nauru
Netherlands
12 (1969)
12 (1969)
3 (1878)
12
12 (1978)
12 (1967)
200 (1976)
12 (1959)
50 (1973)
12 (1969)
Territorial limits 
defined by geographical 
coordinates (approx. 
3-55 miles)
200 (1979)
20-200 (1952-54) 
6 (1921)
New Zealand
6 (1971) 
70 (1978) 
12 (1970) 
12 (1969) 
12
12 (1973) 
12 (1976) 
3
12 (1971)
3 (1889) 
(12)
12 (1977)
24 (1978)
70 (1973)
12 (1964)
200 (1977)
«> Dependent Territories:
Tokelau 12 (1978)
- Associated States:
Cook Islands 12 (1978)
Niue 12 (1978)
Nicaragua 3
Nigeria 12 (19&7)
Norway 4 (I812)
Oman 12 (1977)
^legislation enacted but pending entry into force.
200 (1979) 
200 (1979) 
200 (1979)
200 (1977)
200 (1980)
Areas defined 
geographical 
coordinates
(1976)
200 (1978) 
200 (1977) 
200 (1976)
200 (1981) 
200 (1976)
200 (1978)
200 (1978)
200 (1978)
200 (1978) 
200 (1978) 
200 (1980) 
200 (1978) 
200 (1977) 
200 (1981)
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STATE TERRITORIAL 
SEA (miles)
FISHING ZONE 
(miles)
ECONOMIC ZONE 
(miles)
Pakistan 12 (1966) 200 (1976)
Panama 200 (1967)
Papua New Guinea 12 (1978) -f 200 miles offshore water zone (1978)
Peru Sovereignty and jurisdiction over the sea, its soil 
and subsoil up to 200 miles (1947)
Philippines In accordance with treaties 
of 1898, 1900 & 3,930. Straight 
baselines surrounding archi­
pelago (1961)
200 (1979)
Poland 12 (1977) Up to median line 
(1978)
Portugal 12 (1977) 200 (1977)
Qatar 3 Outer limits of the 
superjacent waters 
of continental shelf 
(1974)
Romania 12 (1951)
St. Lucia 3 (1878)
St. Vincent 3 (1878)
Sao Tome 12 (1978) 200 (1978)
Saudi Arabia 12 (1958) Outer limits of the 
superjacent waters 
of continental shelf 
(1974)
Senegal 150 (1976) 200 (1976)
Seychelles 12 (1977) 200 (1977)
Sierra Leone 200 (1971)
Singapore 3 (1878)
Solomon Islands 12 (1978) 200 (1978) ^200
Somali Dem. Rep, 200 (1972)
South Africa 12 (1977) 200 (1977)
Spain 12 (1977) 200 (1978)
(Except Mediterranean)
Sri Lanka 12 (1971) 200 (1977)
Sudan, The 12 (i960)
Suriname 12 (1973) 200 (1978)
Sweden 4 (1779) 200 (1978)
Syrian Arab Rep. 35 (I98I)
Hlegislation enacted but pending entry into force.
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STATE
H WiMII # #1» liauwui,
TERRITORIAL 
SEA (miles)
FISHING ZONE 
(miles)
ECONOMIC ZONE 
(miles)
Tanzania 50 (1973)
Thailand 12 (1966)
Togo 30 (1977) 200 (1977)
Tonga Territorial limits defined 
by geographical coordinates
I730-I77W & 150-23030*8
-IB
^200
T3?inidad & 
Tobago 12 (1969)
Tunesia 12 (1973)
Tui'lcey 6 (1964) 12 (1964)
Tuvalu 3 (1878) 200 (1978)
USSR 12 (1909) 200 (1976) provisional
United Arab 
Emirates
3 .
(12 in the case 
of Sharga)
Limits to be 
by agreement 
which by the i
United Kingdom 3 (1878) 200 (1977) line
UK Dependent Territories having already extended jurisdictions
“ Bermuda 3 (1878) 200 (1977)
- British Virgin 
Islands 3 (1878) 200 (1977)
« Cayman Islands 3 (1878) 200 (1977)
- Pitcairn Islands 3 (1878) 200 (1980)
“ Turks & Caicos 3 (1878) 200 (1973)
“ Others 3 (1878)
United States of 
America 3 (1793) 200 (1977)
US Trust Territories;
- Federated States 
of Micronesia 3 200 (1979)
- Marshall Islands 3 200 (1979)
- Northern Marianas 3 200 (1977)
- Palau 3 200 (1979)
Uruguay 200 (1969)
Vanuatu 12 (1981) 200 (1978)
Venezuela 12 (1956) 200 (1978)
Vietnam 12 (1977) 200 (1977)
Western Samoa 12 (1977) 200 (1981)
^legislation enacted but pending entry into force.
(source: UN FAO)
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STATE TERRITORIAL FISHING ZONE ECONOMIC ZONE
SEA (miles) (miles) (miles)
Yemen Arab Rep, 12 (I967)
Bsp!’’'’’'" 12 (1970) 200 (1978)
Yugoslavia 12 (1979)
Zaire 12 (1974)
APPENDIX II 
Lfe-Cycle of Main Species of Fish
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Calculations Showing Effects of Hague Preferences 
in the Allocation of Quotas
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N o  c  141/10 O fficia l Journal o f the European Communities Ig . 6. 7S
Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing Com munity fishing plans for directed 
herring fishing in certain zones
(Submitted by the Commission to the Coundi on S June 197S)
TH E  COUNCIL OF TH E  EUROPEAN C O M M UN IT IES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Communicy, and in particular 
Article 43 thereof.
Having regard to die piopusal fruin the Conimiasion,
Having regard to the opinion of the European 
Parliament,
Whereas in its resolution on certain aspects of the 
internal fisheries regime adopted on 3 November 
1976 the Council, having regard to the economic 
implications of fishing in Ireland, declared its 
intention of applying the provisions of the common 
fisheries policy in such way as to ensure the steady 
and gradual development of the Irish fishing industry 
on the basis of the Irish Government's ^ programme 
for the development of inshore fisheries;
Whereas a Community regime for the conservation 
and management of fisher)' resources has not yet 
been established;
Whereas the activity of other categories of vessels 
must be harmoniously introduced into the global 
fishing activity of all the vessels operating in 
area, and in particular undue concentration of 
long-range vessels in areas closest to the coast should 
be prevented;
Whereas vessels of under 12 metres between 
perpendiculars can be exempted from the fishing 
plans, provided that their total catching capacity is 
taken fully into account;
Whereas provisions must be laid down for adequate 
supervision of the terms and conditions of the fishing 
plans;
Whereas a procedure should be established to 
facilitate the implementation of this Regulation and 
to enable rapid adjustments of fishing pians to be 
made as experience suggests and having regard to 
changes in the state of the herring stock; whereas to 
this end the procedure laid down in Article 32 of 
Council Regulation (EEC) Mo 100-75 of 19 January 
1976 on the common organization of the market in 
fishery products (') should be used.
Whereas it is important that measures be taken in the 
immediate future to protect the endangered herring 
stock in division V II bj, c) (Donegal Bay excepted), 
as defined by the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES), whose exploitation is 
of special importance to the coastal population, 
without prejudice to the adoption of similar measures 
for other species and for other maritime regions;
Whereas these objectives may be achieved by the 
introduction of Community fishing plans;
Whereas, in order to organize fishing activity in ICES 
division V II b), c), this fishing plan must define the 
total fishing effort compatible with the available 
quota and the areas where this effort may be 
deployed;
Whereas the fishing plans must ensure thuit the 
quotas can be fished effectively by the interested 
fleets;
Whereas fishing plans must take into account the fact 
that vessels which, because of their limated range of 
operation, can only exercise their activities close to 
the coast should have priority in the coastal areas;
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article I
1. Directed fishing for herring in division V II b), c) 
(Donegal Bay excepted) as defined by the 
International Council for the Exploration of th .^ Sea 
is hereby prohibited unless conducted in accordance 
with the rules and regulations governing fishing in 
this division as approved by the Commission, and 
under the terms and condit’.otts of the fishing pians 
laid down in Annexes I and II hereto to which 
Articles 2 to 7 shall apply.
2. Vessels of under 12 metres between 
perpendiculars are exempted from the fishing plans. 
For the purpose of this .Article, 12 metres berween 
perpendiculars shall be deemed to be equal to 42 feet 
registered length or 13-75 metres overall length.
Article 2
The use of purse seines for herring fishing in ICES 
division V II b), c) (Donegal Bay excepted) is herebv 
prohibited.
(») OJ No L 20, 23. I .  1976, p. 1.
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I Article 3
The Commission shall issue u document to the 
vessels listed in Annexes I and II, certifying that they 
'arc authorized to carry out directed fishing for 
herring in division V II b), c) (Donegal Bay excepted).
This document, which shall be kept on board the 
vessels in question, shall specify the terms and 
conditions under which the vessels in question are 
authorized to carry out this activity.
made in ICUS division V II b), c) (Donegal Day 
excepted) and landed on their territory and also of 
the number of days of directed fishing for herring in 
the said ICES division by vessels listed in Annexes 1 
and 11 hereto.
The detailed rules of application of this Article and 
the rules on reporting by the vessels in question may 
be adopted in accordance with the procedure laii.1 
down in Article 32 of Regulation (EEC) N o  100/76.
The Commission may withdraw this document in 
case of failure to observe the provisions of this 
Regulation.
Article 4
At the request of the Member State concerned or at 
the initiative of the Commission, the fishing plans 
laid down in Annexes I and I I  may be adjusted as 
experience suggests and having regard to changes in 
the state of the herring stock, in accordance with the 
procedure laid down in Article 32 of Regulation 
(EEC) No 100/76,
Article S
Article 6
The Member States shall take all necessary steps to 
ensure compliance with the provisions of tliis 
Regulation.
Article 7
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 July 1973. 
It shall apply until 31 December 1978.
The Member States concerned ' shall inform the 
Commission each month of the volume of catches
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States.
ANN£.X I
Herring fishing plan for Ireland
1. Vessels authorized to fish directly for herring in ICES division VH b), c) (Donegal Bay 
excepted):
Name —  Registered length in feet 
(see attached list of 80 vessels).
CRT bhp
2. No vessels exceeding 24 metres (') between perpendiculars shall fish directly for herring in 
ICES division Vll bl, c) iDonegal Bay excepted) ease of a tine determined by the following 
geographical coordinates:
540 30' N  — 10° 30’ W •
540 15’ N  —  10° 50' W
53° 30* N  —  10° 50’ W
53° 00’ N  —  10° 30’ W
n  24 o e t t t i  between pc.nxndlculan ih i ! l  be deemed to  be c q u jl to 44 feet reçisltred length o f I7 - Ï  metres 
OTcrall length.
2^ ■l
3. Maximum number of vessels over 24 metres (') between perpendiculars authorized to be
present at any one time in ICES division VU b), e) (Donegal Bay excepted) {‘): four vessels.
4. Without prejudice to the requirement not to exceed a total annual quota for 1973 of 10 000 
tonnes the authorized catch for vessels listed under 1 shall be:
500 tonnes for titc period 1 July to 31 August.
5 000 tonnes for the period 1 September to 31 December.
5. Authorized total fishing days for vessels listed under 1:
150 days —  from 1 July to 31 August.
I  750 days — from 1 September to 31 December_
6. Maximum days of directed fishing for herring for each vessel listed under 1 on any 
voyage: five days.
7. Maximum authorized catch per vessel on any voyage: 25 tonnes.
Nome Reginercd length in feet CRT bhp
Oilcan Glas 56 49 365
Jcmaleon 59 52 240
Family Crest 66 68 365
Girl Triera 5 3 ' 65 360
Autumn Glory ' ' 62 75 375
Darncttc €2 ' 70 375
St. Oliver 65 71 400
Summer Star 61 64 . ' 365
Onedin « 68 365
\tallrin 70 79 ■ 400
Mother’s Wish 63 67 240
Shiovana 63 68 415
Margarctte Marie 54 42 290
Golden Eagle 54 42 290
Fisher Lass 48 25 95
Janette 53 38 114
Realt na Mara 50 20 114
Naomh Siobhan 47 26 95
Honey Bee 67 64 152
Sc. Catherine 54 36 114
Elsie Mabel 45 20 66
Inis .^rcain 47 26 88
Sancta Maria 43 27 114
{*) 24 metro betwcin pcrpendiculin ihall be deemed to be equal to 14 feet regiirered length or 27-J merrta 
overall leajth.
Name R e g is te re d  le n g th  in  tce t CRT b h p
Ros Bcithc 49 25 114
Banrion na Mara 48 27 95
Salve Regina 84 169 950
Albacorc 80 196 800
Caimarosc 79 133 850
Miss Conagh 76 111 600
John Karen 80 148 850
Venture «0 148 850
Sliava Bloom 76 111 600
Olgarry 81 156 850
Tcrinon .75 112 600
Shalom 75 112 565
Locb-an luire 76 112 565
Rosses Morn 75 103 600
Shcanne 74 79 . 425
Father Murphy 76 100 375
Azure Sea 74 102 500
Orion 72 105 550
Deirdre Maria 71 115 360 .
Carandon 71 93 430
Mulroy Bay II 70 S3 550
Caroline Anne 71 107 390
Janirch._ 72 91 425
Loretro 66 ■ 82 425
Maria Angélique 71 105 .. • 375
Marie Avril 71 79 475
San Paulin 70 79 425
Gerona 67 31 425
Basalt 72 69 400
San Pablo 62 60 365
Lorandon 63 67 290
Scpdcmar _ 62 67 365
Sea Bridger 61 63 365
Nordkap 63 58 230
Rose d’Ivoire - fio 60
Siobhan 58 . 44 .212
Grainula 81 100 600
Falken 65 62 500
Crimson Dawn 74 109 ‘ 575
Golden Dawn 82 156 850
Marirra 50 25 153
0) Eitïiajtcd tcngui; vcmu! not yet rcgiicered.
ANNEX II
Herring fishing plan for the Netherlands
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Name Registered length in feet CRT (bhp)
Fort Aengus 77 112 600
Cartig Einrc 63 74 448
Duthics 71 68 152
Atkir Castle 67 87 500
Joan Patricia ■ 63 68 240
Allegna 47 ■ 28 215
Ard Eireann ^ 54 38 114
Bountiful , -5» 48 280
Castle Queen 63 70 365
PaccIU 84 169 950
Regina P.icis 67 81 425
Bfcndettc 71 76 435
Ellis Anne 72 99 ' 4 5 0
Kcnure 68 81 430 ■
Shennick 79 143 800
Pam Brid 79 {>) 140 800 .
1. Vessels authorized to fish directly for herring m ICES division Vll b), c) (Donegal Bay 
excepted):
Registration number — Name —■ Overall length — CRT ■ 
(see attached list of 44 vessels).
bhp
2. No vessels exceeding 24 metres (') betwen perpendiculars shall fish directly for herring in 
ICES division VU b), c) (Donegal Bay excepted) east of a line detctmuied by the foilowing 
geographical coordinates:
54° 30' N 
54° 15’ N 
53° 30' N
10° 30' W 
10'- 50’ W 
10° 50' W
53° 00’ N —  10°  30’ W
3. Maximum number of vessels over 24 metres (’) between perpendiculars authorized to be 
present at any time in ICES division Vll b). c) (Donegal Bay excepted); 15 vessels.
f )  14 m ctru between pcrpendicutan rh jil be deemed to be equal ,n H  feet regiwcxd lengih or î ’ - î  metro  
Overall length.
2¥4-
4. Without prejudice to the requirement not to exceed a total annual quota of 4 000 tonnes the 
authorized catch for vessels listed under 1 is fixed at;
4 000 tonnes for the period 1 July to 15 October
nil for the period 16 October to 31 December.
5. Authorized total fishing days for vessels listed under 1;
1 000 days —  from 1 July to 15 October, , ■ _
nil '— from 16 October to 31 December.
6. Maximum days of directed fishing for herring for each vessel listed under 1 on any voyage: 
five days.
7. Maximum authorized catch per vessel on any voyage: 25 tonnes.
R c g is tr a t io a  ' 
Dumber N a m e O v e ra ll  le n g th C R T b h p
KW 15 Rijnmond 1 46 348 1200
KW 39 Johanna 59 541 2300
KW 41 Elisabeth Christina • 46 345 1200
KW 42 Rijnmond V 35 262 1150
KW 43 . Rijnmond 11 46 348 1200
KW 44 Rijnmond III 36 241 . 950
KW 49 Schout Velthuys 54 447 2300
KW 74 Tetman Hette 46 344 1200
KW 81 Hcndrika Johanna 50 • 382 ■ 1600
KW 85 Rijnmond IV 36 241 950
KW 122 Aric Ouwchand 59 538 2 300
KW 123 Holland 46 336 1200
KW 135 Rijnmond VI 35 265 1146
KW 141 Wüly 48 350 1200
KW 170 •Armie Hellina 49 375 1200
KW 171 Jan Maria ' 54 475 2 300
KW 172 Dirk Dicderik 59 475 2 300
SCH 6 Alida 50 362 1320
SCH 21 De Hooker 56 466 2 000
SCH 22 .. _ De Buis 56 477 2 000
SCH 23 Jacob van der Zwan 54 450 2 000
SCH 33 Maria 50 391 1180
SCH 54 Franz isca 54 474 2 000
SCH 62 Nellie 40 263 1320
SCH 81 Frank Vrolijk Czn. 54 466 2 000
SCH 90 Ondemcming ! 56 475 2 000
P) &7< irc n  Qc h e rrin g  rakcn in  the  c o u r x  a t m h in g  fo r o th e r ip c d â  la  tC£S C iv il ia n  V I!  b ), c) (D onegal 
ccccpccd) i b j l l  be 4leduc:cd fro m  u U i qu a n u ry .
245
Regiii ration 
number Overall length CRT bhp
SCH 106 Noocdzee 50 362 1180
SCH 108 Ondemcming 11 56 527 2 700
SCH 118 Prins Claus dcr Ncdcrlan- 
dcn
54 450 2 000
SCH 120 Poseidon 54 450 2 000
SCH 171 Comclis Vrolijk 50 • 352 1380
SCH 302 Willem van dcr Zwan 54 478 2 000
VL- 1 IJrcinilS 43 324 ■ 1000
VL 34 Anita 43 326 1 000
VL 73 Elly 43 326 1000
VL 89 ■ Monica 56 477 2 000
VL 90 Caroline 43 324 1000
VL 105 Elizabeth 43 326 1000
VL 115 Vooraan , 46 345 1200
VL 142 Voorwaarts ' 52 405 2100
I jM  36 " Egmond 54 450 2 000
IJM 57 Zcehaan 49 385 1320
I jM  207 Wiron V II 33 151 630
IJM ,209 Mcycrt Mcnno 33 168 800
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